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How do rights relate to moral complaints? What is the relationship between
ourmoralentitlements—theobligationsthatareowedtous—andthemoralcom-
plaintsthatwecanmake—ourclaimstohavebeenwronged?
It is a familiar and natural thought, especially in recent work on the relational




not map straightforwardly onto our ex post moral relations—like having a com-
plaintandbeingwronged. Rightsandcomplaintsarebothqualitativelyandexten-
sionallydistinct.
To defend this claim, I develop six arguments. First, I argue that third parties






mental activity may not be the subject of rights. Finally, I draw attention to the
diﬀerence between granting permission and granting forgiveness, which suggests
iiiChristineM.Korsgaard NicolasBrowneCornell
thatwaivingarightandwaivingacomplaintareimportantlydistinct.






















phy Department as an 18-year-old college freshman. Emerson Hall has been my
academichomeinsomecapacityeversince. Ioweitmyphilosophicalidentity.
This project began in Niko Kolodny’s seminar during my first year of graduate
school, which first introduced me to the puzzles of wronging and directed duties.
I cameaway fromthatsemester with the kernel of anidea, andI have beentrying
tocultivateiteversince.
Chris Korsgaard helped me turn this kernel into a real project. Her patience,
encouragement,andinsightmadegraduateschoolatimeofdiscoverythatIdon’t









at every turn. Many discussions with Doug Lavin have allowed me to appreciate
theviewthatIamchallenging. Muchofthisdissertationiswritteninthespiritof
answering his questions. I have received important and helpful comments from
JohnGoldberg,whoenteredtheprojectlateandwasthereforeabletohelpmesee
it as a whole. And, throughout the project, I have received informal comments
and assistance from many others, including Ryan Doerfler, Charles Fried, Micha
Glaeser,JeﬀJohnson,PaulSchofield,SeanaShiﬀrin,JiewuhSong,andeveryonein
theMoralandPoliticalWorkshop.
Finally, this dissertation exists because of my family. My father is in the com-








I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe
you,isatanyratethegreatestwhichNiccoloMachiavellihas
it in his power to oﬀer. For in it I have expressed whatever
Ihavelearned,orhaveobservedformyselfduringalongex-
perience and constant study of human aﬀairs. And since
neitheryounoranyothercanexpectmoreatmyhands,you





That is, it concerns the way in which our moral entitlements—the obligations of
othersthatareowedtous—relatetothemoralcomplaintsthatwecanmake—our
claimstohavebeendoneaninjustice,ortohavebeenwronged. Itiscommonplace
for us to slide back and forth seamlessly between these diﬀerent ideas. Levin, for
1example,infersnaturallyfromthefactthathehadnorighttoKitty’saﬀectiontothe
conclusion that he can have no complaint when she rejects his suit (2004, p.84).
Tolstoy’sreader,however,maynotbesoconvinced. Asthissuggests,weoccasion-
ally catch a glimpse of the concepts coming apart. For example, in a prefatory re-
markthatthisauthorwouldgladlyjoin,Machiavellinotesthat,althoughhiswork
may not fulfill his duty to his reader, there can be no complaint against his eﬀorts
(2008,p.9).
My aim is to defend the view that rights and complaints are both qualitatively
and extensionally distinct from one another. Qualitatively, I mean to show that
rights and complaints serve diﬀerent functions in our moral practice. Extension-
ally, I mean to show that the occasions when we can assert a complaint and the
occasions when we have been deprived of an entitlement do not always coincide.
In short, I will argue that rights and complaints are not simply flip sides of the
samecoin. Ifthesemoralrelationsareseparable,itissignificantbothpractically—
because we often infer from one to the other—and theoretically—because their
supposed connection is often thought to tell us about the sources of our moral
obligations.




not treat you as a convenient source of organs. Moreover, you have some control
over the constraints on my action: you can permit my attempts at deception (as












merely be the case that I acted wrongly, but also that I wronged you. Here again
moralityinvolvesaparticularsortofrelationshipbetweenoneagentandanother.
It is tempting to see all these relationships as unified. Having a right is often
taken to provide the unifying concept. Rights, it is thought, place constraints on
what we can do to each other. And what it is to have a right is, in part, that one
will be wronged if certain actions are not performed or if certain interests are not








As I have said, it is often natural to transition between statements about rights
andstatementsaboutwrongs.¹ Inmanycircumstances,thistransitioniswarranted.
But people often claim something stronger—that there is a necessary association




but we can put the same point more colloquially. We can say, for example,
that in killing Sylvia you wrong her: You would do wrong precisely ‘to’ her,
ordowrong‘by’her.”(2004,p.34)
• Justice Benjamin Cardozo: “What the plaintiﬀ must show is ‘a wrong’ to
herself, i.e., a violation of her own right…the commission of a wrong im-
¹Asaterminologicalpoint,Iusetheword“wrong”initsnounform—e.g.,“hecommitteda
wrong”—to mean an instance of wronging. In this way, the use as a noun is associated with the
use as a transitive verb—e.g. “he wronged her.” Thus, wrongs, in my usage, are directed against
someone. This use should be contrasted with uses associated with the adjective “wrong”—the
substantival use or use to imply simply an instance of doing something that is wrong—which
would not necessarily imply injustice directed against someone. In other words, I distinguish
“he did a wrong” from “he did wrong.” Not all writers agree with my choice. David Owens, for
example, specifically distinguishes between “wrongs” and “wrongings.” He oﬀers the following
example: “If I concrete over the Grand Canyon, I have committed a wrong by disregarding its
aesthetic value even if I have wronged nobody” (2012, p.45). Although Owens says that the
assimilation of “wrongs” and “wrongings” is “a substantive normative claim,” I think that we are
in basic agreement despite our linguistic disagreement. I agree with Owens’s substantive claim
thattherecanbewrongfulactsthatdonotinvolvewronginganyone. Isimplyresistcallingsuch
acts “wrongs” because, to my ear, “he committed a wrong” implies that there is someone who
has been wronged. Owens’s terminological choice means that, for him, “he did a wrong” and
“hedidwrong”meanthesamething,whereasIthinkthatwewouldordinarilytakethemtohave
diﬀerentmeanings. Outofanoverabundanceofcaution,Ishalltrytousethegerund“wronging”
wherethere might be anypossible confusion. But the readershould understand that I generally
usethenouns“wrong”and“wronging”interchangeably.





• E. J. Bond: “Itcan nowbe statedbluntly that it can only be true that I have
amoralobligationtowardyou…ifyouhaveamoralrighttodemandsome-
thingofme.…(Thisisbuiltintoourveryunderstandingofmorallanguage,
which meansthatit istrue a priori.) IfIdo haveamoralobligation toward
you…which means that you have a moral right to demand it of me, and I
fail to honor that obligation…then you have been wronged, you have a jus-
tifiedcomplaintagainstme,acomplaintjustifiedonmoralgrounds,andyou
maybemorallyentitledtoseekredressorreparation,perhapstopunishme
or to demand that I be punished (pay a penalty), perhaps to demand that
I make amends, or both.…The preceding…showed…the interconnected-
nessofcertainideasthatexistinthecommonunderstanding.…[I]fthereis











• G. E. M. Anscombe: “Justice as a personal virtue is that character in a man
which means that he has a settled determination not to infringe anyone’s
rights. A wrong is an infringement of a right. What is wrong about an act
thatiswrongmaybejustthis,thatitisawrong.”(1990,p.152.)
Thisdissertationaddressesthissupposedunity. Thesubjectofthisdissertation
² Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,248N.Y.339(1928).
5ishowtherelationalobligationsthatweowetoothersrelatetothewaysthatothers
can hold us accountable for our actions. Put another way, how do ex ante moral
constraintsrelatetoexpostmoralcomplaints? Oryetanotherway,howdorights
and duties relate to wrongs and injuries? As has already been suggested, I believe
thattheanswerisnotoneofsimpleunity. Mythesisisthatourexantenormative
relations—likerightsanddirectedduties—donotmapstraightforwardlyontoour
ex post moral relations—like having a complaint or being wronged. Rights and
complaintsareseparablemoralphenomena.
The separability of these relations holds significance both for first-order, prac-








commotion from the explosion knocked over a scale, which landed on Mrs. Pals-
graf, injuring her. In a famous opinion dismissing Mrs. Palsgraf’s lawsuit against
the railroad company, Cardozo explained that, although the railroad breached a
duty to the owner of the package, the railroad did not breach any duty owed to








Even if it did not have this wide-reaching practical significance, distinguishing
between rights and complaints would be important for questions about the na-
ture and source of our moral obligations. Some philosophers have been drawn to
the idea that our capacity to level complaints against one another—to hold each
other accountable—is essential to the moral obligations that we owe to one an-
other. To highlight one recent example, Stephen Darwall has influentially argued
that morality involves “second-personal reasons,” which are the reasons involved
inourauthoritytomakeclaimsononeanother. Darwallexplainsthisspecialkind
ofauthority,inpart,intermsofthegroundsonwhichotherscanmakecomplaints
and hold us accountable. He writes, “if [someone stepping on your foot] accepts
thatyoucandemandthathemovehisfoot,hemustalsoacceptthatyouwillhave
grounds for complaint or some other form of accountability-seeking response if
he doesn’t…A second-personal reason is one whose validity depends on presup-
posed…accountability relations between persons” (2009, p.4). The idea is that
ourabilitytomakeclaimsononeanotherpresupposesourabilitytoaddresseach





ing ways in which rights and complaints have diﬀerent qualities and function in-
dependentlyofoneanother,Imeantoshowthatneitherpresupposesordepends
ontheother.
This is not to deny that there is a distinctly second-personal relationship be-
tweenmoralagents. Itistosaythatthereismorethanone. Exante,wevieweach







some stake in an action and the actor being unable to oﬀer justification. Neither
oftheseideascanbeexplicatedintermsofrights. Rights,Iwillargue,derivefrom
the special respect owed to a rightholder. Rights cannot simply be the entitle-
ment to make a certain sort of moral complaint because they are action-guiding













In describing the distinctly “second-personal” aspect of morality, Darwall de-
scribes what he calls “a circle of irreducibly second-personal concepts.” I mean
to suggest that there are two such sets of interrelated concepts. It is perhaps in-
structivebywayofintroductiontolistsomeoftheconceptsandrelationshipsthat
Itaketofallintothesesets.
Before explaining the distinction between these diﬀerent sets of ideas, the dis-




mental idea of a right. According to this understanding, rights are bound up with
the very idea of the duties that agents owe to one another. Hohfeld’s insight, in
otherwords,isthatrightsanddutiesarecorrelated.
Whatever agreement there is on this skeletal structure of rights and their place
inmoraldiscourse,ithasnottranslatedintoagreementontheirsourceorjustifica-
tion. Therearetwoquitedivergentconceptionsofthejustificationforrights. Ac-
9cording to one view—commonly called the interest theory—rights serve to pro-
tect the interests of the rightholder. The interests or reasons in favor of placing a
duty on one party are what generate the rights of the other party. To have a right,
then,istobeonewhoseinterestsaresuﬃcientlystrong,oroftheappropriatechar-
acter, to justify imposing duties on others. Speaking roughly, one might say that
theinteresttheorytakestheideaofaprohibitionasprimary,andinferstherelated





right. As H.L.A. Hart put it, a rightholder is ”a small-scale sovereign.” To say that
X has a right that Y do φ is to say that X is the one who is entitled to determine
what Y does with regard to φ. By focusing on the idea of normative control, the
will theory attempts to capture the sense in which the duties that correlate with
rightsaredirectional—thatis,owedtoanotheragent. Againspeakingroughly,one
might say that the will theory starts with the idea of claim-rights over others, and
prohibitionsderivetherefrom. Thisfocusofthewilltheoryhasmadeitattractive












account of rights. An individual is entitled to complain against another (thus, is
wrongedbyanother)ifandonlyifthatindividualhasastakeintheotherperson’s
action and the other person cannot oﬀer a justification to the individual. This
conception parallels the basic interest-theory elements of harm and justification.




Chapters 4 through 10 develop various arguments for distinguishing between
rights and complaints. As I have said, my claim is that rights and complaints are
bothqualitativelyandextensionallydistinctfromoneanother. Accordingly,some
chapters focus on the claim that rights and complaints can exist without one an-
other. Otherchaptersfocusontheideathatrightsandcomplaintsarequalitatively
or functionally diﬀerent such that we should see them as diﬀerent relations even
wheretheydoappearinconjunctionwithoneanother. Thesevariousarguments—
although independent in the sense that the reader might accept one without ac-
11cepting another—should be considered mutually reinforcing. The apparent mis-
match between rights and wrongs is more palatable if the concepts can be given
content independent of one another, and the qualitative diﬀerences between the
conceptslendcredencetotheapparentmismatchseeninparticularexamples.
Some of chapters highlight features of wronging that do not seem to be par-
asitic on the idea of having a right. Chapter 4 is devoted to examining cases in





the value of the right implicated. Chapter 6 illustrates this qualitative diﬀerence
betweenwrongsandrightsbylookingatthemismatchbetweentheexantevalue
ofarightandtheremedyavailablewhenacorrespondingwrongiscommitted. Fi-
nally, wrongings seem to involve the standing or capacity to complain, which is
notimpliedbyhavingaright. Partieswhocannotcomplain—rangingfromthose
who have surrendered their standing by virtue of their own malfeasance to non-
humananimalswhosimplylackthecapacity—mayneverthelesshaverights. This
disparityisthesubjectofChapter7.
Other chapters focus more on rights, and the distinctive features that they of-




to something diﬀerent than simply the idea that we owe it to others not to wrong
them. I believe that it does. First, rights are normative—they provide guidance
to an agent regarding how to act or not to act going forward. In Chapter 5, I ar-
gue that the potential ex post complaints of other parties are not suited to serve
thisnormativerole. Inanimportantsense,onemustaimtodowhatoneowesto





thoughts, we do not have rights against them. Third, rights also give rightholders
thepowertodeterminewhatwillcountaspermissibleconducttowardthem. This
normative control goes beyond being able to determine when one will and will
not have a complaint. This diﬀerence between consenting—asserting normative
control over permissibility—and surrendering future complaint is the subject of
Chapter9.
Although perhaps none of these features of complaints and rights would, on
theirown,beenoughtoquestiontheintimateconceptualconnectionbetweenthe
concepts that is assumed by moral philosophers, I maintain that, taken together,
they sketch a picture of two diﬀerent moral relations, which play distinct roles in
our moral experience. Chapter 10 attempts to oﬀer such a sketch by suggesting
analyses of the two concepts. The ultimate picture is one in which having a right
13involves being entitled to respect ex ante such that one has a claim on the con-
ductoftheotherperson; wrongings, incontrast, ariseexpostwhenanactionhas
involvedanotherpersonanditcannotbejustifiedtohimorher.
But this is merely a preview of the sketch to come. Although any reader who
makes it through to those final pages probably has the right to be rewarded with
a complete understanding of the relationship between rights and wrongings, the
readercannot—asMachiavellisaid—complainifwhatIhavetooﬀerdoesnotrise
tothislevel.





Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective
goal is not a suﬃcient justification for denying them what
theywish,asindividuals,tohaveortodo,ornotasuﬃcient








This chapter addresses a cluster of theories—referred to as interest theories of
15rights—thatbuildonthiscommonsenseidea. Roughlyspeaking,accordingtoan
interest theory, an individual has a right if and only if that individual has an in-
terest that grounds a duty in another party. The origins of this idea lie in Jeremy
Bentham, who thought that the principle of utility justifies society in prohibiting
certainactions. Tobeprotectedbysuchalegislatedprohibition,forBentham,was
tohavearight. Thisexplicationoftheconceptisappealinglysimpleandseemsto
have a ring of truth to it. But this simple idea faces a diﬃculty: it oﬀers little con-
nection between the protected interests and the prohibition. I may benefit from
the law preventing my neighbor from building skyscraper, but that doesn’t seem
to transform me into a rightholder. That is, the fact that a particular prohibition
protectsaparticularinterestcouldbeincidental,whereasrightsseemtoinvolvea
connection between a rightholder and the sorts of things that cannot be done to
him or her. As a result, the skeletal idea of rights as protections of interests has
spawned more sophisticated modern descendants, which seek to articulate more
fullytheconnectionbetweentheinterestofarightholderandtheprohibitionthat
generatesaright.
After discussing Bentham’s view, this chapter considers two modern descen-
dants of Bentham’s approach. Both seek to supplement Bentham’s approach by
appealing to the concept of suﬃciency. Matthew Kramer spells out the idea of
suﬃciencyin evidentialterms—the impairmentofthe interestmustbe suﬃcient
evidencethatthenormhasbeenviolated. JosephRaz,incontrast,reliesonanidea
ofjustificatorysuﬃciency—therightholder’sinterestmustbesuﬃcientreasonfor
imposing the relevant duty. Although quite diﬀerent, both of these approaches




claim is not the primary aim of this chapter. Instead, I want to draw attention to
something about where the theory starts from, what emphasis naturally emerges,
and what general diﬃculty results. What I want to suggest is that the theory’s
features—including its shortcomings—are the result of its orientation. The goal
ofthischapteristohighlightthreegeneralfeaturesoftheinteresttheories.
First, the interest theory generally takes the concept of a wrong or oﬀense as
primary. The core intuition behind the interest theory is, I think, that having a
right involves having a special sort of protection against injury.¹ We create rights,
the theory suggests, insofar as we deem certain hurtful activities to be impermis-
sibleandtherebygivepotentialvictimsoftheseactivitiesaspecialformofprotec-
tion. The recognition of certain things as wrongs or injustices—as things not to
be done—is at the core of the interest theory. In the words of Alan Dershowitz,






¹ Or, to put the point the other way, rights are an assurance that some interests will be given
categoricalpriorityoverothers. SeeDworkin(1978).
17are suﬃcient reasons or interests to justify imposing an obligation. This means
that a dispute about rights simply boils down to a dispute about the justifiability
ofaction. Rightsarenotmysteriouslyindependentnormativeconsiderations,but
rather derivatives of our moral reasoning. As Raz puts it, “Assertions of rights are
typically intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties”
(1986, p.181). This connection with justification is, I mean to suggest, the major
strengthoftheinteresttheory.
Third, one of the interest theory’s main weaknesses is that it seems to prolifer-
ate rights. Having an interest that is furthered by a duty of someone else is too
indiscriminate. This relation exists in many instances where we would not nor-
mally think that a right exists. There must be some tighter connection between
therightholderandtheduty. Asmentionedalready,moderntheoristshaveintro-
duced the idea of suﬃciency to make this connection, and I will devote much of




Although this chapter involves, in part, a rejection of various interest theories,









According the interest theory of rights, someone has a right when they
haveaninterestthatisprotectedbythefactthatotherpersonsareunderaduty. The
basic idea, which has an evident plausibility, is that having a right involves having
aninterestthatisgivenprotectionbysomesetofnorms. Thebasicbuildingblock
of rights, then, are duties or norms and the interests that are benefited by those
dutiesornorms. (Forthisreason,thistypeoftheoryisalternativelycalledabenefit











into oﬀences those things that are harmful, I will take him to be describing what the law should
make into oﬀences and not necessarily what it does. He writes, “It is necessary, at the outset, to
19Bentham thinks that there are interrelated concepts central to a legal system,
including oﬀences, rights, and obligations. He describes the concepts in the fol-
lowingway:
[T]o declare by a law that a certain act is prohibited, is to erect such





fundamental idea. He describes them as “born together” and “inseparably con-
nected.” He also thinks that the language of one concept may be translated into
that of another: “These objects are so simultaneous that each of their words may
besubstitutedtoonefortheother”(Bentham,1838,p.159). Forexample,saying
that I have a right not to be killed is just a diﬀerent way of saying that killing me
wouldbeanoﬀence,whichinturnisjustadiﬀerentwayofsayingthateveryoneis
underanobligationnottokillme.³
Though these concepts are inter-definable for Bentham, there is an important
senseinwhichthenotionofanoﬀenceistheprimaryconcept. Asheputsit,“The
fundamental idea, the idea which serves to explain all the others, is that of an of-
fence” (Bentham, 1838, p.160). This is because the crucial notion for Bentham
makeadistinctionbetweensuchactsasareormaybe,andsuchasought tobeoﬀences. Anyact
maybeanoﬀence,whichtheywhomthecommunityareinthehabitofobeyingshallbepleased
to make one: that is, any act which they shall be pleased to prohibit or to punish. But, upon the




20is that of preventing harms to people’s interest. What underwrites Bentham’s en-
tire account is the prohibition of actions that are harmful to others. As a result,
the concept of an oﬀence is the one that is “fundamental.” This is the first exam-
ple of the way in which interest theories give primacy to wrongs. Because of the
focus on the interests to be protected, the central concern for the interest theory
is prohibiting—i.e. making into an oﬀense—those actions that will constitute an
injurytothoseinterests.
In the basic interest theory approach, there are two components of having a







This simple definition, however, is insuﬃcient. The problem is that that two
conjuncts of the definiens do not have any connection to each other. X’s interest
in Y’s doing φ need not be related to the reason φ is required. Imagine that you
owemoneytoafriendandareobligatedtopayitback. Accordingtobasicinterest
theory definition, if I place a wager on your paying the money back, then I would
have a right that you pay the money back. I would have an interest in your repay-
ment and you would be obligated to repay. This is pretty clearly the wrong result.
We do not generally think that I would have a right in that case—you would not
21owe it to me to repay the money. This is indicative of a general problem for inter-
esttheories: theproblemofproliferatingrights. Theproblemarisesbecausethere
needs to be some further connection between the rightholder and the duty. One
might say that forging this connection is the flipside of the problem of proliferat-
ingrights: theinteresttheoryneedsanexplanationofwhytherightisowedtothe








is a matter of chance, but to the intended end, which is a matter of design” (1970,
p.31). Thereasonthatmywageronyourpayingyourfriendbackdoesn’testablish






⁴ “It has been shown that the happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is com-
posed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator
22The idea of an intended beneficiary thus oﬀers a possible solution to the prob-
lem of proliferating rights. One might formulate a new definition of rights: X has
a right that Y do φ iﬀ X has an interest in Y’s doing φ which is intended to be pro-
tected by making Y’s not doing φ an oﬀense. The idea is that having a right is a
matter of having an interest that is—at least according to the legislator—worthy




the duty. One has a right when one’s interests are those intended to be protected
bytheimpositionoftheduty.
AsH.L.A.Hartfamouslypointedout,appealingtointendedbeneficiariesdoes
not seem to solve the problem of rights proliferating to third parties. This is be-
cause,accordingtoHart,onemaybeanintendedbeneficiaryofadutyandyetnot





mother in his absence. Rights arise out of this transaction, but it is
surely Y to whom the promise has been made and not his mother




23by its performance, but the person to whom he has an obligation to
lookafterherisY.ThisissomethingduetoorowedtoY,soitisY,not
his mother, whose right X will disregard and to whom X will have
done wrong if he fails to keep his promise, though the mother may
be physically injured. And it is Y who has a moral claim upon X, is
entitledtohavehismotherlookedafter,andwhocanwaivetheclaim
andreleaseYfromtheobligation. (1955,p.180)
The problem, according to Hart, is that the mother is the (or at least, an) in-
tendedbeneficiaryofthedutytocareforher. Butsheisnot,Hartargues,properly
viewedasarightholder,adesignationappropriateonlyforY.Ifthisiscorrect,then
the problem of rightsproliferating to thirdparties persists. And the reasonwhy it
persistsisthateventheideaofanintendedbeneficiarydoesnotcapturethesense
inwhichthedutyisowedtotherightholder.
The idea of intended beneficiary has other problems that may be worth noting
in passing. First, the notion of intended beneficiary is indeterminate because it
can be specified with diﬀerent levels of detail. Too definite an intended benefi-
ciarywouldseemtoruleoutwhatshouldbecategorizedasoﬀenses. Forexample,
if the people who created the protection against unwarranted seizures never in-
tended the application to wire-tapping, does the law provide protection? On the
otherhand,tooindefiniteanintendedbeneficiarywouldruntheriskofgivingno
content at all. For example, how is one to know that the laws weren’t intended to
benefit those placing wagers on good behavior? Second, it is unclear whether the
notionofanintendedbeneficiarycanbeadaptedtomoralrightsandoﬀensesand
notmerelylegalones.⁵ Theteleologicallanguageofintendedendsmayhavecon-
⁵ This, of course, is not really a problem for Bentham, because he believes that there cannot
berightsotherthanthosethataretheproductofmanmadelaws.
24tentformanmadeinstitutions,butitishardtoseewhatitwouldmeantospeakof




Matthew Kramer offers a diﬀerent approach to addressing the problem of
proliferating rights to third parties. Hart’s example of the contract for the ben-
efit of some third party creates a problem for the interest theory because, if the
interest theory is to capture our concept of having a right, it must distinguish the
rightholderfromthosewhostandtogaingenerally. AsKramerputsit,
[W]e have to distinguish the relevant beneficiary from other peo-





Kramer is conceding here that, unless the interest theory can resist the prolifera-







have to be injured if an oﬀense is to occur. As Hart puts it, “we may interpret the
statement that a law is intended to benefit assignable individuals (and so confers
rightsonthem)asmeaningnomorethanthattoestablishitsbreachanassignable
individualmustbeshowntohavesuﬀeredanindividualdetriment”(1982,p.179).
Hart’s idea is that we can think of a law intending to benefit a particular person
whenever an injury to that particular person is essential for finding a violation of
thelaw. Murderlaws,forexample,createarightinthepersonwhomightbekilled
becausefindingaviolationofthelawwouldrequireashowingthatthepersonwas
killed. In short, the idea is that someone is a rightholder if showing detriment to
hisorherinterestsisnecessarytoshowinganoﬀense.
This idea that rights exist where a harm to someone’s interests is necessary for
the existence of a violation narrows the circumstances where the interest theory
willpositrights. Notalllegalprohibitionswillberights-creatinginthewaythata
prohibitiononmurderis. Forexample,failuretopaytaxesisprohibited,butthere




loss would not be necessary to show that a murder has occurred. So the idea that
harm to a person’s interests is necessary to an oﬀense narrows the ascription of
rights by providing an explanation of the connection between the interests of the
rightholderandthedutycorrelatedwiththeright.
26Kramer builds on this general idea, but replaces the relation of necessity with
thatofsuﬃciency.⁷ ForKramer,onehasarightwhenadetrimenttoone’sinterests
would be suﬃcient to establish the violation of a norm. Here is Kramer’s oﬃcial
statement: “[A]ny person Z holds a right under a contract or norm if and only
if a violation of a duty under the contract or norm can be established by simply
showingtheduty-bearerhaswithheldabenefitfromZorhasimposedsomeharm
uponhim”(Kramer,1998,p.81).
The reason why Kramer replaces necessity with suﬃciency is that a norm may
protect more than one party and therefore generate more than one rightholder.
Whenthatisthecase,detrimenttoanypartyprotectedwillshowaviolationofthe
norm. That is, detriment to the interests of any protected party will be suﬃcient,
butnotnecessary,toaviolation. Kramerexplainsthepointformally:
[C]onsideranormNthatcallsfortwoinstancesoflegalprotection,
S and T. To show that N has been fulfilled, we have to show that S
andT both obtain(i.e. ‘S&T’). Toprovethat N hasbeen breached,
conversely, we have to prove that ‘S&T’ is false—which amounts to
provingthatSdoesnotobtainorthatTdoesnotobtainorthatboth
of them do not obtain (i.e. ‘:S v :T’). Suﬃcient but not necessary
forproofofaviolation,then,isademonstrationof:S.(1998,p.82)
Thisisabitabstract,soanexamplemightbehelpful. Imaginealawthatlegally
protects the confidentiality of a journalist’s sources. Such a law might protect the
interests of both the journalist and the source, and, in this sense, both parties are
⁷ “Hart erroneously presumed that the relevant question to be asked is whether proof of Z’s
undergoingadetrimentatthehandsofYwillbenecessaryinordertoestablishthatYhasviolated
a certain norm or contract. In fact, the relevant question is whether such proof will be suﬃcient
toestablishaviolation.” (Kramer,1998,pp.81-82)
27rightholders under the law. This can be seen, Kramer would suggest, by the fact
that injury to either party’s interests will evidence a violation of the law. If a jour-
nalist is imprisoned for failing to reveal a source, that will be a violation. And if
a confidential source has her identity revealed without her consent (perhaps by
a journalist acting in his own interests), that too will constitute a violation of the
law. Either injury is suﬃcient, but not necessary, to show that the law has been
violated.
The idea of suﬃciency is meant to provide a connection between the interest
and the duty. Not simply any interest that is protected by a right will count as
the basis for a right—only an interest such that proof of its detriment is suﬃcient
to show a violation of the duty. This rules out interests that are protected merely
coincidentally. For example, if you owe me a pumpkin pie, and I intend to give
that pumpkin pie to my father, then both my interest and my father’s interest are
advanced by your obligation. But only an impairment of my interest will be suf-
ficient to establish a violation of your duty. If I don’t receive a pie, then you have
failed in your obligation. If my father doesn’t receive a pie, that does not alone
show that you failed in your obligation—perhaps I got hungry on the way to my
father’shouse.
Withthisinmind,onemightwonderhowKramer’saccounthandlesthemother
in Hart’s example. After all, showing a detriment to the mother’s interest would
seem to be suﬃcient to establish that the duty has been violated. And, in fact,
Krameracceptsthatthemotherdoeshavearightinthiscase. Kramerarguesthat
hisapproachdeliverspreciselytherightresultinthird-partycontractcases:
28[The] test will work very smoothly when applied to the scenario of
the third-party-beneficiary contract. To prove that Y has breached
hiscontractualdutytoX,oneneedonlyshowthatYhasinexcusably




In other words, while Kramer’s interest theory will rule out as rightholders those
who have interests that are protected merely accidentally, Kramer contends that
intendedbeneficiarieslikethemotherinHart’sexamplereallyarerightholders.
What, then, of Hart’s point that the intended beneficiary does not have the
power to enforce or waive the right? Kramer suggests that this is essentially be-
sidethepoint:
Of course, in England and in most American jurisdictions, X would
haveapowertoenforcehisrightwhereasZwouldnothaveanysuch
power. For the interest theory, however, the unenforceability of Z’s
rightbyZhimselfdoesnotbelieorprecludehisholdingoftheright.
(1998,pp.82-83)
The mother (Z) may not have power to enforce or waive the duty, but to infer
from that to the claim that she does not have a right would be to simply presup-
posethecorrectnessoftheinteresttheory’smainrival,thewilltheory. Arguments
like Hart’s that assume as a premise that the intended third-party beneficiary of a
contract is not a rightholder simply beg the question—they assume that the abil-





injury is prevented by the contract. If she doesn’t get the care promised, then the
contracthasbeenbreached. Sheisentitledtothatcareunderthecontract;sheis,
inthissense,arightholderunderthecontract.
Notice two points about Kramer’s view. First, the primacy of the wrong that I
highlightedinBenthamisevenmorepronouncedinKramer. Thecorethoughtis
thatonecanunderstandrightsbyexaminingwhatcountsasaninjuryinviolation
of a norm. The injury is the focal point. Having a right involves being protected
from harm to one’s interest. Second, notice that, in a circumscribed way, Kramer




implausible. There is an important intuition behind the thought that the mother
has a right to the care: she is more than merely an interested bystander, and the
potential detriment to her interests is more than coincidentally connected to the
dutyimposedbythecontract. IwillreturntothisideainChapter4.
2.2.2 ProblemsforKramer
Kramer believes that the suﬃciency condition oﬀers the appropriate connection
betweeninterestsanddutiestopreservetheinteresttheory. Hesuggeststhatitcan




a plausible subset? Can he say that my father does not have a right that you give
methepumpkinpie,andonlythatthemotherhasarighttothecarepromisedher
son? Itisnotclearthathecan.⁸
First, the interest theory seems less well equipped to explain those rights that
are primarily about having certain powers. For example, in the third-party con-








third parties. The mother might have a daughter who equally has an interest in





31A second thought might be simply that the son has an interest in the promisor
keeping his promise. But this won’t do either. The point of the theory is that
a right exists where an interest is present such that detriment to it will show that
the relevant norm was violated. The question is what sort of injury would show
that the promisor has not kept his promise. The detriment to an interest in the
promisorkeepinghispromisecannotplaythisrolewithoutmakingthetheoryen-
tirely empty. And, additionally, it’s not entirely clear that it would be adequately
circumscribed: inthepumpkinpieexample,myfathermightseemtohaveanin-
terestinyoukeepingyourpromise.
Perhaps one can combine the first two thoughts into a third: the son has an
interest in his bringing it about that his mother is cared for. This does seem like
it will rule out the third parties in the other cases. The trouble, though, is that
this does not seem like an interest that the son must really have. It may simply
be important to him that his mother is cared for, not that he be the one to bring
it about. So it is hard to see how the theory can explain that the promisee is a
rightholderinthethird-partycontractcase.
Second, it is also not clear that the theory can explain how the beneficiary is a
rightholderinthethird-partycontractcase. Theideaissupposedtobethatdetri-
menttothemother’sinterestissuﬃcientevidencethatthedutyhasbeenviolated.
But suppose that the son waives the promise. In that case, the detriment to the
mother’s interest is not suﬃcient to establish that the promise was violated. This
suggeststhat,ingeneral,detrimenttothemother’sinterestsisnotsuﬃcienttoes-
32tablish a violation of the duty, because the promise may have been waived.⁹ In
discussing the case, Kramer slips into saying that “unexcused detriment” will be
suﬃcient. Butthisshiftwouldseemtomakethetheoryratherempty. Itwouldbe
suﬃcient to show an unexcused detriment, but the question of what counts as an
unexcuseddetrimentcontainsthequestionofwhetheradutyhasbeenviolated.
Perhaps the idea is supposed to be that the detriment is suﬃcient to show a
prima facie violation, absent any proof of excuse. Detriment is suﬃcient for a vi-
olation, subjecttotheviolation potentiallybeingexcused. Itisanalogoustohow
theelementsofacriminaloﬀensemaybepresent,andyettheremaystillbeanaf-
firmativedefensethatcouldexcusethedefendant. Thisunderstanding, however,
faces a substantial diﬃculty. When attorneys describe the elements of a crime,
they are making a conceptual claim. They are, in a sense, analyzing what the of-
fenseinvolvesasaconcept. Certainevidenceissuﬃcienttoshowhomicidesimply
because that is what homicide involves. The question of excuse is secondary be-
cause it does not undermine the existence of the crime, but only eliminates guilt.
To argue that it was self-defense is not to contend that a homicide did not occur,
buttocontendthatthedefendantwasnotculpable.
Returningtothe promisecase, ifthe motheris not caredfor, wewouldnot say
that this counts, conceptually, as a violation of the contract, subject to a potential






These troubles suggest a general diagnosis of where Kramer’s theory struggles.
Thebasicidea,onemightsay,issomethinglikethis: (1)onehasarightwhenone
standstobewrongedbyanaction;(2)oneiswrongedbyanactionwhenonesuf-
fers the sort of injury that shows that a wrongful action has occurred; therefore
(3) if one stands to suﬀer the sort of injury that shows a wrongful action has oc-
curred, then one is a rightholder. (Note that premise (1) is an expression of the
primacy that interest theories give to wronging.) The problems described above
suggest that premise (2) is false. First, the son seems to be potentially wronged
irrespective of any injury that he might suﬀer. Second, the mother stands to be
wronged even though her injury is not suﬃcient to show wrongfulness. Both of





lems that would arise from attempting to ascribe intent to moral norms. Joseph
Raz averts this problem by replacing the idea of an intended beneficiary with the
idea of “suﬃcient reason.” For Bentham, an individual is a rightholder when her
interests are the basis for the intention to hold another under a duty. For Raz, an
individual is a rightholder when her interests are suﬃcient reason to hold another
34under a duty. In this way, Raz replaces Bentham’s descriptive conception of the
interestasbeingthebasisforthedutywithanormativeconceptionofinterestsbe-
ingthe basis for the duty. Put another way, it is not that the rightholder’s interest












some other person is under a duty. Unlike Kramer’s theory in which the inter-
est is used as a form of suﬃcient evidence, Raz’s idea is that the interest provides
suﬃcientreason.
Notice that Raz’s definition oﬀers a rather simple explanation of what consti-
tutes a wrong. A wrong to someone is the performance of an action where that
¹⁰FrancesKammnotesthat,inhisoﬃcialstatementoftheview,Razdoesnotspecifythatthe
duty must involve protecting or promoting the interest. But he does explain the view in these
termslater(Raz,1986,p.180). AsKammpointsout,withoutthisadditionalcondition,theview
would seem to have counterintuitive results: “For example, suppose I see that you have a very
highlevelofwell-being. Thatmaybesuﬃcienttogroundadutyinmetoseethatyourwell-being
does not improve further (for reasons of equality with others, or because you do not deserve so
much well-being). On the first (but not the second) account of rights, you would have a right
that I carry out this duty, but that hardly seems true.” (Kamm, 2002, p.483). I assume, for this
reason,thatRazmeansforhistheorytoincludethisprovision.
35person’s interests were suﬃcient to hold another under a duty to not to perform
theaction(ornon-performancewhereinterestsgroundadutytoperform). Raz’s




has a right when that entity has an interest that grounds a duty. But what is the
right? Itisneithertheinterest¹¹northeduty.¹² Razhasonlygivenconditionsfor
whenonehasaright,buthehasnotexactlysaidwhat isaright.
The answer, for Raz, is that rights are a step in between interests and duties.
The picture is one of a chain of justification running from interests to duties with
rightsasthelinkinthemiddle. Rights,then,arecentralstagesinacertainformof
argument. Razexplains:







¹¹ This should be rather apparent: my interest in not being punched in the nose is not the
same thing asmyrightnottobepunchedinthenose.
¹² “[T]he right is the ground of the duty. It is wrong to translate statements of rights into
statements of ‘the corresponding’ duties. A right of one person is not a duty on another. It is
the ground of a duty, ground which, if not counteracted by conflicting considerations, justifies





36plete reasons…An interest is suﬃcient to base a right on if and only
ifthereisasoundargumentofwhichtheconclusionisthatacertain
right exists and among its non-redundant premises is a statement of
someinterestoftheright-holder…(1986,p.181)
Thisisabitopaque. Onedoesnotnormallysupposethattheclaim“Ihavearight
that p” amounts to something like, “The first lemma of an argument about duties
canbeproven.”
Ofcourse,Razdoesnotsimplymeananystageintheargument,butratherthe
particular stage at which an interest is recognized as suﬃcient to ground duties.
One can then argue forward from this stage, or lemma, to particular duties. For
example, to say that I have a right not to be tortured means simply that I have an
interest that is suﬃcient to prohibit some general class of treatments. One can
argue from this right to particular duties in particular cases—for example, to the
claim that the FBI has a duty not to waterboard me. One need not appeal all the
waybacktomyinterests,althoughthejustificationdoesgothatfarback.
Nevertheless, one may worry that thinking of rights as intermediate stages in
justificatoryargumentsstilldoesn’tgivethemthedeterminatecontentthatrights
seemtohave. ThisworryconnectswithoneofthethemesthatIhavebeenhigh-
lighting concerning the interest theory—the primacy of injury or wrongs. Raz’s
accountofrightshastroublespellingoutexactlywhatarightisbecause,inasense,
rightsaren’tfundamentalconceptsforhim. Likeotherinteresttheories,thebasic
idea is that certain human interests are the basis for duties. Rights are a deriva-
tiveofthisconnectionbetweeninterestsandduties. Raz’saccountishonestabout




This starting point leads Raz’s view to focus on justification—another theme







theory, which generally seems to avoid the problem of third-party beneficiaries,
may appear vulnerable to examples in which it may seem too profligate. Frances
Kamm gives the following example: “[I]f I have a duty to help you by praying to
God for your recovery, you still might not have a right that I relate to God in this
particular way” (2002, p.483). Other examples might also work: your need for
thestore’slastbottleofaspirinmaygivemeadutytoletyouhaveit,butthatdoes
notmeanthatyouhavearightthatInotbuyit.¹³ Whatexampleslikethissuggest
is that merely being the source of a duty may not fully capture the way in which a
¹³ I’m actually not sure that these examples are at all decisive. If there really is a duty to pray
oradutytogiveuptheaspirin,thenitdoesnotseemespeciallyproblematictometosaythatone
hasarighttothat(althoughofcoursenotalegalright,becausethosewouldnotbelegalduties).




ers and interest holders. By saying that one is a rightholder when one’s interests
ground a duty, Raz’s account seems able to block the straightforward third-party
beneficiary problem. The move replaces the connection between interests and
rights in the simple theory with a stronger one. In the skeletal interest theory,
one is a rightholder if one’s interests are protected by a norm. In Raz’s theory,
one is a rightholder if one’s interests ground a norm.¹⁴ It is not enough to be pro-
tected under a norm; one’s interests must be the source of the norm. As a result,
mere third parties (Hart’s mother, the wagering bystander, etc.) will not count as
rightholders.¹⁵
Unfortunately, tightening up of the relationship between interests and rights-
basednormsseems,atleastsuperficially,tocreateanoppositeproblem. Thisisbe-
causetherearerightholderswhoseinterestsdonotseemtobetheprimaryground
of the duties that their rights entail. For example, parents have a wide range of
rightsregardinghowtheychoosetoraisetheirchildren. Butanaccountofparental
rights is likely to rely on the interests of children in justifying the prohibitions
against state intervention. If it were the case that children were substantially bet-
¹⁴ Note that, if this were true in Bentham’s view, then only the community at large could be
a rightholder. For Bentham, any justification for a duty must be traced to the overall welfare of
thecommunity. Razdoesnotsharethisutilitariancommitment.
¹⁵SeeSreenivasan(2005,p.265): “Oneversionoftheinteresttheoryisplausiblyregardedas
exempt from the third party beneficiary objection. I think Joseph Raz’s version may be seen as
having solved the problem, which is somewhat ironic, since as far as I know he does not discuss
it.” I think this is generally correct, although there may still be examples where the idea that




suﬃcient to ground many of the duties owed toward parents, and yet parents do
seem to be rightholders. Or—to use another example—it seems that the right
to free speech is based largely on the interests of society in free and open debate
rather than simply on the interests of the speaker. That is, the interests of speak-
ers may not (alone) be suﬃcient to ground the duties owed toward speakers that
characterize the right of free speech. Or—as a third example—a policeman may
havearighttocarryanduseafirearm,whichdoesnotseemtobegeneratedsimply
fromtheinterestsofthepoliceman.¹⁶
¹⁶ To make this vivid, Kamm points out that “it is theoretically possible for a policeman to
have a right to use a gun in defense of everyone except himself” (2002, p.485). This third sort
of example—wherein a job or position gives one a right which does not appear to be based on






that protect doctors might be viewed as actually owed to the patient. Although Raz explicitly





Moreover, this move becomes harder to sustain when the privilege is one that is discretionary












portance of a right. But, he claims, “the main reason for the mismatch between
the importance of the right and its contribution to the right-holder’s well-being
is the fact that part of the justifying reason for the right is its contribution to the





This recognition that the interests of others play a justificatory role seems to
contradicttheinitialappealtosuﬃciency. RecallthatRaz’saccountidentifiedthe
rightholders as those whose interests are suﬃcient to ground the duties and not
simply as those that are protected by the duties. But here it seems that Raz is
acknowledging that some rights are grounded in interests other than those of the
rightholder. That is, Raz seems to be allowing that there are rights for which the
individual’s interests are not a suﬃcient ground.¹⁸ How are we to make sense of
notbasedonanyinterestofhis. Perhapstheideaisthattheindividualdoeshavetheinterestqua
agentbecauseitistheinterestoftheprincipal,butthiswouldneedtobedevelopedmore.
¹⁷ Raz explicitly acknowledges that in some cases the common good is far more significant
than the interests of the individual rightholder: “If I were to choose between living in a society
which enjoys freedom of expression, but not having the right myself, or enjoying the right in








I believe that the key, for Raz, is distinguishing between an interest and what
givesaninterestitsimportance. Ifonedrawsthisdistinction,onecansaythatthe
individual’sinterestmustbesuﬃcient(onitsown)togroundthedutiesassociated
with the right. But—andthis is the crucialmove—one canappealto interestsof
others to explain the importance of the individual’s interest. In other words, I
have a right only if my interests are suﬃciently important to ground a duty, but
whatmakesmyinterestsuﬃcientlyimportantmightbetheinterestsofothers.
Thus, an individual’s interest may take on an importance that far outstrips the






because of its usefulness to members of the public at large. (1986,
p.179)
address it (2002, p.485). But this avenue seems unpromising. First, in many cases, it does not
seem plausible to say that the interests of the individual would alone be suﬃcient to ground the
right. For example, the interests of a parent in controlling his or her child’s education surely
is not strong enough to generate the parent’s right over the child’s education. Second, given
Raz’s view that interests justify a “core right” from which more particular rights and duties are
derived,itseemsdiﬃculttomakethissortofcleanconceptualdividebetweentherightandthe
right’s stringency. If, by additional stringency, one means that a right generates more extensive
particularrightsandduties,then,forRaz,thatwouldbeadiﬀerentrightaltogether.
¹⁹ Kamm suggests that these aspects of Raz’s view cannot be consistent: “It is not clear that
hisaccountoftheimportanceofarightoutstrippingtheinterestitdirectlyprotectsinthecaseof
thejournalistisconsistentwithhis…accountsoftherelationbetweenrightsandinterests. They
say that a right is present when an interest of the rightholder is suﬃcient to give rise to a duty.
Butifthesatisfactionofinterestsofothersisthereasonwhythejournalistgetsarighttohavehis
interest protected, his interest is not suﬃcient to give rise to the duty of non-interference with
hisspeech.” (Kamm,2002,p.485).
42Putthisway,itisnotthatthegeneralinterestsofthecommunitydirectlyground





these two ideas by thinking that the importance of a person’s interest is not given
entirelybythatperson’sinterestonitsown.
Crucially,itisn’tonlythatthegeneralcommunityhasaninterestinthejournal-
ist collecting sources, that the journalist has an interest in collecting sources, and
that these two interests only jointly provide suﬃcient reason for the duty. If this
werethepicture,thenitclearlywouldnotbethecasethatthejournalist’sinterest
provides suﬃcient reason for the duty. Rather, the idea must be that the general
interest somehow transfers its weight to the journalist’s interest: “the journalists’
interest is valued because of its usefulness.” There are two closely related ways
to makes sense of this—each of which squares with some things that Raz says.
First, perhaps the idea is that the journalist’s interest is valuable “instrumentally,”
meaning that the interest serves as a means to the common good. As Raz puts
it, “some rights protect interests which are considered as of merely instrumental
value” (1986, p.179). Alternatively, perhaps the idea is that what explains why
the interest is a suﬃcient reason for a duty is an appeal to the broader interests
of the community. As Raz puts it, a right exists when there is a sound argument
generating duties premised on an interest of the rightholder and “other premises
43supplying grounds for attributing to it the required importance” (1986, p.181). I
will mainly address the first of these, and return to the second only at the end of
thenextsection.
2.3.3 HowRaz’sSolutionFails
Although I think viewing the individual’s interest as imbued with significance by
the community oﬀers the most plausible interpretation of Raz, I do not believe





metric with Raz’s claim about the capacity to have rights. Raz claims that the ca-
pacitytohaverightsrequiresthatanentity’swell-beingbeofultimatevalue(orbe
artificially treated as such). This provision is necessary to rule out the possibility
that plants have a right to be watered because they have an interest in being wa-
teredthatgroundsadutytowaterthem. Butwhyshoulditbethecasethatrights
can be grounded in an interest the value of which is not ultimate, but only beings
whoseinterestsareofultimatevaluecanberightholders?²⁰ Intheaccountofthe
journalist’sright,thejournalist’sinterestistakentohaveinstrumental,notultimate
value. But if instrumentally valuable interests like this can generate rights, why is
²⁰ Raz acknowledges the appeal of symmetry here: “It seems plausible to suppose that just
as only those whose well-being is of ultimate value can have rights so only interests which are
consideredofultimatevaluecanbethebasisofrights.” (1986,p.178)
44havinginterestsofultimatevaluearequirementforbeingarightholder?
The puzzle can be made more tangible if we imagine an argument for plant
rights. Plants have an interest in living, growing, and reproducing—this is part





they generate duties, they do so because of their instrumental value. It is hard to
see why Raz can call one a rightholder and the other not. It is true, of course,
that the journalist’s interest may also be of non-instrumental value, whereas the
plant’s interest is not. But that diﬀerence is irrelevant to how the interests gener-
atesduties—whichisthecruxofRaz’stheoryofrights. Theasymmetryheregets
Raz the correct result,²¹ but at the expense of explanatory power. The asymme-
trymakesithardtounderstandwhatreallyundergirdsrights—havinginterests,or
havinginterestsofultimatevalue.
Second, there seem to be cases in which a rightholder has little or no interest
intherightatall—itisnotthatthereisaninterestthatisinstrumentallyvaluable,
becausethereisnointerest.²² Supposethatastrangecultconcludesthatyouareits
²¹ Indeed, Raz’s reason for rejecting the symmetrical view is simply that “there are plenty of
counter-examples”(1986,p.178).
²² I don’t mean for this argument to be that there can be rights that are not in the particular
rightholder’sinterest. Rather,theideaisthattheclassofpersonstowhomtherightisgivenlack
anyinteresttobaseitupon. Soitisnotsimplythefamiliarpointthatsometimesageneralright
will not serve a particular rightholder’s interests, which interest theorists have readily acknowl-
edged. See, e.g., MacCormick (1977, p.202): “It is not necessarily the case that each individual
acquiring a right under the law should experience it as a benefit, an advantage, an advancement
45deity. Thisaﬀordsyoutherighttopresideovertheirworshipgatheringswhenever





certain things, but it doesn’t seem to be thereby committed to thinking that God
hasinterests.
Ifthesereligiousexamplesseemtoopeculiar,consideramoremundaneexam-
ple of a rightholder who seems to lack any interest in having the relevant right.
Suppose there are two diﬀerent chemicals, Alpha and Beta, that are equally good
fertilizersinallrelevantrespects. Alphausedtobetheonlycertifiedoption,butit
hasrecentlycometothegovernment’sattentionthatoverallenvironmentalimpact
is reduced if some farmers use Alpha and others Beta. In order to facilitate this,
the government permits farmers to use either Alpha or Beta, on the grounds that
the relatively random distribution between the two will achieve the desired envi-
ronmentalbenefit. Itseemstomethatunderthispolicyeachfarmerhasarightto
usechemicalAlpha(orchemicalBeta). Thereasonwhytheyhavethisrightisthat
it instrumentally serves the common good. But any given farmer has no interest
in which chemical he uses. It’s not the case that the farmer has an interest that is
orprotection of hisinterests…Noneof thatisin anywayinconsistentwith the proposition that
the function of the law is to confer what is considered to be normally an advantage on a certain
class by granting each of its members a certain legal right.” Raz (1986, p.178): “Though rights
are based on the interests of the rightholders, an individual may have rights which it is against
hisinteresttohave.”
46instrumentallyvaluable,becausethefarmerreallyhasnointerestatall.
Third, notice that the general interests of the community do not simply lend




not going to prison. But should we say that this interest is suﬃcient to ground
the right because it is instrumentally valuable? In fact, one can imagine such an
explanation: this interest will lead defendants to seek to exclude this evidence;
excluding this evidence will deter police from obtaining it; we all have an interest
inpolicenotengaginginillegalevidence-gathering;therefore,weoughttoprotect
thisinterest. Buttheexistenceofthisargumentdoesnotmeanthatadefendant’s
interest in not going to prison is more important in general. The argument does
notsaythatsatisfactionofthedefendant’sinterestisanymorevaluable.²³
The above points all point towards a fourth and final point: when interests are
valued instrumentally, they aren’t really being valued as interests at all, but rather
asdispositions. Whenaninterestisvaluedinstrumentally,whatisvaluableabout
thatinterestisthatitislikelytobepursuedbyitsbearer—notthatitactuallycon-
tributes to the bearer’s well-being. What is useful about the criminal’s interest in
avoidingprisonisthatitwilllikelyinducehertoadvocatefortheexclusionofevi-
²³ This argument is similar to Frances Kamm’s argument for showing that rights are not built












Warren Quinn (1993), I simply have an urge to turn on radios. It happens to be
thecasethatthereisasocialneedforsomeonetoturnonradios(perhapsawarhas
just broken out and all the radios in a previously dormant intelligence command
centerneedtobeactivated),sothegovernmentgrantsmepermissiontoaccessits
radios. Now it seems to me that I have a right to access the radios. But this has
nothing to do with my having an interest in accessing the radios—that my well-
beingisimprovedbyaccessingtheradios.




against being imprisoned. In such a scenario, the rationale for the exclusionary
ruledescribedinthepreviousparagraphwouldstillfollow. Andwecouldstillsay
that criminals have a right not to be convicted on the basis of illegally obtained
evidence. But this right could not be based on the criminal’s interest in avoiding
48convictionbecause,exhypothesi,theywouldhavenosuchinterest.




mitted, wewould, I think, saythatpeopleareaﬀordeda righttogamble. Butthis
isnotbecausetheyhaveavaluableinterestingambling—it’sprobablynotintheir
interest at all. What is valued in these cases is our disposition to do something





the existence of the norm are generated by the common good.²⁴ The well-being
of the rightholder isn’t really important to grounding the right. The interest only
matters because it disposes people to act in a certain way. If this is correct, then
Raz’s account in a way collapses into something more like Kramer’s. The interest
starts to seem like a factual rather than normative ingredient in the right. That is,
it begins to seem like one has a right when one has an interest and there is a rea-
sonforprotectingthatinterest. And,Ihavealreadysuggested,thisdoesnotseem
adequatelytolinktherightholdertothesourceoftheduty.
²⁴ Sometimes Raz comes close to admitting as much. He perplexingly describes the claim




nection between the rightholder and the duty. What is needed is an account of
the sense in which the duty is owed to the rightholder. For Bentham, the duty is




duty. The trouble is that even these explications of the sense in which the duty is
owedtotherightholderseeminadequate.
I just suggested that the ultimate problem for Raz’s view is that, in some cases,




seemed to be going in the right direction—the journalists, parents, and criminal
defendants seem to get their rights in virtue of fulfilling a social role. But this so-
cialroleisn’tthatofsomeonewithaparticularinterest,butratherthatofsomeone
whowilldosomethingofsocialimportance. Whatisneededistheideathatrights
protect our ability to do things—that is, that rights protect voluntary actions, re-
gardlessofwhethertheyareinourinterest.
Put another way, having a right seems—at least some of the time—to involve
50having one’s choices respected and granted protection. The rightholder is ac-
corded a status that aﬀords him or her the discretion to do certain things. Often
thisprotectedstatuswillrelatetothefactthatarightholderisapersonwhosewell-
beingisintrinsicallyvaluableandwhoshouldthereforebeabletopursuethatwell-




This idea that having a right involves having one’s choices aﬀorded protection
captures a sense in which the duty is owed to the rightholder that seems to be














have a right against another is a judgment of a special ongoing nexus of individu-
als.²⁶ Oneagentisboundtotheotheragent;theyareunitedinarelationshipthat
shapesconduct. Thisideaofanongoingnexusofagentsiswhattheinteresttheory
lacks. It cannot capture this nexus because it focuses only on the duty and where
that duty came from; it does not focus on how the duty shapes the relationship
between the parties going forward. Put another way, the interest theory cannot
accommodate the way in which rights involve respect for the rightholder and not
just attention to her interests. An important aspect of rights is the way that they
not only arise out of, but also are constituted by, respect for the rightholder as a
person. In this sense, to say that you have a right that I do φ is to say that proper
respectforyouinvolvesmydoingφ.
In fairness to Raz, he does acknowledge a related concern, and he thinks that
histheoryofrightscanaccommodateit. Raz’sresponseistosaythatbeinggiven







lowing way: “In all such judging, whatever the determinate form, I may be said to view a pair
of distinct agents as joined and opposed in a formally distinctive type of practical nexus. They
are for me like the opposing poles of an electrical apparatus: in filling one of these forms with
concretecontent,Irepresentanarcofnormativecurrentaspassingbetweentheagent-poles,and
astakingacertainpath…Thisspecialpostureofthemindincouplingcertainrepresentationsof
agents marks the resulting judgements as belonging to the element of justice…The mark of this
special virtue of human agents, as Aristotle says, is that it is ‘towards another’, pros heteron or
pros allon; it is, as St. Thomas says, ad alterum, or as Kant says, gegen einen Anderen.” (2004,
pp.335-37).
52respect is one of our interests.²⁷ This interest in being given respect is an interest
inhavingone’sotherinterestsgivendueweight.²⁸ Thisinterestinbeingrespected
groundsadutyofrespect,andthus,Razcontends,wemaysaythatthereisaright
to be respected. Raz wants to explain this right to respect as a sort of meta-right:
arighttohaveone’sotherrightsgivendueconsideration.
Beingaveryabstractright, nothingveryconcreteabouthowpeople
should be treated follows from it without additional premises. This
explainswhyitisinvokednotasaclaimforanyspecificbenefit,butas
anassertionofstatus. Tosay‘Ihavearighttohavemyinteresttaken
into account’ is like saying ‘I too am a person.’ This may perhaps
explainits‘deontological’flavour. (1986,p.190)
Thereisawayinwhichthisseemscorrect: assertinga“righttorespect”would
amount to no more than an assertion of moral status. This fact, however, hardly
seems to support Raz’s claim that respect is just one of the interests people have.





To the extent that the interest theory fails—and I do not mean to say that it
entirelydoes—theproblemseemstobetraceabletoitsstartingpoint. Theinterest
²⁷“Rights,onemaysay,arebasedneitherontheright-holders’interest,noronthatofothers.
Rather they express the right-holders’ status as persons and the respect owed to them in recog-




53theory starts from the idea that rights protect us from certain harms and injuries.
This is an important and very plausible starting point. But the ultimate diﬃculty
for the theory is that it does not accommodate the idea that rights are necessarily
aboutdoingsomething—aboutbeingabletomakecertainchoicesandengagein
certain activities. That idea involves a forward-looking, enabling conception; it
focusesonwhatrightsallow. Itisverydiﬀerentthanthethoughtthatrightsprotect
against injury, which focuses on what rights prevent and then reasons backward
fromthepotentialinjurytothemechanismforpreventingit.
The primacy given to injuries and wrongs in the interest theory—although it
createstheproblemsaboutover-inclusivityandtheroleofrespect—naturallyand
helpfully connects questions about rights with questions about justification. Ac-
cording to the interest theory, rights violations arise when someone is injured by
the transgression of a norm. As a result, questions about rights transform into
questions about whether harming is justifiable or whether there is a justification
foranormagainstthatkindofharming. Andthismakessense. Whenweaccuse




54By definition rights give the individual zones of unchecked
discretionary action that others, whether private citizens or
governmental authorities, may not invade. They are entitle-
mentsofanindividualheorshemayclaimathisorherelec-
tion…They are what gives meaning to that article of Amer-
ican faith: that each human being is unique, that by virtue
ofhishumanityhepossessesanunalienableandundeniable
dignity and worth that he is entitled to the maximum basic
personal liberty consistent with like liberty for each other.
SupremeCourtofMississippi
For me, I don’t like it when there is too much interference in





rival theory is based on the idea that rights give us control. Rights, it is thought,
involvethefreedomtogovernone’sownlife. Havingarightisn’tabouthavingcer-
taininterestsprotected;rather,itisabouthavingacertainsphereunderone’sown
control. The emphasis is on the way in which rights represent a special concern
55fortherightholderasanautonomousagent.
This conception of rights has come to be known as the will theory (or choice
theory or control theory). The following statement from H.L.A. Hart is a classic
articulationofthebasicidea:
Insteadof utilitariannotions of benefitor intendedbenefitwe need,
if we are to reproduce this distinctive concern for the individual, a
diﬀerent idea. The idea is that of one individual being given by the





Jeremy Waldron describes the will theory as “essentially connected to a certain
distribution of freedom.” (1988, p.128) In short, according to the will theory,
rightsareaboutdistributingcontrolovertheworldaroundus.
As with the interest theory, I think that the will theory captures important as-
pects of rights-based moral relationships, but I also think that it faces significant
weaknesses. The aim of this chapter is to highlight some of these strengths and
weaknesses. Thesefeaturesofthewilltheory—boththepositiveandproblematic—
are the result of shifting focus. Instead of starting from the injuries that can arise
when a duty has been breached, the will theory emphasizes the powers and prac-
tices that are antecedent to a duty’s performance or nonperformance. The focus
inthewilltheoryisonwhathappens(orcanhappen)beforeadutyisperformed,
not on what happens (or can happen) afterwards. As a result, the will theory’s
strengths and weaknesses are something like a mirror image of the interest the-











would not mean that you didn’t have the right. So the control isn’t a matter of
actual,physicalcommand.
Instead, the control at issue is normative control—it is control over what will
andwillnotbepermissiblebehaviorbyothers. Or,asHartputsit,itiscontrolover
the other person’s duty. That is, the control typically involves having choice over
theapplicationoftheotherparty’sduty. Forexample,yourrightsoveryourbody







from the concept of harm or injury, which involves the retrospective comparison
of a present state with a prior state, the will theory begins from the idea of what
a rightholder can do in the future. Having a right is seen as being about having a
sortofempowerment.
Throughthiscontroloveranotherperson’sobligations,thewilltheoryseesrights




(directional element) that there is something Tuck must do (modal
element). This is a relation, moreover, in which Tuck is bound and
Nip is free. Nip not only has a right, but he can choose whether or
nottoexerciseit,whethertoclaimit,whethertoregistercomplaints
upon its infringement, even whether to release Tuck from his duties
andforgetthewholething. (1970,p.250)
In other words, rights connect one agent with another, as one who is bound by a
dutyandonewhocontrolsthatverysameduty.
Whatthisconnectioncapturesisthewayinwhichrights-baseddutiesareowed
to the rightholder. In Hart’s word, “Rights are typically conceived of as possessed
or owned by or belonging to individuals, and these expressions reflect the concep-
tionofmoralrulesasnotonlyprescribingconductbutasformingakindofmoral




In the will theory, this directional nature of the duty is explicated in terms of
control. The duty is owed to the rightholder in the sense that the rightholder is
given authority over its enforcement. Or as Hart puts it, “duties with correlative
rights are a species of normative property belonging to the rightholder, and this
figure becomes intelligible by reference to the special form of control over a cor-
relative duty which a person with such a right is given by the law” (1982, p.185).
The property metaphor is significant here. The rightholder “possesses” a duty in











the crucial point is that the rightholder has the choice about whether—and per-
haps to what extent—the other party will be bound. It is not suﬃcient that one
59partyisboundbyadutyregardinganother. Whetherthedutyisinforcemustbe
up to the other party. Because this choice is the crucial element, the will theory
tends to be cast as essentially concerning the power to waive or release. Insofar
as a party can waive an obligation and release the party that is bound by it, the






lem. While many paradigmatic rights—especially transactional rights like prop-
erty or contractual rights—involve control over the other person’s duty, not all
rightsseemtohavethischaracter. Thatis,notallrightsseemtoinvolvecontrolby
therightholder. Somerightsseemliketheycannotbewaived,andsomeseeming
rightholders seem like they cannot engage in waiver. Whereas interest theories
of rights face the diﬃculty of awarding rights too broadly, the will theory faces a
symmetricalproblem: theproblemofnotrecognizingenoughrights.
Not all rights are potentially waived. There are some rights that we normally
considerinalienable—life,liberty,andthepursuitofhappiness,tonameafew. If
theserightsareinalienable,thenthepotentialforwaiverisnotanecessaryfeature




might be exemplified by my prerogative to choose who gets access, my right to
life hardly seems to be exemplified by a prerogative to choose who gets to slit my
throat. Theproblemisnotmerelythatsuchinalienablerightsseemtoexistbutalso




is hard to explain. As Neil MacCormick puts it, “if the will theory is correct, the
more they are inalienable, the less they are rights” (1977, p.199). So the problem
is not simply that some rights seem to be inalienable, but that inalienable rights
pointbacktotheideathatrightsareaboutprotectionandnotaboutwaiving.
Inalienability,however,isnotnecessarilytheequivalenttounwaivability(Fein-
berg, 1978). A right might be waivable insofar as an agent is at liberty not to ex-
ercise it on a particular occasion, while a right might be inalienable insofar as the
agent can never permanently give up this liberty to exercise it or not.¹ For exam-
ple,onanygivenoccasion,Icanwaivemyrighttomylabor—asIdo,forexample,
whenIvolunteermyenergiestoanotherpersonororganization. ButIcannotsell
myself into slavery, in that this would involve a complete relinquishment of my
rightandnotsimplyadecisionnottoexerciseit.
¹AsFrancesKammputsit,“[I]tispossibletowaiveevenaninalienableright. Forexample,
I may waive, on a given occasion, my right to speak even if I cannot alienate my right to speak.
SoperhapsinalienablerightsarenotreallyaproblemforHart,thoughnon-waivableonesmight
be.” (2002,p.482).
61Still, even drawing this distinction, some rights may still seem to involve not







the thought that there could be such rights does not seem conceptually incoher-
ent. If such unwaivable rights are possible, then the concept of a right does not
requirewaivability.
Although the problem for the will theory is evident from such potentially un-
waivable moral rights, the diﬃculty is even more vivid with certain actual legal
rights.³ You have a legal right that I not murder you. This legal right is linked to
theprotectionthatyoureceivefromthecriminallawsagainstmurder—thatis,the
criminallawplacesmeunderalegaldutynottokillyou,andyouhaveacorrelative








³ There is a noteworthy correlation between interest theories and a focus on legal rights and
will theories and a focus on moral rights. But it seems to me that one shouldn’t let this be an
excuse for either theory’s weaknesses because we want a concept of rights that applies to both.
Ifthewilltheorydoesnotoﬀeraconvincingaccountoflegalrights,thatshouldcountagainstit
asatheoryofrightsgenerally.
62essentially no control over my legal duty. You cannot waive my legal duty not to
kill you. As the German cannibal Armin Meiwes learned, the prosecutor’s oﬃce
will not be impressed with even convincing evidence that a victim has attempted
towaivehisright. Inasense, youcanenforcemydutynottokillyou, inthatyou
can use force to defend yourself. But in fact, anyone could use force to defend
you—it’snotapowerthatisexclusivelyyoursastherightholder. Inshort,thewill
theory seems to lack the resources to say that we all have a legal right not to be
murdered.⁴
What the previous paragraph suggests is that my legal duty not to kill you is
controlledbysocietyatlarge. Butthecontroloveralegalrightmayalsofallupon
a third party—the rightholder herself lacking the power to waive. This happens,




your race, your gender, or your income. But you cannot straightforwardly waive
this right—jury duty is not only a right but also (as the name says) a duty. In
fact,yourinabilitytowaivethisrightispartofacriminaldefendant’srighttoatrial
by a jury of peers. The state cannot strike a black juror for no other reason than










a third party. So here, again, there seems to be a real legal right that cannot be
waived.
Thereisasecondproblemofnarrownessfacedbythewilltheory. Theproblem
described thus far is that certain important rights do not seem to be covered by





Because infants and mentally infirm people are both factually and
legally incompetent to choose between enforcing and waiving their
claimagainstothers,andbecausechildrenolderthaninfantsarelegally
incompetent and sometimes factually incompetent to engage in en-
forcement/waiver decision they hold no powers to make such deci-
sions. Now, given that the Will Theory insists that claims must be









is capable of caring for himself or herself” (1977, pp.154-55). In short, if having






times held by another person. The consideration of those who lack the capacity
forwaivermakesthisevenclearer. Aninfanthasarightnottobeasubjectofmed-




narrow. I take this to be a serious problem for the will theory. And it is a prob-
lem that is an interesting mirror image to a diﬃculty for the interest theory. In
thepreviouschapter,Idiscussedthewayinwhichtheinteresttheoryappearstoo
broad—it would assign rights to third parties who we would not ordinarily con-
sider rightholders. The problem arises because what seems to be the right of one
partycanoftenservetheinterestsofanother(third)party. Thewilltheory’sdiﬃ-
cultyistheopposite. Itseemstobetoonarrowinsofarasitwouldnotassignrights
to parties that we ordinarily consider to be rightholders. The problem arises be-
causewhatseemstobetherightofonepartycanbeunderthecontrolofanother




In order to address the problems of narrowness, a brief summary of the
rights framework developed by Hohfeld (1917) is helpful. Hohfeld recognized
that philosophers and lawyers often conflate diﬀerent uses of the word “right.” In
order to clarify the concept, Hohfeld distinguished eight diﬀerent jural relations.
Atthefirstorder,Xhasaclaim-right againstYiﬀYhasadutytoX. Forexample,I
have a right that you repay your debt to me, and that correlates with your duty to
pay me; this is a claim-right. In contrast to a claim right, X has a liberty (or privi-



















a technical sense. We might say that I have the power to relieve you of your duty
not to trespass on my land, by, for example, granting you an easement. Insofar
as I have this power, you have a liability with regard to me. But, of course, this
isn’t a bad thing—you’re liability is just a potential to be given additional rights.
Thefinaltworelationsareimmunityanddisability,whicharecorrelatedwitheach
otherandtheoppositesofliabilitiesandpowers,respectively. Thatis,tohavean





This framework is undoubtedly helpful in distinguishing various uses of the
67word “right,” but it doesn’t itself provide an account of rights. That is, Hohfeld’s
framework is perfectly compatible with either an interest theory or a will theory.
Nevertheless, anecdotally, it seems to me that will theoriststend to have a greater
aﬃnity for the framework. I suspect the reason is that it emphasizes the way in
whichhavingaright(beitaclaim-right, aliberty, apower, orwhatever)isfunda-
mentallyrelational. Butperhapsitisbecausethewilltheoryappealssoheavilyto
the second-order relations. According to the will theory, having a right involves
havingpowers. Forexample,myrightstomyproperty—beitmyclaimrightthat
youstayoﬀormylibertyrighttodecoratemylivingroom—aresubjecttomycon-




rightholder does not have the second-order power to waive the correlated first-











the problem of narrowness as much as it just stipulates that there is no problem.
The problem was that the will theory seems to deny rights where we ordinarily
consider them to be present—such as your right not to be murdered. Steiner’s
appealtostateoﬃcialswhohavecontroloverthedutiesinquestiondoesn’tsolve
this problem. If having a right is about having certain powers and if it is the state






Second, even if this first problem were not present, it is not always possible to
locate a state oﬃcial in whom the relevant power resides. Return to the example
ofmurder. Aprosecutormayhavediscretionabouthowtoenforcethelawsabout
murder, but a prosecutor certainly could not waive my legal duty not to commit
murder. That is, the prosecutor does not have the Hohfeldian power to waive
myduty not to murder you. As Steiner points out, state oﬃcials must have some
powerswithregardtothisduty,otherwise“weshouldbeveryhardputtoexplain
the occurrence of such standard criminal law practices as plea-bargaining and the
granting of clemency, pardons, reprieves, paroles and immunities from prosecu-
69tion” (1994, p.70). But even these powers fall short of the straight-up power to
waivemydutynottokillyou. AsSteineradmits,“although…oﬃcialsareempow-
ered to forgive non-compliance with such duties ex post, they still lack the power
to waive compliance with them ex ante” (1994, p.71). And although an autocrat
might have this latter power, in a constitutional democracy even the legislature
seemstolackthislatterpower.
Steiner’s answer to this second problem appeals to the Hohfeldian structure of
rights. Steinerarguesthatifastateoﬃciallackstheabilitytowaiveacriminallaw
duty,thensuchanoﬃcialisencumberedbyadisability. ButinHohfeld’sscheme,
a disability implies a correlative immunity. For example, your disability to waive
mycriminallawdutynottokillyoucorrelateswithanimmunityintheprosecutor
(an immunity from having the right to prosecute removed). But the prosecutor
alsofacesadisability. Steinerpositsthatthismeansthattheremustbesomeother
oﬃcialwhohasanimmunity. Andsincethischaincannotcontinueforever,there
must be some state oﬃcial who has a waivable immunity. As he declares, “Un-





Steiner’s argument here strikes me as terribly unsatisfying. He is simply posit-
ing that, as a structural matter, there must be something waivable at some point.






Steiner’s argument is repurposed in an excellent paper by Paul Graham (1996).
GrahamacceptsSteiner’sargumentthatdisabilitiesmustimplyimmunitiessome-
whereinthesystem. Ifprosecutorsaredisabledfromwaivingcriminallawduties,
then there must be someone who is the bearer of a correlative immunity. But,
Graham says, “in order to overcome the narrowness objection we have to go out-
side the legal system and appeal to a moral theory” (1996, p.266). In particular,
Graham appeals to a general contractualist picture. The idea is that we don’t end
Steiner’s regression by assuming that there is some state oﬃcial “fairly high up in
the hierarchy.” Instead, the relevant immunity is to be found in the parties who
agreetothesocialcompact.
The idea is that rational agents with complete power to create rights and their
correlativedutieswouldmakesomedutiesunwaivable. AsGrahamexplains,
Ideal agents recognize that non-ideal agents suﬀer from weaknesses
inreasoning,whichareparticularlyacuteinthecaseofchildrenand
the infirm. Non-ideal agents may also be subject to coercion, given
the inequality of power outside the moral choice situation. Conse-
quently,idealagentswillframelegalandpoliticalprinciplesthatnot
only allow for agency but also for the protection of agency. (1996,
p.266)
71This contractualist picture grounds the inability to control particular duties in
thecontractingparty’scontrolovermoralandlegalprinciples. Thecontrolisstill
there; it is just a more abstract, second-level control. I noted above that part of
the reason that Steiner’s argument seemed unpromising was that, not only could
aprosecutornotwaivethecriminallawduties,butinaconstitutionaldemocracy,
the legislature could not waive these duties either. Graham’s point is that this in-
ability too reflects control—control over the constitutional principles governing
thelegislature. Thecontroloverthedutiesismanifestintheprocessofchoosinga
constitutionitself. AndthisalsogoestowardansweringMacCormick’spointthat
inalienability seems to involve greater rights protection, not less. On Graham’s
view, inalienability represents a second-order choice to strengthen certain duties
intheserviceofprotectingfirst-orderagency.
Now the beauty of Graham’s move is that it not only solves the second prob-
lem in Steiner’s account, but it also oﬀers resources for an answer to the glaring
first problem. Steiner’s account seemed ill-fated from the start because, even if
there were some higher-up oﬃcial with the relevant powers, that would suggest
that the oﬃcial was the rightbearer and not the citizen. But, in Graham’s picture,
the regress does end, in a sense, with the citizen herself, albeit with an ideal rep-
resentative of her. Thus, even where individuals lack the capacity to waive the
duty that is owed to them, they ultimately control the duty that is owed to them;
their disability is, in a sense, the result of their own imposition. Inalienable and
unwaivable rights are viewed as part of the distribution of freedom that best em-
powersactualcitizensinto“small-scalesovereigns.” Inthissense,Graham’spicture
72resonateswithHart’simageofrightsasdistributingnormativecontrol.
Still, one might think that the initial problem of narrowness has not been en-
tirely resolved. The original appeal of the will theory was that it could explain
the idea that rights-based duties are owed to the rightholder by the fact that the












contractualist hypothetical is, of course, merely a device to describe what we can
justify to others. To say that your hypothetical representative holds an absolute
immunityagainstmydutynottokillyoubeingwaivedistodescribeajustification
for interfering with my freedom. In appealing to the contractualist idea, Graham
is suggesting that rights are owed to the rightholder in the sense that there is a
justificationforaprohibitiononcertaininterferencewiththerightholder.







One way to see the point is by considering a famous argument by Hart. Hart










another’s freedom requires a moral justification the notion of a right could have
noplaceinmorals;fortoassertarightistoassertthatthereissuchajustification”
(1955, pp.188-89). Hart thus concluded that there was a conditional argument
for a right to equal freedom: if there are any rights—if the practice of asserting
74rightsistomakesense—thentheremustbearighttoequalfreedom. “Ifwejustify
interference on such grounds as we give when we claim a moral right, we are in
factindirectlyinvokingasourjustificationtheprinciplethatallmenhaveanequal
right to be free” (1955, p.190). The basic idea is that the very practice of assert-
ing rights presumes that there is a question about how to justify interfering with
oneanother. Orputanotherway,thepracticeofassertingprotectionfromothers’
interferencepresupposessomebaselineofnon-interference.
This picture is, I think it is fair to say, a Kantian one. Hart’s idea of rights pre-




with a universal law, is the only original right belonging to every hu-
manbeingbyvirtueofhishumanity. (1965,6:237)
Rights, then, are about giving each person their proper share of freedom. This
conception unifies the duty—i.e. the prohibition on others—with the control of
therightholder. Thedutyexiststogivecontroltotherightholder. Indistributing
freedom, one person being bound is the correlate of another person having free-
dom. So control isn’t merely an additional feature attached to certain duties, as
theinitialconceptionofthewilltheorysuggested. AsKantexplains,
[R]ightshouldnotbeconceivedasmadeupoftwoelements,namely
an obligation in accordance with a law and an authorization of him
who by his choice puts another under an obligation to coerce him
to fulfill it. Instead, one can locate the concept of right directly in





How does this picture of rights as involving the distribution of equal freedom
linkupwiththenarrownessproblem? Thewilltheoryholdsthatrightsareabout
having control over a duty of another—they are, so to speak, about giving the
rightholder a sphere of normative control. But the narrowness objection points
out that many (and important) rights do not give the rightholder control in the
sense described. What Graham’s argument does is suggest that, even in those
cases, we can still see the right as tied to the will of the rightholder. And in this
way, it answers the narrowness objection by drawing on the tradition of Hart and
Kantinseeingrightsasdelineatingwhatrestrictionsoninterferencemarkoutthe
appropriate sphere of freedom for each person. My criminal law duty not to kill
youisowedtoyouinthesensethatthereisajustificationforinterferingwithyour
freedom that is based on the moral significance of your own will. Although you
don’tcontroltheduty,thedutyexistsasafunctionofyourcontroloveryourown
sphere. In other words, the suggested answer to the narrowness objection lies in
shifting the focus from duties that are controlled by the rightholder to duties that
givetherightholdercontrol,whichisabroadercategory.
763.3.2 Ripstein’sArgumentfromHarmlessTrespass
Arthur Ripstein has recently put forward an argument for the Kantian theory of
rights that is in general accord with Hart’s picture.⁷ For Ripstein, rights involve
having independence from the control of others. As has already been discussed,
this view is a bit diﬀerent than the basic will theory. The idea isn’t that having a
right involves having control over another party’s duty, but rather that others are
under a duty not to exert their control over the rightholder. That is, the theory is
lessaboutthecontroloftherightholderandmoreaboutfreedomfromthecontrol
of others. As Ripstein puts it, “You are sovereign as against others not because
yougettodecideaboutthethingsthatmattertoyoumost,butbecausenobodyelse
gets to tell you what purposes to pursue; you would be their subject if they did”
(2009,p.34). Asthissentencesuggests,however,theideaisstillverymuchHart’s
picture of the rightholder as a “small-scale sovereign” or Waldron’s picture of the
will theory as “essentially connected to a certain distribution of freedom.” The
distinctive sovereignty of the rightholder is, for Ripstein, the absence of anyone
else’scontrol.
Ripstein argues for the idea that rights are about independence from the will
ofanyoneelsebydrawingattentiontoexamplesofharmlesstrespass—thatis,ex-
⁷ Ripstein says that his view is not a version of the will theory (2009, p.34). I consider his
disclaiming the will theory to be based on an unduly instrumentalist picture of what the will




protect things that matter apart from them” (2009, p.34). But it seems to me that, if this were
whatthewilltheoryamountsto,itwouldbejustaversionoftheinteresttheory,treatinghaving
choicesastherelevantinteresttobeprotected.
77amples in which someone is wronged by the interference of another, even if that
interference causes no manifest harm.⁸ For a variety of reasons—because they’re
vivid, convincing, necessarily a bit artificial, and all kind of fun—I want to repro-
duceafewofRipstein’sexamples.
Suppose that, as you are reading this in your oﬃce or in the library,
I let myself into your home, using burglary tools that do no damage
to your locks, and take a nap in your bed. I make sure everything is
clean. Ibringhypoallergenicandlint-freepajamasandahairnet. Iput
myownsheetsandpillowcasedownoveryours. Idonotweighvery
much, so the wear and tear on your mattress is nonexistent. By any
ordinaryunderstandingofharm,Idoyounoharm. IfIhadthesame
eﬀectsonyourhomeinsomeotherway,noonewouldsupposeyou
had a grievance against me, let alone that you should be able to call
thelawtoyouraid. Yourobjectionistomydeed,mytrespassagainst
yourhome,nottoitseﬀects…Theharmprinciplecannotprovidean
adequate account of either the wrong I commit against you or the
groundsforcriminalizingit. (2006,p.218)
Suppose that you are opposed to the fluoridation of teeth on what
you believe to be health-related grounds. You are mistaken about
this, but committed to campaigning against fluoridation. As your
dentist, I use the opportunity created by filling one of your (many)
cavities to surreptitiously fluoridate your teeth, pleased to have ad-
vancedthecauseofdentalhealth,andprivatelytakingdelightindo-
ing so on you, the vocal opponent of fluoridation. In this example,
I don’t harm you, and there is even a sense in which I benefit you. I
still wrong you because I draw you into a purpose that you did not
choose. (2009,p.44)
⁸ There are interesting parallels between Ripstein’s argument from harmless trespass and
David Owens’s argument from “bare wrongings,” which Owens describes as follows: “A bare
wronging does no one any significant harm…A bare wronging has no wrong-base, no basis in
facts about human interest which might explain why it constitutes a wronging” (2012, p.127).
Despite focusing on similar phenomena, Ripstein and Owens come to quite diﬀerent conclu-
sions.
78IfIcauseyouminorharm,suchasthedistractionofthefewseconds
of pain you experience when slapped, the small injury is serious be-
cause it aggravates an unauthorized touching. That is why an unau-









like the following chain of thoughts captures the way in which Ripstein believes













Written this way, it is evident that the argument depends on the thought—
indicatedbypremise(3)—thateitherharmorinterferencemustprovideaunified
explanationforrightsandwrongings. Theargumentreliesonthethoughtthat,if
harms to interests cannot do the explanatory work, then interference must. This
ideaunderwritesthetransitionfrom(2)to(3)andagainfrom(5)to(6). Sothe
argument basically depends on the idea that there are really only two candidates
forexplainingwhysomethingisawrong—thatitdoesharmorthatitisunautho-
rized. In this sense, the argument gets oﬀ the grounds by already presuming an
exclusivecompetitionbetweeninterestsandcontrol,asexplanatoryelements.
Proposition(1)iswhatRipstein’sexamplesaredesignedtoshow. Itisnotewor-
thy how artificial the examples all are—one must introduce hypoallergenic paja-
masandanesthesiaand(presumably)alackofdiscoveryinordertocomeupwith
harmless wrongs. Still, there is little doubt that the examples do constitute gen-
uine wrongs. In addition to being creepy, the examples all generate a sense that
the victim has been violated. There is little doubt that, if the victim knew of the
trespass, he could certainly complain against it. And the transgressor—in his hy-
poallergenicpajamasorwithhispuckeredlips—couldnotescapemoralsanction
by saying “no harm, no foul.” One might insist that the examples are not truly






Y wrongs X can be indirectly explained in terms of harm. For example, the harm
caused by unauthorized medical treatments is suﬃcient to generate a prohibition
on treatment without consent, and the violation of this rule is what explains the
wrong committed by the unauthorized flouridator. Although this line of argu-
ment is certainly an important one to play out, it is not one that I wish to focus
on. As Ripstein points out, the trouble is that to be successful, the strategy must
be able to explain why the prohibitions take the general form when only a subset
oftheprohibitedactionsareharmful. Thesearen’tcasesinwhich“[a]lthoughno
one knows in advance which cases will or will not cause harm, everyone knows
thatmanywill,sonooneisentitledtoanexemptionafterthefactmerelybecause
noharmwascaused”(2006,p.223). Sure,sometrespassesandmedicaltreatments




cases. Rather, we prohibit such actions, and consider them to constitute wrongs,
because they are violations (trespasses, unauthorized) regardless of whether they
exposeustoariskofharm.
Proposition(5)isultimatelythetargetofthisdissertation. Ripstein,likemost
theorists, assumes that rights and wrongs are flipsides of the same coin, and he
thereforetransitionsquitefreelybetweenwrongsandrights. Itistakenforgranted
81that,bydescribingafactaboutcertainwrongs,heisshowingussomethingabout





But this creates a puzzle. Generally, the gravity of a wrong depends, in part, on
the harm that is done. Your complaint against me will be diﬀerent depending
on whether, while trespassing on your property, I ruin an intimate encounter or
accidentally scareoﬀ a potentialintruder. And, while the dentistwho fluoridates
teethwithoutpermissiondoesseemtowrongthepatient,itisasubstantiallylesser
wrongthanthedentistwhoperformsexperimentalrootcanalprocedureswithout
permission. If being wronged is, as Ripstein suggests, entirely about the imposi-
tion on the victim’s self-mastery and not on the harm that is done, then there is
nothingtoexplainwhyharmmatterstothegravityofthewrong.
Ripstein acknowledges that harm plays this role. As quoted already, he says,
“IfIcauseyouminorharm,suchasthedistractionofthefewsecondsofpainyou
experiencewhenslapped,thesmallinjuryisseriousbecauseitaggravatesanunau-
thorized touching” (2009, p.46). But why is it that the injury “aggravates” the
unauthorizedtouching? Iftheunauthorizedtouchingistheessenceofthewrong,
then why is the harm morally significant at all? Ripstein does not seem to have a
82ready explanation here.¹⁰ So, while Ripstein oﬀers a powerful argument for how
harmdoesnotmatter,hisaccountleavesquestionsabouthowharmdoesmatter.
Inthisvein,Ripstein’sfocusonharmlesswrongsoﬀersastarkcontrastwiththe
emphasis of the interest theory. Recall that the interest theory begins from the




I believe that framing matters in terms of wrongs is counterproductive for Rip-
stein’s argument. To my mind, Ripstein’s argument is more convincing as an ac-
count of rights violations. Ripstein’s focus on interference seems like a plausible
explanation of harmless violations. But I believe that there are harmless wrongs
thatdo not have this character. For example, if I think badly or inappropriately of
you in an unwarranted way, then it is natural to think of this as wronging you, as
¹⁰ThereisoneavenueherethatisclosedoﬀtoRipstein. Itmightbetemptingtothinkthatthe
bigger the harm, the further the other person’s freedom is undermined. If the dentist gives you
fluoride,thenitinterfereslesswithyourabilitytogovernyourlifethanitwouldifheremovedall
yourteethwithoutauthorization. Thegreaterharmmakesthedominationgreater. Asplausible
as this sounds, I think it is precisely the sort of thing that Ripstein’s account is committed to
rejecting. Harm does not itself constitute domination. And freedom as non-domination does
not assure you that you will not be harmed. So it seems to me that Ripstein cannot appeal to
themerefactthatgreaterharmhasbeendonetoshowthatgreaterdominationhasoccurred. (In
fact,evenusingthecomparative“greaterdomination”seemsabitodd.)
¹¹ In another way, Ripstein accepts the primacy given to wronging in the interest theory. He
too tries to understand the nature of rights by considering what it is to be wronged. He simply
resists the idea that this must be understood in terms of harm or injury. This focus on wrongs
makes his view particularly interesting, but, as I describe in the next section, arguably causes
problems.
83doingyoua wrong.¹² Nowweno doubt havethe intuition that exampleslikethis
may not be harmless—thoughts, after all, influence actions. But, as in Ripstein’s
examples,wecouldessentiallystipulateawayanypotentialharm;thewrongnessof
the action seems to be independent of the harm. The trouble for Ripstein’s argu-
ment is that these examples seem to be harmless wrongs and yet they don’t really
seem to be about interference. If the argument from harmless trespass is that a
theory of rights should be able to account for harmless wrongs, then it seems like




permissible thoughts or attitudes. Ripstein’s examples seem to be violations, in a
waythatthesenewexamplesarenot. Ithinkthisiscorrect,buttherearetwoways
that one can mean this. It might be meant to describe the internal character—
the phenomenology, one might say—of the wrong. Ripstein’s napping burglar
‘feels like’ a violation, whereas someone who simply doubts your character does
not. But I think that some non-interfering wrongs do ‘feel like’ violations. Imag-
ine, for example, that someone sits at home every night (perhaps in his lint-free
pajamas) and goes to sleep stroking a photograph of you. To me, this ‘feels like’
a violation in much the same way that Ripstein’s examples do, but this isn’t about
interference. And,eveniftherewereaphenomenologicaldistinctiontobedrawn,
why should we care that some wrongs feel like a violation, while others feel more
¹²Thistopicisthesubjectofchapter8. Inoteit,here,onlytosuggestaproblemwiththeway
thatRipsteinframeshisargument.







omy. I think this is probably correct—Ripstein’s examples do seem to be rights
violations in a way that some other harmless wrongs may not be. But if this is
correct, then Ripstein’s argument doesn’t develop an account of rights based on
the nature of wronging. Ripstein is not interested in wrongs per se, but in in a
certain subset of wrongs. This point is highlighted by the fact that Ripstein often
squeezes in a seemingly innocuous qualifier. For example, he writes, “you do not
wrong me in the sense that is of interest to us here” (2009, p.78, emphasis added).
Orhewrites,“These…typesofwrongare,Ihavesuggested,exhaustiveofwrongs






is focused on violations of our self-governance. But why focus on this category?
This question raises a general, deeper concern about the will theory. By focusing
85on non-interference, the will theory can seem to privilege an individualistic con-
ceptionofhumanlife.












as a species-being, species-life itself, society, appears as a framework
exterior to individuals, a limitation of their original self-suﬃciency.
(1844,pp.60-61)
Marx’s concern is that rights presuppose an overly individualistic conception
of morality. Treating people as, in Hart’s words, “small-scale sovereigns” means
focusing on the boundaries between people. Versions of this concern have been
articulatedmorerecentlybyarangeofthinkers. JosephRazwrites,“Myobjections
to the view that morality is right-based derive from a sense of the inadequacy of




¹³ Consider Taylor (1985, p.209): “For non-atomists, however, this very confidence in their
86In this light, Ripstein’s focus on noninterference—and that of the will theory
generally—is concerning if it immunizes us from moral criticism as long as we
act within our sphere of right. Marxists and communitarians draw attention to
morally problematic conduct that is not about interfering with the entitlements
ofothers: exploitation,layingoﬀemployees,culturaldeterioration,pornography,
and so on.¹⁴ These kinds of examples suggest that many important wrongs aren’t
trespassesupontherightsofothers.
I believe that other contexts also suggest that rights do not exhaust the moral
complaints and criticisms that we would like to make on each other. Elizabeth




wrong? Noneofthemcansay: ‘youowedittome.’ Fortheremight
benine,andifonecansaythat,allcan;butifIusedit,Iletoneatleast
gowithoutandhecan’tsayIowedittohim. Yetallcanreproachme
if I gave it to none. It was there, ready to supply human need, and
humanneedwasnotsupplied. (1967,p.17)
startingpointisakindofblindness,adelusionofself-suﬃciencywhichpreventsthemfromsee-
ing that the free individual, the bearer of rights, can only assume this identity thanks to his re-
lationship to a developed liberal civilization; that there is an absurdity in placing this subject in
a state of nature where he could never attain this identity and hence never create by contract a
societywhichrespectsit.”
¹⁴ For example: “Communitarians would be more likely than liberals to allow a town to ban
pornographic bookstores, on the grounds that pornography oﬀends its way of life and the val-
ues that sustain it. But a politics of civic virtue does not always part company with liberalism in
favor of conservative policies. For example, communitarians would be more willing than some
rights-oriented liberals to see states enact laws regulating plant closings, to protect their com-
munities from the disruptive eﬀects of capital mobility and sudden industrial change.”(Sandel,
1987,p.148).
87What Anscombe brings out is that one might have a legitimate moral complaint
even if there is nothing that one can say one is owed.¹⁵ The objection cannot be
in terms of interference with the patient’s sphere of control. The moral criticism
seemstooutstriptherightsinvolved.
And,infact,oneneednotresorttosuchextremeexamplestoseethis. Imagine
you could easily open a door for me while my arms are full, but you don’t help
me. My rights are not violated—you did not owe it to me to open the door; it
just would have been nice. Still, it would seem odd to say that I have no moral
complaint whatsoever. Surely I can feel a little miﬀed. And it’s not just that the
worldwouldhavebeenalittlebitbetter—aslightlyrosierplace—ifyou’dheldthe
door for me. That leaves out the fact that you did something to me. I had a stake
in your action, not just as anyone who wants a rosier world. Your action aﬀected
me. WhattheMarxistsandcommunitariansaddtothissimpleexampleisthefact
that many of our dependencies on each other go far deeper than holding a door.
Theycangotoourveryidentities.
Ripstein is focused on violations of individual sovereignty. But there is reason
toquestionthisfocus. Ripsteiniscorrectthatsomewrongsareaboutinterference
¹⁵ Itmaybetempting tosometo saythatthereis somethingthatis owed—namely, a chance.
However,evenifthisiscorrectinthecaseofadoctorwhoonemightviewashavingspecialobli-
gations, it’s not clear that it undermines the more general point. For example, if a rich person
owns the medicine and decides to burn it as incense, then it seem like each person might com-
plain against this—although none could say to the rich person that they were owed anything,
evenachance. Second,it’snotcleartomethateachpersoncansaythattheyareowedachance.
This is because it is not clear that the doctor must perform a lottery, let alone a lottery with par-
ticular chances. Would the complaint really be same if the doctor gave it to no one, or gave it
tothepersonwhohavethemost“quality-adjustedlifeyears”togain? Forthesereasons,itdoes
notseemtome thateachpersoncanclaima righttoXchance,justas a personholdinga lottery
ticketcould.




the strength of the will theory is its ability to describe the way in which rights are
owed to the rightholder in terms of the respect for the sovereignty of the other
person. Thewilltheoryisinitselementwhenitisdescribingrightsasprospective







lemwith narrowness. Manysignificantviolations do not seemstobe abouta de-
nialofcontrol. This problemarisesbecausecontroloverthe relevantlycorrelated
duty sometimes seems to reside in a third party—like a parent or a prosecutor—
rather than in the rightholder herself. Sophisticated versions of the will theory
mayhavesomeresourcestoaddressthisproblem,butitsexistenceisnoteworthy.
Finally,thewilltheorystrugglestoexplainthemoralsignificanceofharm. This
is true in two ways. The will theory struggles to explain the way in which the
harmdone toanothercanseemin somecircumstancestobethe basis ofa wrong
89against that person, and the will theory struggles to explain how degrees of harm
can matter to the degree of wrong that is done. In a way, this goes back to the
first point. The will theory is strongest explaining what one owes to others going
forward—respect for their control over their own lives. It is weaker at assessing
thedamagedone.
Althoughtherehasnotexactlybeenasingleunifiedargumentoverthelasttwo
chapters, it should be evident that we have, in large part, come full circle. The
interest theory starts from the thought that rights protect us from certain harms.
Ittakesasprimarytheconceptofinjuryandwronging. Fromthere,itbuildsrights
outoftheideathatsomeinterestsjustifyprohibitions,andthatthoseprohibitions
create protections for those bearing the relevant interests. As appealing as it is,
thisaccounthasweaknesses. Becausethirdpartiescanhaveaﬀectedinterests,the
theory seems to generate too many rights. What it lacked is that idea that being
a rightholder involves being in a position to perform a special sort of normative
activity.
The will theory starts with what the interest theory lacked. That is, the will
theory begins from the idea that having a right involves being able to perform a
special sort of normative activity—namely exercising control over the obligation
ofanother. Itbuildsrightsontheideaofrespectforthechoicesoftherightholder.
But this account, too, has weaknesses. It seems too narrow insofar as it does not
capture the violations involved in many significant wrongs. These problems can




the significance that harm plays in such wrongs. And so matters come full circle
totheideasofharmandinjurywithwhichtheinteresttheorybegan.
Thissensethattheinteresttheoryandthewilltheorymirroreachother’svices
and virtues can make the debate between the two seem intractable. And many





understanding of what rights there are, and to an ordinary under-
standing of what rights do for rightholders. Neither side could win
adecisivevictory,andthedebateendedinastandoﬀ. (Wenar,2005,
p.223)
At this point, my sense is that many philosophers now consider the debate to
benotonlystalebutpositivelyunproductive. Ascompetingsolutionstothesame
problem,boththeoriescanappearunpromising.










It is my opinion that these diﬀering perspectives embedded in the two theo-
riesgive the debate between themits unending quality. Sometimes, especially in
thinkingaboutwhataduty-bearershoulddogoingforward,aperspectivefocused
onrespectforanotherperson’sdomainisappropriate. Atothertimes,especiallyin
thinking retrospectively or hypothetically about in what sense one individual has
wrongedorwouldwronganotherindividual,ourperspectiveisonwhetherharm




debate. Instead, my hope is that these discussions of the interest theory and the
willtheoryhaveprimedthereaderfortheideathatthetwotheoriesaredescribing
diﬀerentmoralphenomena. Mostoftheremainingchapterswillarguethatthere
is a distinction to be drawn between our ex ante moral relations and our ex post
moral relations. If there is such a distinction, then the interest theory and will
theorycanbeunderstoodascorrespondingwithdiﬀerentsidesofit.
92Leonato: Marry, thou dost wrong me, thou dissembler, thou…
Know, Claudio, to thy head,
Thou hast so wronged mine innocent child and me
That I am forced to lay my reverence by,
And with gray hairs and bruise of many days
Do challenge thee to trial of a man.
Shakespeare,Much Ado About Nothing
Cassius: That you have wronged me doth appear in this:
You have condemned and noted Lucius Pella
For taking bribes here of the Sardinians,
Wherein my letters praying on his side,




The philosophical assumption that rights and wrongs are necessarily con-
nected has an attractive simplicity to it. Whether we are wronged would map
onto whether we had a claim to begin with, and vice versa. But human relation-
ships are not always so clean and simple. Shakespeare—a great student of life’s
complexities—wasattentivetothefactthatwearesometimeswrongedbyactions
93donetoothers,notjustbyconductdirectlyowedtoourselves. InMuchAdoAbout
Nothing, Leonato says that he is wronged by the false accusations Claudio makes
againsthisdaughter. InJuliusCaesar,CassiusbelieveshimselfwrongedwhenBru-
tus condemns one of Cassius’s friends on whose behalf he had spoken. What
Shakespeareknewwasthatourstakeinactionsdonetoothersoftenmakesusvul-
nerable to those actions as well. We are wronged not only by what is done to us,




even when he or she is not the bearer of any independent right of his or her own.
In this way, the range of actions in which others can wrong us outstrips the range
ofactionsinwhichadutyisowedtous. Rightsandwrongingsare,therefore,not
necessary correlates of one another. What we are owed beforehand and what we
cancomplainofafterwardaretwodiﬀerentthings.
4.1 Third-PartyWrongs
I begin with H.L.A. Hart’s famous example, discussed already in Chapter 2,
whichheusestoillustratethefailureofasimpleinteresttheoryofrights.
XpromisesYinreturnforsomefavorthathewilllookafterY’saged
mother in his absence. Rights arise out of this transaction, but it is
surely Y to whom the promise has been made and not his mother
who has or possesses these rights. Certainly Y’s mother is a person
concerningwhomXhasanobligationandapersonwhowillbenefit
94by its performance, but the person to whom he has an obligation to
lookafterherisY. ThisissomethingduetoorowedtoY,soitisY,not






evidenced by the fact that she could not control X’s performance. She could not
demandorexcuseperformance.¹ Inthisregard,Hart’sargumentseemscorrect.
But the last sentence of the quoted passage strikes me as, in part, false. Hart
says,essentially,thatthedutyissomethingowedtotheson(Y),andthattherefore
it is the son and not the mother who stands to be wronged. The inference here
is rather straightforward, and it is not hard to find the unstated premise. Hart
assumes, without stating it, that a person stands to be wronged by the absence
of something if and only if that something is owed to the person. This premise
underwrites a valid inference: The duty is owed to the son, not the mother; one





the promise to the mother were broken. I think it would be mistaken to say that
¹ Hart goes on to make precisely this point: “And it is Y who has a moral claim upon X,




arranged something for her, and as a result of X’s actions, she has not received it.
The law would most likely allow the mother to sue for a breach of the contract.²
And one can imagine X apologizing to the mother or the mother forgiving X. In
short,itseemsthatallofourpracticessuggestthatthemotherisamongthosewho
havestandingtofeelaggrievedbyX’saction.
I believe that these two descriptions of the case should be taken at face value.
The mother does not have a claim-right against X—this is Hart’s main point. But
she is wronged by his action—this is, one might say, Shakespeare’s point. If this
is correct, then the unstated premise that underwrites Hart’s inference must be
incorrect. Itisnotthecasethatoneonlystandstobewrongedbythosemattersin
which one is owed something. Taking these descriptions seriously means giving
upthetheoreticalpresuppositionthatrightsandwrongingsareinexorablylinked.
My argument for giving up this assumption is driven both by concrete exam-
plesinwhichtheserelationsseemtocomeapartandbytheoreticalconsiderations
aboutthe diﬀerentmoral functionsthatthese relationsplay. Elsewhere, I will of-
fertheoreticalreasonsforthinkingthatrightsandwrongsrepresentfundamentally
diﬀerent moral relationships. But first it is incumbent upon me to illustrate the
actual divergence of these moral relations in concrete examples. Hart’s example
providesthefirstglimpseofsuchadivergence.
² This is true as long as the contract is intended to benefit the mother. See Restatement









tive claim that there is another distinct moral relation in such cases—call it what
onemay. TomaintainthatLeonatoandHart’smotherarenotwrongedinthissub-
stantivesense,onemustbepreparedtosaythattheydonothaveanyuniquemoral
standing to complain—that, morally, they are just like any other bystanders. Per-
hapsthisisplausibleinoneorbothoftheseparticularcases. Butfurtherexamples
willhopefullysuggesttheimplausibilityofthisasaresponseacrosstheboard. We
have settled commitments about wrongs—commitments about the appropriate-
ness of complaint, resentment, apology, forgiveness, compensation, and so on—
that cannot be captured by focusing only on rights violations. To deny flatly the
phenomenonofthird-partywrongingis,Ithink,payingtoogreatacosttopreserve
theoreticalcleanliness.
The other temptation is to explain the way that third parties are wronged in
termsofmoresubtleclaims. Thatis,onemightthinkthatpartieslikeLeonatoand
Hart’smotheractuallydohaveclaims—somethingthatisowedtothem—though
not in the ordinary way that a direct rightholder does. Wrongs, it is maintained,
arestilltobeexplainedbytheexistenceofsomepriorclaim. Theremainderofthis







that that derive from, or piggyback on, the rights of others. If this were the case,
then one could explain how individuals are wronged by the violation of others’
rightsbyappealingtosomerightoftheirs,albeitaderivativeright.
Theinitialappealoftheapproachisobvious. Onewantstosaythatthemother
has a stake in the matter—she is no mere bystander—and yet one wants also to













98person’s right is also a derivative rightholder. For example, if you pay a contrac-
tortomakeimprovementsonyourpropertythatwillhavetheincidentaleﬀectof
improving your neighbor’s property value as well, it would be peculiar to say that
yourneighborhasaright,evenderivatively,thattheworkbecompleted. Although
yourneighbor’sinterestsinsuchacasemaypiggybackonyours,itdoesnotfollow
that her rights do. Put more generally, if Y has a right that X do φ and Z has an
interestinXdoingφ,itdoesnotseemtofollowthatZhasarightthatXdoφ.
But this actually understates the diﬃculty of appealing to derivative rights. It
is not merely that such derivative rights do not seem to exist in fact; such rights
donotseemlikeacoherentpossibility. Theproblemisthatonecannotsaywhata
derivativerightamountsto,otherthanatheoreticalplaceholder. AsKammpoints
out, if the mother cannot demand or waive performance on her own, then what
doesitmeantosaythatsheisarightholder?
The essential diﬃculty lies in explaining how the same right could be vested
in diﬀerent people at the same time. A comparison may be useful. Often, one
may transfer a right that one has to another person. For example, if I have a con-
tract with a bank to pay me certain sums of money, then it may be the case that
I can transfer some or all of my rights under that contract to you. Such transfer
isn’talwayspossible,butitoftenis. Whensuchatransferoccurs,youbecomethe
‘obligee,’ so to speak, of the obligations that were originally owed to me. In such
circumstances, your right would be dependent upon my right, in the sense that
what you have depends upon what I had. What is important to see, however, is
that the bank’s duty is owed either to me or to you, but never both. You acquire
99rightsonlyinsofarasIgivethemup.
What this analogy highlights is the conceptual diﬃculty with thinking that the
same right resides in two diﬀerent people simultaneously. But this simultaneous
possession seems to be required for the notion of a derivative right. The idea is
not that the son has a right to certain actions and that he transfers this right to
his mother. This would be perfectly intelligible, but in such a case the son would
no longer be a rightholder. Instead, the idea is supposed to be that the son is the
rightholderandthemotherisalsotherightholder(butdependently). Themother
gains a claim without the son giving anything up. But how can this be possible?
This is the force of Kamm’s point about waiver. If the son is the one who can
demand or waive performance, then the mother doesn’t have the power to waive
performance. Soitbecomeshardtoseewhatthemother’ssupposedrightwould
involve.⁴ Put very roughly, the problem is that there is only so much normative
power to go around—if it belongs to the son then it can’t belong to the mother
also,andviceversa.
This principle creates a serious problem for any appeal to derivative rights. In-
steadofthinkingoftheparties’rightsasinvolvingthesamepowers—whichraises




And it is conceivable that these diﬀerent parts of the bundle may be split up among diﬀerent
people. It may be, for example, that the son has the right to demand or waive performance but
thatthemotherhastherighttodeterminecertainaspectsofhowperformanceisrendered. But





give Sophie certain rights. Sophie’s rights are derivative, but they don’t cut into
my rights. They are new, additional rights. We might impute this structure to the
contract involving the mother. That is, we might think that the son has not hired
the caregiving to render services to his mother; rather, the son and the caregiver
have an agreement that the caregiver will owe something to the mother. Giving
themotherarightwaspartoftheagreement.⁵
Whilethisisdefinitelyacoherentarrangement,itisn’tthearrangementinHart’s
example. Hart’s example is the simpler, more straightforward case. Hart’s main
pointisthattherighttocareisn’towedtothemother,buttotheson. Itisfruitless
tonotethatwecanimagineanalternativescenarioinwhichthisisnotthecase. The
problem is that, even in the simple case in which the mother has not been specif-





any reduction in the son’s rights, one might be able to describe some relationship
⁵ The contract law rules concerning third parties involve some aspects that seem to imply
this structure. In particular, a third party can generally sue to enforce a contract only if that
was the intent of the contracting parties. But other aspects of the rules are incompatible with
this conception. For example, the third party need not be identified at the time of the contract.
Restatement(Second)ofContracts§308(1981).
101betweenthemotherandsonthataccountsforadistributionoftherightsbetween
them. The mother would hold some of the rights and the son would hold some
of them. That is, when the son acquires his rights, part of those rights automati-
callytransferredtothemother,perhapsduetoanexistingnormativerelationship
betweenthetwoofthem.
Consider an analogy. Suppose that you own a house, subject to a bank mort-
gage. You lease the house to a tenant. You are the one to whom the rental pay-
ments are owed, but the bank also acquires certain dependent rights—for exam-
ple, a right tothe tenant’s rentalpayments should youfail tomake yourmortgage
payments. In a sense, you have transferred some part of the obligations owed to
you, to the bank. But this transfer occurred automatically, by virtue of your rela-
tionshipwiththebank,whichexistedbeforetherentalagreementwasmade. The
point is that, if two parties are appropriately related, then the rights of one party






mother-son relationship colors our reaction to Hart’s example. And the Shake-
speare examples turn on the protagonists’ roles as parent and friend. Someone
whoisskepticalofmyviewislikelytothinkthatthesespecialrelationshipsmuddy






we often have a stake in what is done to other people, and family members are a
primeexampleofthisfact. Ifwesanitizedallexamplesofcomplexhumanrelation-
ships,itmightbemoreplausibletoclaimthatwrongsonlyarisewhenthewronged
person’s rights are violated. But the world is full of these complex relationships,
and it would be folly to ignore them. What I want to reject, however, is the sug-











And, substantively, it involves the extreme and outdated premise that families or
103households are a single unit, such that we cannot distinguish rights or claims of
individual family members. In Shakespeare’s time, a promise to marry may have
been given to the father as much as to the daughter. But, this archaic conception
ofmarriageishardlyrequiredinordertounderstandLeonato’sgrievance.
The appeal to special relationships need not be so extreme. A more plausible
idea is that special relationships create special underlying claims, which aﬀect the
cases. For example, we may think that the son has a responsibility to care for his
perhapselderlymother. Sheiswrongedbecauseshewasentitledtoherson’scare.
Because the contract was the son’s attempt to do what he owed his mother, the




diﬀerent from ordinary duties in being more outcome- and less action-oriented.
If you have a right that I teach you what I know, that reflects certain actions that
I am under a duty to perform. If, in contrast, I have a responsibility to educate
you, it amounts more to an obligation to see to it that you learn. This diﬀerence
cuts two diﬀerent ways. On the one hand, the responsibility seems weaker than
a duty in that I could fulfill the responsibility even if I get someone else to do the
teaching. States rather than actions are what seem to be owed. On the other
hand, the responsibility seems to be stronger because I can fulfill the right even if
everythingIknowisfalse,but,unlessyouendupeducated,theresponsibilityhas
not been fulfilled. Success matters more. So, in this sense, responsibilities are
104diﬀerentfromordinaryduties-correlative-to-a-right.
The suggestion being countenanced is that, where one party has responsibility
for another party in some way, the parties may acquire certain additional rights,
even if they are not the primary rightholders. For example, one might think that
the son’s responsibility for his mother means that the mother has some claim on
her son. When the son contracts to get care for his mother, he is attempting to
fulfillthisclaim. Themotheriswrongedbythebadcaregiverbecauseheprevented
her son from fulfilling his responsibilities as her son, and, in this sense, he denied
herthattowhichshewasentitled.




the same complaint if the hiring party were not her son, but rather an unrelated
benefactororacharitableorganization.
Or consider a diﬀerent recipient. Suppose that instead of hiring X to aid his
mother,thesondecidesthathewantstoperformarandomactofkindnessbygiv-
ingawaymostofhisfortune. Heassemblesalistofthousandsofpeoplewhohave
in some way or another contributed to the community—schoolteachers, nurses,
veterans, and so on. At an event for these people, one person’s name will be ran-
domly drawn and a large cash prize will be awarded. There will be one of those






feelingwould not be the “awshucks” attitude thatyou might haveupon discover-





on your part, because you did not rely on receiving the money. The son had no
responsibilitytogiveyouthemoney. Infact,youhavenosubstantiverelationship
withthesonwhatsoever.⁸
There is one relationship that you do have with the son: that of being his in-
tended beneficiary. Of course, this is a looser sense of ‘intended’ than in the case
of the mother, in that he didn’t really intend you as his beneficiary as much as he
intendedwhoever it waswhosenamegotpulledout oftherandomdrawing. One
might still cling to the idea that you have a right because the son has a right and
⁷Inregardstoownership,thediﬀerencebetween‘yours’and‘allbutyours’iscritical. Rights
serve to distinguish a point at which the property shifts from being one person’s to another’s.
Upuntilsuchapointisreached,apersondoesnothavearighttotheproperty. Afterthatpoint,
the original owner must give up the right in question. Of course, all associated rights need not
transfer at once. Some aspects of ownership can transfer before others. But with regard to any
particularnormativepower—any“stickinthebundle”aslawyerswouldputit—itmustliewith








ship. The relationship of intended beneficiary is too flimsy. Notice, for example,
that the son might only have wanted to give the money away for a tax benefit or
as a public relations stunt—that you benefit might have been irrelevant to him.
Theexamplereliesonaconfluenceofyourinterestswiththeson’srights,butthat





ultimately correct. There need be no particular relationship between the person
towhomthedutyisowed—thatistherightholder—andthepersonwhoendsup
beingtheprimaryvictimoftheduty’sviolation.
Suppose that you overhear your coworker talking to a customer at work. Your
coworker tells the customer that the South Bridge has been fixed and is now op-
erational. You don’t think anything of it at the time. But later that day, you are
suﬀering from an asthma attack and need to rush to the hospital. You try to take





tions; you would not be mistaken in feeling wronged. The familiar package of
emotions and practices would seem to apply: resentment, apology, forgiveness,
etc. Thisisnot,however,becausethecoworkerviolatedyourrightsinanyobvious
way. Anditcertainlyisnotbecausethereceivingcoworkerhadaresponsibilityto
make sure you didn’t hear anything false, from which you might have a derivative
right.
The reader inclined to preserve the correlation of rights and wrongs is likely to
appealtoadiﬀerentexplanationforthewronginginthiscase. Itwillbenotedthat
your coworker seems to have been negligent in spreading his falsehood. Thus, in
seekingsomerightofyoursthatthecoworkerviolates,anaturalcandidateisaright
not to be negligently subjected to false information. Your coworker wrongs you
byspreadingmisinformation. Heought,accordingtothislineofthought,tohave
recognized the possible harms of such an action. His failure toward you is one
of carelessness. It might even be suggested that your coworker would not have
wronged you if he had taken every precaution not to be overheard, but had been
foiled only by your eavesdropping. Thus, he is in a position to wrong you only
becausehedidnottakesuchprecautions.
⁹Forarealexamplepresentingasimilarproblemaboutthirdpartiesanddutiesoftruth,see
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997). In that case, a 13-year-
old girl sued the former employer of the vice principal who sexually assaulted her, because the
former employer had given unreservedly positive references for the vice principal position de-
spite knowing of prior charges of sexual misconduct and impropriety. The court decided that
theformeremployerwasliabletothegirl,butthecourt’sattempttoforcethisconclusionwithin
arights-basedframeworkisquiteproblematic.
108There is, I suppose, a duty not to spread false information negligently. For ex-





gation that is correlative to a right. Although the liar or the actor should perhaps
becognizantofpotentialbystanders,abystanderwouldnotnecessarilybeableto
claim an entitlement to be shielded from the falsehoods, e.g., “You owe it to me
to do that behind closed doors.”¹⁰ Notice here how the theoretical insistence on




vacy when they decide to promulgate lies. A first problem, therefore, is that this
response seems to proliferate rights beyond the claims we would normally make
ofoneanother.
A second problem is that, assuming that there is an obligation not to spread
falsehoodsnegligently,thisobligationdoesnotnecessarilymapontothenatureof
the wrong committed. The wrong, I believe, would be based on the lie itself, not
¹⁰Itisnoteworthy,aswell,thatincasesinwhichathirdpartycouldbringalegalsuit,itwould
notbebroughtfornegligencebutratherunderthedoctrineof“transferredintent.” Thethought
wouldnot bethatthethirdpartywaswrongedthroughnegligence,but thatthe wrongful intent
withregardtoonepersoncanbe“transferred”tothecomplainingparty. IfIattempttodefraud
a third party but end up defrauding you, then you could sue me as though I had intentionally
defraudedyou;youwouldn’tsuemefornegligentlydefraudingyou.
109on the failure to prevent overhearing. In being called upon to justify his action,
the coworker would be required to justify his lie, not his negligence. Your com-
plaintwouldtaketheform,“Whydidyoulielikethat?” Itwouldn’thavetheform,
“Why didn’t you make sure that I couldn’t hear you?”¹¹ And the coworker could
notdefendhimselfbysaying, “Icouldnothaveforeseenthatyouwouldoverhear






the fact that the third-party relied upon the false information. To use yet another
example from Shakespeare, in King Lear, Cordelia is wronged by the lies that her
sisterstellherfather,butnotbecauseshebelievesthemtobetrue. Thewrongisn’t
that the sisters have negligently conveyed false information to Cordelia. Rather,
the wrong arises because the sisters’ wrongful actions aﬀected Cordelia. It had
nothing to do with negligence or reliance. Of course, one might think that the
overheard lie is completely diﬀerent. But, as mentioned above, this explanation
requiresthinkingthatthewrongisn’tactuallybasedonthelieitself. Ithinkthisis
¹¹ If this is not apparent, consider two points. First, notice how this response seems to con-
donethelieitself,asthoughtheonlyobjectionwastotheclumsinessofitsexecution. Itisthesort
of response that would make sense if you and your coworker have a shared malevolence toward
the customer. Otherwise, it has the peculiarity of someone wounded as collateral complaining
about cold-blooded murderer’s choice of weapon. Second, this response suggests that the com-
plaint would be substantively diﬀerent if, instead of overhearing the lie, you had been told that
the bridge was fixed by the deceived customer. But the complaint against your coworker seems
essentiallythesameinbothcases: “Yourlieendeduphurtingme.”
110amistake. Theoverheareriswrongedbythelie—notbythefailuretotakeprecau-
tions against being overheard—and Cordelia is wronged by her sisters’ lies—not
bytheirfailuretoinsulateCordeliafromtheirdeceit.
If one believes, nonetheless, that the wrong caused by the overheard lie ought
tobeexplainedintermsofnegligence,perhapsfurtherexampleswillmakeappeals
to rights against negligence seem less tenable. Situations arise where even negli-
gence cannot possibly explain the special position of an injured third-party. For
example, suppose that a local mom-n’-pop store and Walmart are competitors in
thelocalretailmarket. Bothhavevariousdealingswithlabor. Momn’popalways
treats labor fairly. Suppose (hypothetically) that Walmart, in contrast, exploits
labor at every turn, violating labor’s contractual entitlements and extracting un-
compensated work as a result. By systematically violating labor’s rights, Walmart
is able to charge less for its goods. This competitive advantage puts the mom-n’-
popstoreoutofbusiness.
I think that mom n’ pop may reasonably feel aggrieved by Walmart. After all,
Walmart has unfairly put them out of business. But this is true even though Wal-
mart never violates the rights of mom n’ pop.¹² This fact cannot be chalked up to
Walmart being negligent with regard to mom n’ pop. The problem isn’t that the
injury to mom n’ pop was negligently inflicted (after all, competitors can seek to
puteachotheroutofbusiness),butthatitwasunfairlyinflicted.¹³
¹² Nor, as the example is constructed, does Walmart violate any public legal obligation, like
a criminal law. It is not the case the Walmart acts illegally. In the example, Walmart undoubt-
edly acts wrongly, but it only violatesthe private rights of labor. For an interesting discussion of
the idea that strategic marketplace behavior that harms the general public counts as a wrong to
competitors,seeReed(1916).
¹³ Contrast this with Ripstein, who emphasizes that harms resulting from economic compe-
111Thispoint—thatthewrongtoathirdpartyoftencannotbeexplainedbysome
right that one not be negligently harmed—is particularly clear when the primary
rights violation is one of negligence. Consider what is a very simple but clear ex-
ample of a wrong without an underlying right: the mother who loses a child to a
drunkdriver. Thedrunkdriverwrongsthechildbynegligentlyviolatingherright
to a safe roadway. The direct rights violation here is a case of negligence. But I
thinkanyreasonablepersonwouldalsosaythatthemotherisalsowrongedbythe
drunkdriver—justasLeonatoiswrongedinMuchAdoAboutNothing. Thisisnot
because the mother is entitled to the drunk driver’s care in whom he negligently






Perhaps there is some other candidate right that I have not yet catalogued that
might explain even these cases, but it seems to me that the exercise will only be-
come increasingly strained. Unless one simply posits a general right that others
titionarenotwrongsbecausethereisnorighttoone’spatrons. Hewrites,“youdomenowrong
by oﬀering a product similar to mine but at a better price, even though I lose customers” (2009,
p.39). And again, “If you lure my customers away by providing a better combination of product
and price, I may be much worse oﬀ. You do not wrong me, because I still have my means at my
disposal…Ihadnorightthatmycustomerscontinuetopatronizeme. Ihadonlyarighttooﬀer
them incentives to enter into commerce with me.” (2009, p.49). Ripstein is, of course, correct
that businesses to not have a right to their customers and that taking customers away does not,
initself,constituteawrong. Butitdoesnotfollowthatawrongwillnever arisewhereabusiness
losesitscustomers.
112not act wrongly—an option I will consider below—there will always be the pos-
sibilitytoconstructanexampleinwhichactingwronglytowardsonepersonends
up wronging some other person who did not obviously have a right concerning





graf v. Long Island Railroad Company. The Long Island Railroad Company’s em-
ployeesnegligentlyattemptedtopushapassengerontoatrain,causinghimtodrop




Intuitively, I think that Mrs. Palsgraf’s complaint is perfectly coherent. We un-
derstandthethoughtthatthecompanyhasdoneherawrong;shewasinjuredand
the company is to blame for those injuries. But the New York Court of Appeals
rejected her complaint as a matter of principle. The court did not question either
the wrongfulness of the company’s actions or the fact that they led to Mrs. Pals-
graf’sinjuries. Instead,Cardozoexplainedthat“[w]hattheplaintiﬀmustshowis‘a
wrong’toherself,i.e.,aviolationofherownright,andnotmerelyawrongtosome
one else, nor conduct ‘wrongful’ because unsocial.”¹⁴ That is, the court held that,
¹⁴248N.Y.339,343-44(1928).




Palsgraf opinion, which is now canonical in Anglo-American injury law, is funda-
mentally mistaken. Although it is true that no right of Mrs. Palsgraf was violated,
it does not follow that she was not wronged. Morally, Mrs. Palsgraf did have a
validcomplaintagainsttherailroad;shewasmorallyentitledtoholdthecompany
accountable, demand compensation, feel resentment, and so on. So, as a piece of
normative reasoning, I think that the court’s opinion is incorrect. The alternative
is to read the opinion as a stipulation that ‘wrongs’ will be limited to violations of
one’s own rights.¹⁵ What I have tried to make clear, however, is that such a stip-
ulation flies in the face of our moral practices and experiences. The relationship
with a wrongdoer in terms of complaint and holding accountable—call it what
onemay—isnotlimitedtorightholders.
¹⁵ One might plausibly read Palsgraf as only about what counts as a ‘legal wrong,’ which is
a term of art bearing no relationship with our moral concept. This more limited reading makes
senseonlyifthereisareasonforadoptingaspecialized,legalmeaningof‘wrong,’divergentfrom
our everyday moral usage. Whether such a reason exists raises questions about the purpose of
tort law that are not my subject here. In part because I do not see the purposes of tort law as
giving us reason for such a limited reading, I think it makes more sense to read the opinion as
making a general point about the relationship between wrongs and rights—a point that might





More precisely, the examples undermine the principle that X wrongs Y only if Y
hasarightthatXviolates.
Thereaderwillnote,however,thattheexamplesstillinvolvesomerightsviola-
tion, albeit not the right of the wronged individual. In the examples, one party is
injuredasaresultoftheviolationofarightofsomeotherparty. Onemightwon-
derwhetherthisisanecessaryfeatureoftheexamples. Onemightthinkthatthis
would at least preserve the thought that X wrongs Y only if X violates some right.
This principle might be viewed as preserving some notion that rights and wrongs
arenecessarycorrelatesofoneanother.
Idonotbelievethateventhisweakerprincipleistrue. Inthissection,Iwilloﬀer
some reasons for doubting it. I believe that one can wrong another person even
when one does not violate any rights. But it is worth emphasizing that, strictly
speaking,thisclaimisnotnecessarytomycentralargument. Myprimarypointis
that the two-place relations ‘Y has a right against X’ and ‘X wrongs Y’ are distinct
from one another. Still, it is worth considering the relationship between wrong-
ingsandrightsviolationsmoregenerally.
Ibelievethat,forXtowrongY,isitnotrequiredthatXviolatesanyright. Rather,
I think that there are examples where X wrongs Y and only something weaker is
true: X acts wrongly. In the examples discussed already, one party acts wrongly
115insofar as he or she violates the rights of another party. This wrongful action




I will begin by considering self-regarding duties. Self-regarding duties are some-
what controversial and problematic. To the extent that they exist, however, they




In certain respects, self-regarding duties resemble obligations that are owed to
particular individuals correlative to rights. They seem to have a moral character,





person who is bound by a duty. It does not seem possible that one person could
be both the holder of control and the one bound, simultaneously. As Hart puts
it,“itappearsabsurdtospeakofhavingdutiesorowingobligationstoourselves—
of course, we may have ‘duties’ not to do harm to ourselves, but what could be
116meant…byinsistingthatwehavedutiesorobligationstoourselvesnottodoharm
to ourselves?” (1955, pp.181-82). Because duties regarding the self have both
these characteristics, their disregard can naturally be described as acting wrongly,
butnotviolatinganyrights.
I want to suggest that, in violating self-regarding duties, one can wrong others.
Whenwedonotdowhatweoughtwithourselves,wemaywrongthosewhohave







The obligation not to commit suicide is something of a peculiar self-regarding
duty. Themorecommonexamplesinvolveourobligationstobetterourselvesand
not to waste our lives and talents. Failure to respectthese obligations also can be
thebasisforwrongingothers,Ithink. Aclassicillustrationofthisphenomenonis




the son’s actions. If we could not, then the son’s declaration that he has sinned
against hisfather, hiscontritiondirectedtowardhisfather, andthefather’sforgiv-
117ingthesonwouldnotmakesense.
Although the prodigal son wrongs his father, it would be quite odd to say that
this is because he violates anyone’s rights. As already noted, we do not normally
thinkthatself-regardingdutiescorrelatewithrightsagainstourselves. Nor,Ithink,
hasheviolatedarightofhisfather. Parentsundoubtedlyhaveamassiveinterestin
their children making the most of their lives, but it is not the basis for a right that
parents have against their children. But, by not making the most of himself, the
sonhasfailedthosewhocareabouthimandwhohaveaninterestinhisthriving.
It is easy to see this structure replicated in a range of contexts, which is why
it makes for a good parable. One might feel that one has wronged a spouse by
failing at work. For example, in Bleak House, Richard, unable to apply himself
professionally with any consistency, remarks about his fiancée: “I love her most
devotedly; and yet I do her wrong, in doing myself wrong, every day and hour”
(1853, p.228). One might similarly feel that, through one’s personal failings, one
alsofails one’schild. Notmakingthe mostof one’stalentsmightevenbe thought
towrongafriend. Forexample,inthefilmGoodWillHunting,Chuckiecomplains
toWillthathewillwrongtheirfriendsifhedoesn’tputhistalentstouse: “[Y]ou,








to apologize thirty-nine years later for abruptly abandoning his class.¹⁶ In Octo-
ber 2012, British Education Secretary Michael Gove wrote a letter apologizing to
his grammar school French teacher, stating “Because we misbehaved, we missed
out…Andforthatyoudeservemyapology.”¹⁷ Justaboutanyonecanimagineex-
pressing a similar sentiment to a former teacher. We have the sense that, in not
taking advantage of our opportunities, we may do an injustice to the teacher or
mentor who puts energy or faith into our self-improvement. One would hardly
say,however,thatteachershavearighttotheirstudents’besteﬀorts.
Of course, the suicidal daughter or the prodigal son will be clearer examples
for a skeptical reader. They present most pointedly the idea that, assuming there
are self-regarding duties, one can wrong others by violating those duties. But I






with the actions of other people. This can happen in deliberate and overt ways,
¹⁶ Tom Hallman, Jr., “A teacher, a student and a 39-year-long lesson in forgiveness,” The Ore-
gonian,April21,2012.
¹⁷ See, e.g., Sarah Harris, “I’m sorry, Sir! 30 years on, Gove apologises to French teacher for
his’clever-dick’questions,”The Daily Mail,Oct. 22,2012.
119as when one chooses to have a child. Or, probably more often, it can happen or-
ganically, as some relationship or interdependence evolves between people. In
particular,onemaycometorelyontheexpectationthatanotherpersonwillcon-
form to certain norms of conduct. When that person defies our expectations by
doingsomethingthatheorsheoughtnotdo,wemayhaveacomplaintagainsthim
orher.
This proposition is at odds with the common thought that, as long as we don’t
violate anyone’s rights, no one can have any complaint against us. This thought
is generally premisedon the idea thatanother person’smere relianceon us—that





depriving me of shade, you harm me, but you do not wrong me in
thesensethatisofinteresttoushere. Althoughyouperformanaﬃr-
mativeactthatworsensmysituation—exposuretolightdestroysmy
mushrooms—I do not have a right, as against you, that what I have
remainsinaparticularcondition. (2009,pp.77-78)¹⁸
AsRipsteinsetsuptheexample,Iwouldagreethattheneighbordoesnotseem













likely leave the garage there forever. Or suppose that the owner simply hates the
factthatthemushroomfarmer’sheifersalwaystaketheblueribbonatthecounty
fair, and the owner tears down the garage only as a vindictive retaliation against
the mushroom farmer. Or imagine that the rustic old garage is being torn down
tomakeroomforanappallinggaudyglassgazebothatwilloﬀendallaestheticsen-
sibility in the rural Vermont shire where this drama is set. It seems to me that is
caseslikethese,themushroomfarmermayverywellbewronged.¹⁹
Whatisrequired,Ithink,ismerelythatthereisadecisivereasonfortheneigh-
bor not to tear down the garage, such that he would act wrongly if he does tear it
down. The reason could be rights-based. For example, the neighbor might have
entered a conservation agreement with the local land trust. But, as the previous
paragraph was meant to show, there could be other reasons that have little to do
with anyone’s rights. They could be legal, aesthetic, religious, or perhaps even
prudential.
¹⁹ It seems to me that knowledge of the reliance is not even necessary in these cases. Knowl-
edgeofreliancecansupplythereasonwhysomeoneshouldnotaltertheirconductwithoutgood
reason,buttherecanbeotherreasonswhysomeoneactswrongly.











Frank Greystock was not her lover. Ah,—there was the worst of it
all! She had given her heart and had got nothing in return…Then




blush upon her cheek that there should have been so much, and yet




Lucy Morris, the girl described, does not view her self as having a claim on
Frank’s love—it is essential to the story that they are decidedly not engaged or
anything. And yet she feels that there has been so much between them that he
shouldbecommittedtoher. Heismakingamistakeandlettingherdown.
122Onceoneopensone’smindtoit,thereareawidevarietyofinstanceswherewe
consider ourselves aggrieved because we are let down. That is, we are aggrieved




I don’t think that any of these folks would have, except in the most heated mo-
ment,insistedthattheyhadanyauthorityorrightoverwhatwasdone—thatDy-
lan or O’Malley or James should have gotten their authorization. And yet they
would have insisted that they—along with other music fans or New Yorkers or
Cavsfans—haveseriousgroundsforcomplaintandresentment.
Of course, fans can be fanatical, so we may find these sentiments somewhat
over-the-top. ButIdon’tthinkthatweshouldconsiderthemincoherent. Theyare
examplesofthefactthat,whenwehaveastakeintheactionofanotherandwhen
we perceive that person to have acted wrongly, we consider ourselves aggrieved.
Weareaparticipant,notjustanobserver,inthehumandrama;andourharmisn’t
theresultofsomenaturalevent,buttheresultofacriticizablehumanaction. This
creates a morally significant relationship between one who has been injured and
one who is accountable. Whenever we act wrongly, it has the potential to create
sucharelationshipbecausepeoplesooftenhaveastakeineachother’slives.
1234.3 TheOutwardRippleofBadActs
This view of wrongs may seem to open us to absurdly expansive liability for
our bad actions. One may worry that the view that I have been defending—that
one can wrong third parties towhom one did not directly owea duty—would be












have happened but for my bad act. The causation must be appropriately ‘strong.’




connections count as violating a right. You have a right against being injured by my negligent
driving. Butsupposethatmynegligentdrivingcausesmetostrikeatree,whichfallsovercausing
anaircurrent,whicheﬀectsweatherpatterns,causingyoutosliponsomeblackicehourslater. I
124Assuming, however, that they are the result of a recognizable chain of cause-
and-eﬀect, I believe that we are accountable for all consequences of our immoral
actions. Unforeseen wrongs to third parties are a critical and familiar attribute of
our moral experience. Consider an example from Robert Penn Warren’s novel,
All The King’s Men. One of the novel’s subplots involves an upstanding charac-
ter named Cass Mastern, whose one bad act consists of having an aﬀair with his
friend’s wife, Annabelle Trice. Upon discovering the aﬀair, Mr. Trice removes





At that moment of perturbation, when the cold sweat broke on my
brow,Ididnotframeanysentencedistinctlytomymind. ButIhave
looked back and wrestled to know the truth…It was…the fact that
allofthesethings—thedeathofmyfriend,thebetrayalofPhebe,the
suﬀering and rage and great change of the woman I had loved—all
had come from my single act of sin and perfidy, as the boughs from
the bole and the leaves from the bough. Or to figure the matter dif-
ferently, it was as though the vibration set up in the whole fabric of






of proximate cause. This is because one might think that one only proximately causes those










our fortunes, both material and moral. It may be tragic but it is not absurd that
one immoral act can mean that we have wronged unforeseen others. Although
Cass Mastern could never have foreseen the eﬀect that his act would have on the
slave,hedevoteshimself,unsuccessfully,tofindingPhebeandsavingherfromthe
whorehouses. This is intelligible as an attempted act of repair. The two become
unitedinarelationshipofonewhohaswrongedandonewhoiswronged.
I want to make clear one thing that I am not saying here. One might read the
above-quotedpassagefromAllTheKing’sMenasmerelydescribingtheclichéidea
thatallthingsareinterrelatedinunimaginableways—theproverbialbutterflyflap-
ping its wings. This is not my point, nor, I think, is it Robert Penn Warren’s.
Rather, the point is uniquely about bad acts—that badness seems to spread in
a special kind of way. The butterfly that innocently flaps its wings isn’t morally
accountable for the hurricane, but Cass Mastern is accountable, in some morally
significant sense, for the evils that result from his “single act of sin and perfidy.”
Wrongnessspreads in a unique way. It is only when we commita bad actthat we
aremorallyliableforwhateverfollows.
126Philosophers and legal scholars have occasionally noticed—often with some
discomfort—that there is something expansive about the way in which bad con-
sequencescanbeimputedtobadactions. InhisdissentinthePalsgraf case,Judge
Andrews argues that there can be liability for injuries to unforeseen plaintiﬀs. He
writes, “It may be said this is unjust. Why? In fairness [the negligent person]
should make good every injury flowing from his negligence. Not because of ten-
derness toward him we say he need not answer for all that follows his wrong.”²¹
Similarly, Elizabeth Anscombe forcefully rejects the idea that “you can exculpate









Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes: “The good or bad results of an action that is




²² Note that Kant says only that one is accountable for the bad consequences of wrongful
acts. Ithinkthatthisasymmetrictreatmentofgoodandbadconsequencescausesproblemsfor
one natural way to interpret Kant’s views here. One might defend Kant’s view in the following
127ThisprincipleisatworkinKant’smuch-malignedessay“OnaSupposedRight
toLieBecauseofPhilanthropicConcerns.” Kantarguesthatifonetellsalie,even
to a murderer at the door, one is responsible for the resulting evil consequences,
nomatterhowunforeseen. Hewrites,
[I]fbytellingalieyouhaveinfacthinderedsomeonewhowaseven
now planning a murder, then you are legally responsible for all the
consequences that might result therefrom. But if you have adhered




unobserved and thus eluded the murderer, so that the deed would
not have come about. However, if you told a lie and said that the
intended victim was not in the house, and he has actually (though
unbeknownst to you) gone out, with the result that by so doing he
has been met by the murderer and thus the deed has been perpe-
trated,theninthiscaseyoumaybejustlyaccusedashavingcausedhis
death. Forifyouhadtoldthetruthasbestyouknewit,thenthemur-
derer might perhaps have been caught by neighbors who came run-
ning while he was searching the house for his intended victim, and
thus the deed might have been prevented. Therefore, whoever tells
a lie, regardless of how good his intentions may be, must answer for
theconsequencesresultingtherefromevenbeforeaciviltribunaland
must pay the penalty for them, regardless of how unforeseen those
consequencesmaybe. (1993,p.65)
way: When you follow your duty, then what you did was not really up to you. As a result, it
is only when you do not follow your duty that we can think of you as the “the author” of what
happens. The point would be, in a sense, strictly metaphysical. But if this were correct, then
all of the results—good and bad—of an agent breaking a duty should be imputed to that agent.
If the point is only about metaphysical attribution, then the good consequences of breaking a
duty should equally be attributed to the agent. For this reason, I think that the thesis should be
viewedasmakingapointaboutmorality. Thatthepoint,andthesubsequentdiscussionsamong
commentators, is framedin termsof “imputation,”which suggeststhe metaphysicalidea, seems
to me to be unfortunate. For further discussions of how Kant ought to be interpreted, see Hill
(2000,Ch.6);Timmermann(2008);Reath(2006,Ch.9).






sequences that result from acting wrongly.²³ The murderer-at-the-door example
hasasubstantialsimilaritytosomeoftheexamplesIhaveoﬀered. Inparticular,in
thebridgeexample,Iarguedthatthecoworkerismorallyliableforthebadconse-
quences that his lie produces, even the unforeseen consequences to a third party.




to make the point even clearer, suppose that you have a strong reason to believe
that he does have a right to be given a truthful answer—imagine that he is your
friend’s boyfriend, or a police oﬃcer carrying a warrant. You nevertheless lie in
violation of this right—perhaps because you don’t like the boyfriend, or because
youareconcernedthatthecopmightfindthedimebagofpotthatyouhaveinyour
pocket. Now suppose that Kant’s imagined chain of events comes to pass: your
friendhas,unbeknownsttoyou,snuckouttoavoidthemurdererand,onaccount
²³ Others have defended Kant on this point as well. See, e.g., Schwarz (1970). Christine
Korsgaardnotes,“TheadvantageoftheKantianapproachisthedefinitesphereofresponsibility.
Your share of the responsibility for the way the world is is well-defined and limited, and if you
actasyouought,badconsequencesarenotyourresponsibility.” (1996,p.150).
129ofyourlie,befallspreciselythefatethatshehadsoughttoevade.
In this situation, I think Kant would be right; you would have wronged your
friend by virtue of your lie. Only a strangely callous person would not feel partly
at fault for what has transpired. Supposing your friend survived, she might rea-
sonablyask,“Whatthehellwereyoudoing?” InKant’swords,youwouldhaveto
“answer for the consequences” of your action. To say this isn’t to deny that the
murderercommitsawrong. Wrongingisn’tzerosum,andthesameinjurycanbe
thebasisformoreorfewerwrongings. Inthiscase,yourfriendiswrongedbythe





door examples is that, in the variation, telling the lie constitutes acting wrongly.
This is true ex hypothesi because of the stipulation that you believe the person at
thedoortohavetherighttoatruthfulanswer. Intheoriginalexample,incontrast,








combined with the premises that one is responsible for the bad consequences of





So why think this? Kant’s thought is that truthfulness is a duty owed to hu-
manity at large. He writes, “Truthfulness in statements that cannot be avoided




the lie as “a wrong done to mankind in general” (1993, pp.64-65). Thus, even if
we do not have a duty owed to the murderer to be truthful, we have a duty owed
tohumanityingeneral.
In his Palsgraf dissent, Judge Andrews makes similar statements about the du-
ties of care that are violated when we are negligent. He says that a lack of care is
“a wrong not only to those who happen to be within the radius of danger but to
all who might have been there—a wrong to the public at large.”²⁴ He goes on to
suggestthatthedutyisowedtoeveryone. Hesays,“Duecareisadutyimposedon
²⁴248N.Y.339,349(1928)(Andrews,J.,dissenting).
131each one of us to protect society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or
C alone…Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those
actsthatmayunreasonablythreatenthesafetyofothers.”²⁵Thisunderstandingof
duty allows Andrews to view Mrs. Palsgraf’s complaint as “original and primary”
concerning “a breach of duty to herself,” and not merely one “subrogated to any
right of action of the owner of the parcel.” Andrews thus preserves the idea that a
plaintiﬀ must have been owed a duty by arguing that the duty not to be negligent
isowedtoeveryone.
This thesis—that our duties are owed to humanity at large—has the poten-
tial to restore the correlation between rights and wrongings. This approach con-
cedes that sometimes individuals are wronged even without having a right that
is uniquely their own violated. It also concedes that injured third parties have
no more claim-rights than bystanders—they are just like anyone else. What it
addsisthatanyone—byvirtueofbelongingtothemoralcommunity—hasaclaim
againstanyoneelsenottoactwrongly. Thus,thewrongdonetothirdpartiesmay
be explained in terms of the violation of an outstanding right that people behave
morally. Mrs. Palsgraf,themotherwhodoesnotreceivethecarepromisedtoher
son,thecoworkerwhooverhearsthelie,themom’npopstorethat’sdrivenoutof
business, the slave Phebe, and the friend who runs into the murderer as she tries
toslipouttheback—allofthemdoinfacthavearightthatisviolated,namely,the
rightofallhumanitythatothersactaccordingtotheirduties.
It is important to distinguish between two versions of the idea that duties are
²⁵Id. at350.
132owed to humanity at large. According to the first version, duties are owed to ev-
eryoneasopposedtoanyoneinparticular. ThisisessentiallyAndrews’sconception
of negligence. Care isn’t owed to anyone in particular, but instead to society at
large. Thus, Andrews contrasts negligence with violations of duties owed only to
certain people, such as duties to invitees onto a property or to the farmers pro-
tected by an ordinance. This way of thinking of a duty as owed to humanity at
large essentially involves denying that the duty has ‘relational’ or ‘bipolar’ charac-
ter. Whileitisplausiblethatsomeobligationslackthischaracter—whatAndrews





at large, which I will call the moral pact thesis. The idea behind the moral pact
thesisisthat,inadditiontoowingdutiestoprimaryrightholders,eachpersonalso
owes it to everyone else not to act wrongly. We owe it to everyone else to act
morally becausemorality is, roughly speaking, a pactbetweenall members of the
moral community. Thus, when I act contrary to duty, I violate a social compact
at the same time. By way of analogy, it is a bit like the student who agrees to an
honor code: when he cheats, he not only violates his obligation not to cheat but
alsobreakshiswordandwrongstheschoolcommunity. Thisthesiswouldexplain
thecasesofthird-partywrongingwhileretainingthecorrelationthesis’sinsistence
that all wrongs have a correlated right. The correlated right in these cases is the
133rightofallpersonstoexpectthatotherswillconformtomorality.
Thereissomethingcorrectinthespiritofthisresponse. Whatmakesthethird-
party wronging cases plausible is that, although the third parties are not the pri-
mary rightholders, acting morally seems to be something, in some sense, owed to
everyone. Although I partly agree with its sentiment, I think that the moral pact
thesisisincorrect.
The first hint of diﬃculty for the moral pact thesis is evident in the murderer-
at-the-door example itself. As I’ve noted, Kant believed that you owe a duty to
humanity in general even though you do not owe a duty to the murderer. This
seems to produce the wrong results. The reason it produces the wrong results, I
want to suggest, is that your obligation actually is dependent on the right of the
murderer. If someone has a right to a truthful answer, then you have a duty to





the duty could be owed to the individual person and yet also to humanity in gen-
eral. A Kantian, I suspect, would say something like, “it is owed to humanity in






of William and Mary’s honor code, the oldest in the nation, states, “I pledge on
my honor not to lie, cheat, or steal, either in my academic or personal life.” The
famousBrighamYoungUniversityhonorcodeleadsoﬀwith“BeHonest.” Interms
of shaping what one should and shouldn’t do, this is pointlessly redundant. The





to describe three interrelated ways to see this. First, there is what I will call the
doublingproblem. Theproblemisthatthemoralpactseemstoaddasecondduty
ontopoftheprimaryduty,whichisatbestredundantandmorelikelymisleading.
To see the point, consider an example. Imagine that you promise me that you
will return my bike by Wednesday, and then you don’t. I had been planning to




then you have wronged Sylvia. She might complain to you about your breached
²⁶ If a would-be murderer knocks on a BYU door, he could not say, “I know that I wouldn’t
normally have a right to be given a truthful answer, but as a fellow member of the honor code,
youhavepromisednottolietome.”
135promise, and you might plausibly apologize and oﬀer your own physical labor in
thefutureascompensation.
ThemoralpactthesiswouldexplainthewayinwhichyouwrongSylviainterms
of you and her sharing an agreement to act morally which you do not follow in
breaking your promise to me. So far, so good. The problem arises in that you
also share this moral pact with me. If there is any pact saying, “one should keep
one’spromises,”thensurelyI’mapartytoitaswell. Sonowyouhavebrokentwo





The redundancy becomes downright pernicious if the two rights are thought
to be capable of coming apart. This is, I think, what really goes wrong in Kant’s
discussion of the murderer at the door. Kant seems to think that the murderer
has no right to be given a truthful answer and yet that the right of humanity in
generalpersists. ThisiswhatgroundsKant’srigidinsistencethatonetellthetruth,
even to the murderer. But wouldn’t the murderer himself, as a fellow member of
humanity, also be wronged by your breach of the moral pact? Surely this is not
correct. Whateverdutyisowedtohumanityingeneralmustbeparallelwith—and
parasitic on—a duty to the particular individual. But if the rights aren’t capable
ofcomingapart—ifIhavethegeneralrightalwaysandonlywhenIhavethemore
particular right—then it makes the redundancy all the more pronounced. My
136rightseemstoconsistentirelyintheparticulardutyyouowemeaspromisee;the
restissuperfluous.
A second problem concerns the applicability of claiming or demanding. Or-
dinarily,whenyouandIhaveanagreementthatyouwillperformcertainactions,
then I have a claim that exists prior to your performance. This gives me a certain
standing and makes possible certain practices—e.g., I can demand that my claim
be enforced, excuse you from your duty, transfer my claim on you to someone
else,andsoon. Themoralpactthesismistakenlygrantsthisstandingtothirdpar-
ties. If,asthemoralpactthesiswouldhaveit,everyonehasessentiallycontracted
with each other to abide by morality, then this should entitle everyone to make






tially harmed by a failure to perform, but this is not the same thing as demanding
performance because you could prevent the harm in ways other than by fulfilling
the promise. But if Sylvia personally demanded that you keep your promise, she
would seem to arrogate to herself powers that she does not have—as though she
²⁷ In fact, one might see this as one of the important features of honor codes: they entitle







manity is a large universe of people. The agreement that is posited between you
and Sylvia by the moral pact thesis would also be shared between you and those
notaﬀectedbyyourpromiseatall. Asaresult,theviewunderconsiderationwould
have to maintain that you wrong David Beckham in the same way that you wrong
Sylvia. Beckham would have the same basic complaint. Coupled with the previ-
ousproblem, it wouldseemthatBeckhamwouldhavea claimthatyoukeepyour
promise even though he has no real stake in the matter (and doesn’t even know












²⁸ It might be thought that the problem here would be that Sylvia is assuming individually
the role of promisee when really that is the role of the moral community in general. But if this
is right, if the moral pact isn’t between individuals personally, then it’s not clear how it could
underwritethethoughtthatthirdpartiescanbewronged,individually,byimmoralacts.
138and the code probably adds nothing. On the other hand, the honor code serves
animportantpurposeinformalizingtheideathattheentireacademiccommunity
has a stake in these duties. It expresses the idea that everyone stands to be po-
tentially wronged by a violation.²⁹ This would be true regardless, I think, but the
honor code serves a symbolic purpose in making clear that certain censure from
thecommunitycanbeexpecteduponbreachofone’sduties.
Plutarch attributes to Solon, the great lawgiver, the following description of
whatcityisbesttolivein: “Thatcityinwhichthosewhoarenotwronged,noless
than those who are wronged, exert themselves to punish the wrongdoers” (1914,
p.455). Thehonorcode,inasense,doespreciselythis. Itisarecognitionthateach
personispotentiallyaccountabletoeveryoneforanybadact.
This constitutes a sense in which our moral duties are owed to everyone: ev-
eryoneispotentiallyamongthosewhocouldbewrongedbyviolatingthem. This
fact—that everyone is potentially among those wronged—is a corollary of the
principle that one’s accountability for an immoral action can spread indefinitely
and unpredictably. And, in this sense, it is true that we owe our moral duties to
everyone. Butthissenseofbeingowedadutyisn’tthesenseinwhicharightholder
isowedaduty. Onecould,ofcourse,saythateverybodyhasaright,butthiswould




community with one another. In the film The Social Network, Larry Summers glibly rejects this
interpretation,stating“Youenterintoacodeofethicswiththeuniversity,notwitheachother.”
139They will comeapart becausethe violation of a rightcanspreadits consequences




140You shall not wrong one another.
Leviticus25:17
Do not wrong anyone (neminem laede) even if, to avoid do-
ing so, you should have to stop associating with others and
shun all society.
Kant
Do not commit a wrong now through the ignorance and
thoughtlessness of youth that will gnaw at you for the rest






It is a familiar thought that one ought not commit a wrong against another
person. This thought can easily be taken to imply that, when an action (or omis-
sion) would wrong another person, that fact counts as a reason—perhaps even a
decisive reason—against the action (or omission). In this way, it is easy to think
thatthefactthatsomethingwouldconstituteawrongagainstanotherpersoncan
141explainwhyoneoughtnotdoit.
For some philosophers, in fact, this thought goes to the essence of morality.
Schopenhauer, for example, believed that we come to experience morality by ex-
periencing what it is to wrong another person, extending our will so far that it
interferes with the other person’s. “[T]he concept of wrong is the original and
positive,andtheconceptofright,whichisopposedtoit,isthederivativeandneg-
ative” (1907, p.437). On a slightly diﬀerent note, Elizabeth Anscombe suggests
that wronging can explain the wrongness of some actions: “What is wrong about
an act that is wrong may be just this, that it is a wrong” (1990, p.152.). More re-
cently,StephenDarwallhasarguedthat,whenweappreciatehowanactionwould
openustothemoralcomplaintofanotherperson,weappreciatethemoralreasons
against that action. He writes, “When…a free and rational deliberating agent ac-
knowledgesshewouldbetoblamefordoingsomething,shetherebyacknowledges
conclusivereasonsnottodoitand,inasense,holdsherselfaccountable. Thispic-
ture links accountability centrally to the reasons free and rational being have for
living by the moral law” (2009, p.113). These philosophers represent the appeal
of thinking that the fact that an action would wrong another—that it would give
anothergroundstocomplainorholdoneaccountable—isanimportantaspector
descriptionofwhyoneoughtnotperformthataction.¹
¹ Although not committed to precisely this view, contractualism involves a quite similar
thought. Itscoreintuitionisthatwehaveareasonnottoperformactsthatcannotbejustifiedto
others,i.e.,thatotherscouldcomplainagainst. Forexample,Scanlonwrites,“WhenIreflecton
the reasons that the wrongness of an action seems to supply not to do it, the best description of
thisreasonIcancomeupwithhastodowiththerelationtoothersthatsuchactswouldputme









have normative significance. That we owe a duty to another is a reason—is often
a decisive reason—to perform an action. But this reason, I will argue, is neither
provided by nor equivalent to the fact that another would be wronged. If this is
correct, itrevealsanimportantwayinwhichrightsandcomplaintsaredistinct—
rightsarenormativeinawaythatcomplaintsarenot.
It is worth pausing over what would be meant by the thought that potential
wrongings are normatively significant—that is, it is worth clarifying the motiva-
tionbehindtheviewthatImeantooppose. Isuggestedinthepreviousparagraph
that doing one’s duty—as opposed to avoiding wronging anyone—is what is of
normative significance. The former provides reasons, not the latter. One might
be tempted, however, to say that I am drawing a distinction were there is none to
be drawn. Fulfilling one’s duty to X and avoiding wronging X aren’t two separate
² Just to be clear, my interest is in the phenomenon of wronging others, not merely acting
wrongly. When one does something that one ought not do, we might say that one acts wrongly.
Toactwronglyis,inthissense,totransgressagainstdutygenerally. Butwhenweactinsuchaway








φ would wrong someone is a reason not do it—precisely the same reason that is
providedbythefactthatyouoweittothatpersonnottoφ. Thetworelationships
are one and the same; they are flipsides of the same coin.³ And therefore aiming
toperformone’sdutyjustisaimingnottowronganyone,ashopingforheadsjust
is hoping for not tails. In short, the view to be challenged is not that a potential
wronging would count as an additional reason against an action over and above
theotherreasonsthatmakeanactionwrong,⁴butratherthatapotentialwronging





A valuable relationship transforms the needs and desires of the participants into
reasons for each to act in behalf of the other in suitable contexts. At the same
time,itgiveseachofthemreasonstoformcertainnormativeexpectationsofthe
other, and to complain if these expectations are not met. In particular, it gives
each of them reason to expect that the other will act on his or her behalf in suit-
able contexts. These two sets of reasons—reasons for action on the one hand
and reasons to form normative expectations on the other—are two sides of the
same coin. They are constitutively linked and jointly generated by the relation-





nor is it that the reason for acting and the reason that the other person is wronged are the same
reason. Rather,hisclaimisthattherearetwodiﬀerentsetsofreasonsthatspringfromthesame
fundamentalrelationship. Thisclaimiscompatiblewithmyargument.





analogies, that there is something conceptually mistaken about aiming to avoid
generatingcomplaintsinothers—thatmoraldeliberationisnotlikethat. Thisdif-
ferencesuggeststhatdirecteddutiesandpotentialwrongingsdonotplaythesame
role for deliberating agents. This points to a qualitative diﬀerence between rights
and wrongings. Section 5.2 oﬀers a more practical line of argument. There, I ar-
gue that whether one will commit a wrong does not track the question of what
one ought to do. I shall try to show that (a) there are cases in which an action
would make it the case that one has wronged another and yet one is not morally
required to avoid that action, and (b) there are cases in which the fact that an ac-
tionwouldwronganotherprovidesnoreasonatallfornotperformingthataction.
This points to a diﬀerence in extension between potential wrongings and moral
obligation. Section5.3attemptstoprovidesomeerrortheoryaboutwhyithasso
often seemed as though the potential wrongs to others of our actions constitute
morally significant reasons and attempts to suggest what—if not the way that we
mightwrongothers—isdoingthenormativeworkinthesecases.
⁵ This view should be contrasted with a weaker claim, which I do not dispute. It is plausi-
blethat,wheneveronecommitsawrong,onemusthaveactedwronglysomehowatsomepoint.
Wrongnessmaystillbeanecessaryingredientinanywronging. Considerananalogy. Itisprob-
ably true that one only gets lost if one has taken a wrong turn. But that does not mean that
following directions—making sure that one makes the correct turns—is the same as trying not
togetlost.
1455.1 TwoAnalogies





is most likely to avoid liability. Or, similarly, it is a bit like the person who goes
through life trying to avoid having regrets. Even if such a mode of deliberation
had no diﬀerences in result, it would involve—to borrow a phrase—one thought
toomany.
5.1.1 Legalliability
In a major study, a collection of major law-and-economics scholars studied how





awarded higher punitive damages when a business weighed the costs of potential
injuries or deaths in deciding to pursue a particular course of action than if the
business engaged in no such analysis. What was even more peculiar was that the
higher the cost that a business assigned to potential injuries or deaths, the higher




crazy to me. If I were on a jury and a corporation anticipated being held liable
in a certain number of wrongful death suits, which it anticipated costing $5 mil-
lion dollars each, but determined that was not worth the cost of the added safety
feature to avoid those suits, then the first thing that I would want to do is hit that
corporationwithmorethan$5millionindamages. AndIwouldprobablybemore
lenient with a corporation that caused the same injuries in the same manner, but
wascompletelyoblivioustothefactthatitwouldfacelegalliabilityforit.
Why? The oblivious corporation would cause harms that the cost-benefit cor-
poration would avoid, and, in that sense, the oblivious corporation is objectively




bility. What the cost-benefit analysis does is treat the reason for avoiding wrong-
fulconductasequivalenttothecostoflegalliability. Theeconomistsviewedthis
as perfectly natural. For them, the point of legal liability is to generate a reason
toavoidsociallydetrimentalconductwithoutdeterringsociallyadvantageousbe-
⁶“Thiseﬀectisexactlycountertoexpectations…Companiesareconsequentlyinthebizarre
position of increasingthe potentialdamages awardthat the jury maylevy the greater the weight
theyplaceonconsumersafety,asreflectedintheirinternalvalue-of-lifeestimate.” (Viscusi,2000,
p.125).
147havior. So deliberating about potential liability is the same as deliberating about





gations. Not all legal transgressions will be detected and penalized, so a focus on
avoidingactuallegalpenaltieswouldclearlybediﬀerentthanafocusoncomplying
with one’s legal obligations. But I mean to be suggesting more than this. Even a
well-intentionedcorporationthatdidnotplanonavoidingdeservedlegalliability
would,Ithink,befocusedonthewrongthingifitdeterminedhowtocomplywith
the law by considering what its liability would be. It is a mistake to equate one’s
reason to comply with the law with the reason one has for avoiding legal liability,
evenliabilityinprincipleratherthanliabilityinpractice.
But, one might say, wrongful death suits are a loaded example. Isn’t it okay to
considerwhatspeedisunlikelytogetyouaspeedingticketwhenyoudecidehow
fast to go on the interstate? Perhaps. I suspect that this example turns on two
things. First,wemaythinkthatgoing70mphina65-mphzoneisn’treallybreak-
ing the law—it’s complying with the conventional understanding of the law. In
thinking about what we are likely to be ticketed for, we may be thinking about
whatthelegalnormreallydemands.
Second,andmoreimportantly,insomeminorregulatoryoﬀenses—likegetting
a speeding or parking ticket—we may accept a view like the law-and-economics
148picture according to which the law is basically imposing a price or tax on certain
activities. Infact,thesearetheexceptionsthatprovetherule. Ingeneral,ifonehas
the same respect for the law as one has for speed limits, then one is doing some-
thing wrong. One should not assume the attitude that breaking the law is some-
thing for which one simply pays the price and moves on. It’s true that, if we do
breakthelaw, thereisnothingtodo butpaythepriceandmoveon. Yetthatdoes




on complying with the law or avoiding legal liability respectively, would end up




Above, I picked on economists and praised ordinary human preferences. To be
fair, I’ll flip things around now. Economist Richard Thaler studied people’s re-
sponsestothefollowingexample:
Mr. Aiswaitinginlineatamovietheater. Whenhegetstotheticket
window he is told that as the 100,000th customer of the theater he
hasjustwon$100. Mr. Biswaitinginlineatadiﬀerenttheater. The
maninfrontofhimwins$1,000forbeingthe1,000,000thcustomer









One couldn’t control whether one stood in the winning spot in line because one










Why, then, does it seem strange to say that one would prefer to be Mr. A? I
thinktheansweristhatthereseemstobesomethingamissaboutmakingachoice
simplytoavoidregret. Thatis,whatismistakenisnottheclaimthatMr. Bwould








when deciding what to do (in this case, be someone).⁷ The selection of Mr. A is
peculiarbecausethequestionwasframedasafirst-personalchoice. Ifthequestion
hadbeen“Whichpersondoyouthinkis likelytobemorepleased?” itwouldnot
seem nearly as strange to select Mr. A.⁸ But in the first-person question, “Which
personwouldyouratherbe?,”itseemsmorestrangetoincluderegret. Ithinkthis
is, in general, because deliberation ought to focus on what is best going forward,
notwhatwilllookbestinahistoricallens.
There are two clarifications of the claim that I mean to be making. First, the
claimthatIwanttomakeisaboutthemodeofdeliberationandnotaboutthere-
sult. It may be that two people, one of whom aims simply to live a fulfilling life
andtheotherofwhomaimstolivealifewithoutregrets,willenduplivingidenti-
cal lives. My claim is that the latter person’s deliberation is nonetheless aimed at
the wrong thing. He will be involved in a conceptual confusion. He has surren-
dered the immediate deliberative question of what he ought to do for the specu-
⁷Ishouldnotethatthesethoughtsdon’tseemtoapplyto‘agentregret’whatsoever. IfMr. A
gets $100 and Mr. B faultlessly kills a child and gets $150, I think most anyone would prefer to
beMr. A. Butthisisapuzzleaboutthenatureofagentregret.
⁸ I suspect that the minority who selected Mr. A for Thaler were simply interpreting the
question in this way. Of course, this isn’t unreasonable. The very form of the question “Which
personwouldyouratherbe?” isabithardtointerpret.
151lative question of how his actions will appear when evaluated in retrospect. His
deliberation is, in a sense, viewed through an unnecessary additional lens or mir-
ror. And this redirected view seems in tension with the deliberative standpoint.
As Richard Moran has observed, “there remains the sense in which the stance of




regretone mightencounter. In sucha situation, avoidingactualregretwouldob-
viously diverge from avoiding regrettable activities. But my claim is that there is
somethingconceptuallymistakeneveninaimingtoavoidregrettableactions. The




My claim is that viewing the potential complaint of, or wrong to, another person
as an important reason for action makes a parallel mistake to that illustrated by
thelegalliabilityandregretexamples. Evenifseekingnottowrongothersresults
in the same behavior as seeking to fulfill one’s duties, it seems to be aiming at the
wrongthing.
Moreparticularly,itseemstobeaimingataderivativeconsequenceratherthan
the normatively significant feature. It’s a bit like saying, “if you are playing poker,
152youshouldn’thavefiveacesinyourhand.” Thisistrue,becauseifyouhavefiveaces
in your hand, then you are cheating, and you shouldn’t cheat. But the thing that
matters is not cheating, not the five aces per se. Similarly, if you have wronged








suggest, importantly distinct. Metaphysically, they are diﬀerent things. And one
way to see how they are diﬀerent things is to see that one is normatively guiding
andtheotherisnot.
My central claim is that the same is true of our duties owed to others and the
potential wrongs that we may do them. From the deliberative perspective, one is
primaryandtheotherisepiphenomenal. Thisdiﬀerenceinnormativesignificance




will transfer by analogy to deliberating based on potential wrongs. But there is a
wayinwhichtheargumentismorethanmereanalogy. Thisisbecausetheconcept
153ofwronginganotherisnotsimplyanalogoustotheideasoflegalliabilityandregret,








There is a more practical way to see this distinction. If our directed obli-
gations and the potential wrongs we might do are just flipsides of the same coin,
thentheywillnotcomeapart. Thatis,therewouldnotbecasesinwhichapoten-
tial wrong exists without providing a reason for action. But I believe that wrongs
and reasons do come apart in precisely this way. I mean to highlight three ways
inwhichthepresenceofapotentialwrongtoanotherdoesnotprovidethesortof
reason that is associated with a moral duty owed to another. In these cases, con-
ceiving of the potential wrongs as normatively guiding is not only descriptively
mistakenbutwouldalsoleadtothewrongresults.
5.2.1 Potentialwrongasnotadecisivereason: subtractedoptions
First, I believe that there are cases in which the fact that another person will be
wrongedifonedoesnotperformanactiondoesnotentailadutytoperformthat
154action. That is, there are cases in which there is no duty to avoid committing a
wrong.
Imagine that a friend asks to borrow your car the next day in order to get to a
doctor’sappointmentinthebigcity. Youliveinaruralareawheretransportation
optionsarescarce,andthisisaprettynaturalrequest. Shesaysthatshecansecure
other transportation, but she has to make her reservation within the next hour.
You aren’t doing anything the next day, so you promise her that she can borrow
your car for the day. Unfortunately, that evening, you find that your husband let
yourneighborJimmytakethecarthatmorningandthecarisnowoutofthestate.
Youhadforgottenthatafewdaysbackyourhusbandmentionedsomethingabout
there being a chance he would let Jimmy take the car for a couple days at some
point. So your promise to your friend was negligently given and she now has no
way to get to her doctor appointment. It occurs to you, however, that your hus-
band and you have been considering buying a second car anyway, and you have a
nice used pickup all lined up and financing ready to go. You were still mulling it
over. Ifyougotothelottomorrowmorningandbuythepickup,thenyou’llhave
itintimetolendittoyourfriend.
If you don’t buy the truck and your friend is unable to get to her doctor’s ap-
pointment,thenitseemstomethatyouwillhavewrongedyourfriend. Itwouldn’t
be the sort of grave injustice that drives epic literature, but she would have cause
to feel aggrieved—she would have a complaint against you. It also seems to me
that you would avoid wronging your friend if you were to buy the pickup truck.
Nonetheless, it doesnotseemtome thatyouareundera moralobligation tobuy
155the pickup truck. In other words, the fact that you will open yourself to a com-
plaint if you do not buy the truck does not mean that you are obligated to do so.
Thepotentialwrongdoesnotentailaduty.
One may be tempted to respond that it is not true that you will avoid wrong-
ing your friend if you buy the pickup. One might say that you have wronged
your friend at the very moment that you negligently promised. This is a tempt-
ing thought because that is, of course, the moment at which you did something
that you ought not to have done. And philosophers sometimes do insist that a
wrongiscommittedbyanyactthatwronglyputstheinterestsofanotheratrisk.⁹
This description strikes me as overly formalistic. First, it would imply that the
same wrong is committed regardless of whether the promise is fulfilled, or even
how it is fulfilled. Suppose that moments after promising your friend, your hus-
bandcallsyouandtellsyouthathehaslentthecarout,whichyoupromptlyrelay














fact that you might still see yourself as attempting to fulfill your promise. If the
wronghasalreadybeencommitted,thenwhatareyoutryingtodo?
Thereareseveralpossibleresponses,allproblematic. Oneanswerwouldbethat
your sense of obligation is not promissory but simply a form of the general obli-
gation to prevent harm to others when one can. But this doesn’t seem to capture
thewayinwhichyourpromisefiguresintothedeliberation. Itwouldsuggestthat
youwouldhavethesamereasontobuythepickupregardlesswhetheryourfriend’s
need of a ride was due to your negligence or mere chance, whereas you see your-
self as moved in part by the fact of your promise. A second thought might be
that your eﬀorts to make repair are an attempt to provide compensation for the
wrong you committed by negligently promising. But this wouldn’t explain why
onewouldaimtoprovideavehicleasopposedtooﬀercompensationinanyother
way. Afinalanswerwouldbethattherearetwowrongs—thewrongofgivingthe






157hard to make sense of the fact that one might view oneself as attempting to avoid
thewrongbyrepairingthesituationbeforetheinjuryoccurs.




(2) lend your friend the car, and (3) buy the pickup and fulfill the promise with
it. Again somewhat artificially, we might say that the promise gives your friend a
rightto(2)—sheisentitledtodemandthat. Butthencircumstancesthatyouhad
reason to foresee remove that possibility. All that is left is (1) and (3). Option
(3) is not something that your friend is entitled to demand of you as part of the
promise, but (1) will count as wronging her. You don’t have a duty to buy the
pickupbecauseitismorethanyourfriendhasarighttounderthepromise,butif
you don’t do it then you will have wronged her. Were your friend’s right really a
rightto[Not(1)],thentheimpossibilityofoption(2)shouldimplyarightto(3).




ilar can occur where possibilities are unexpectedly added. Imagine that you and
twofriendsdecidetorentasailboatforadayandtakeaspinaroundtheharborand
nearbyislands. It’sabeautifulday,buttheseasaredefinitelychoppyandtheboat
158is getting jostled a great deal. During your turn at the helm, one of your friends
is suddenly knocked overboard by a large wave. Startled, you very carelessly and
abruptlyturntheboat,andtheboomofthemainsailgoesswingingacross,catch-
ingyourotherfriendinthechestandknockinghimintothewater. Nowbothyour
friends are in the water—one due to no fault of yours and the other due entirely
to your negligence. Both are relatively poor swimmers and look to be in equally
serioustrouble. Ifyousaveone,youmaynotbeabletosavetheother.






negligence that you would have to save the second friend, and, as a result, if you
don’t save the first friend, it is because of your negligence also. Your negligence




board friend. But, by sheer luck, when the second friend is knocked into the wa-
ter, it splashed a very long piece of driftwood onboard that can be used to save









one might think that one bears an extra reason to remedy those evils for which
one is causally responsible. This is the reason why we have a reason to care es-
pecially about those who are harmed by our actions, even our non-negligent ac-
tions.¹⁰ This responsibility for consequences of our actions is not the concern of
my argument. First, this doesn’t seem like the sort of thing that is owed to the
otherpersonasamatterofright. ItistruethatIoughttocareaboutthosewhomI
harmthroughnofaultofmyown,butthisisnotsomethingthatisowedtothemin
the same way—it is not their right.¹¹ Second, one could reconstruct the example






(1981). Although obviously related, I do not see that question as directly bearing on my topic
forthereasonsarticulatedinthetext.
¹¹ Susan Wolf makes something like this point in describing “taking responsibility for one’s
actionsandtheirconsequences”asa“namelessvirtue”(2001,p.13).
160Adiﬀerentinterpretation of responsibility’ssignificancewouldbe thatone has
an additional reason not because one is causally responsible, but because one is
morally responsible. In this sense, one owes it to the friend who you knocked in
to save him, just as you owe it to someone you injure in a car accident to pay his





malpracticebutisabletorecover, savethepatient’slife, andlimitthedamage, the
doctordoesnotowethepatientlessincompensationthanshewouldifadiﬀerent
doctorhadbeentheonetodothesaving. Soactingtosavethepersonthatonehas
imperiled doesn’t seem to count as a form of compensation. Put metaphorically,
whensomeoneisimperiled,thequestionisaboutlimitingone’smoralliability,not





similar act, should be viewed as compensation. For one thing, it would seem un-
fair to the dispreferred person, whose chance to be saved would be lost so that a
wrongdoercouldmakeamends. Anditwouldalsoseemunfairtothevictim,who
wouldreceiveless(other)compensationduetothecircumstancesextrinsictohis
161or her relation to the wrongdoer. The malpracticing doctor still doesn’t owe any
lessincompensation,Ithink,ifsheleftotherpatientsontheoperatingtableinor-
dertosavetheonesheimperiled. Soitseemstomethatcompensatingthefriend
that you knocked into the water does not give you a reason to save him over the





sailboat example reinforces that. Once you have knocked the second friend into
the water, it seems like you have already wronged him. But I think it would be a
mistake to think that the wrong is already, so to speak, used up at the moment of
negligence—thatwhathappensnextdoesn’taﬀectthewrongcommitted. Youwill
have done him a much greater wrong if he drowns than if he simply gets a bruise
onthechestandsomewetclothes.
WhatIwanttosuggestisthattherightsviolationinheresintheactofnegligence,
but the wrong involves within it the subsequent consequences and harms.¹³ The
second friend’s right—what he was entitled to from you—was to have the boat
¹² This is not to deny that, in general, giving preference can be a form of compensation. Af-
firmativeactionarguablyworksinthisway. Butthatisamatterofgivingpreferenceinawarding
positive benefits, not giving preference in performing one’s duties. Creditors who have been
wronged, for example, do not jump ahead of creditors with prior claims. And, despite the
common use of aﬃrmative action in many domains, we do not see it in contexts where we ar-





162not turned unexpectedly. You owed this to him. And, in this respect, you failed.
Whatwrongyouhavedonehimdependsonwhathappensafterthis.
Thisexplainswhyyoudonothaveadutytosavethesecondfriend,eventhough
your wrong will be greater if you do not. What he was owed has already passed.
Hewasentitledtoyourcareinturningtheship. Butheisnotentitledtobesaved
at the expense of the other friend. He does not have that right. So, even though
thewrongdonewillbegreaterifheisnotsaved,thatisnotsomethingtowhichhe
hasanyparticularrightsclaim.
In this example, injuries first arise close to the moment of negligence. At the
timethatthechoiceaboutwhomtosaveispresented,thereisalreadyawrongcom-
mitted and only its magnitude is in question. But that is really only a contingent
feature of the example. Consider a point that Frances Kamm oﬀers to illustrate
that the demands of rights are not simply captured by a requirement to minimize
one’srightsviolations. “MayIkillonepersonnowtostopathreatIstartedyester-
daythatwillsoonkillfivepeople? Ithinknot.” (2002,p.492). Thisseemscorrect.




that you violate the rights of the five simply by placing the time bomb near them.
It’s true that the wrong (in Kamm’s locution, “the rights violation”) doesn’t really
occuruntilthebombgoesoﬀ,butthat’sanothermatter. Whattheexamplereally
shows is that you cannot violate one person’s rights in order to avoid wronging
163five others. And this is the point that I am trying to make: it is the rights that are
normativelyguiding,notavoidingwrongs.
In both the time bomb and the sailboat examples, the presence of additional
considerationsconcerningothersmeansthatsomethingsomeonemightnormally
be entitled to as a matter of right is no longer something that he or she can de-
mand. Consider the boat case. Your friend has a right that you not cause him
tobedrowned. Normally,thisrightincludesbothadutynottoknockhiminthe
waterandalsoadutytopullhimoutifyoudo. (Idon’tknowthatthereisanything
at stake in whether we call these duties all part of the same right, or two separate
rights.) Your friend is entitled to both of these things from you. Normally, even
ifyouknockhiminthewater,yourchoiceswouldbe: (1)donothing,or(2)pull











You owe it to them to see to it that the bomb does not go oﬀ. And this is more than simply the
general duty to prevent others from being harmed when possible. You would owe it to the five
to go to much further sacrifices in order to prevent the bomb from going oﬀ than an ordinary
1645.2.3 Potentialwrongasnoreasonatall
In the examples considered thus far, I have argued that the potential wrong that
one might avert does not imply a duty. But that leaves open the possibility that
thepotentialwrongstillcountsasareasoninthesecases. Yourpromise,youmay
think, provides a reason for you to buy the pickup truck. And perhaps the way
in which you would wrong the friend who fell oﬀ the sailboat due to negligence
countsas a reasonto savehim, evenif it is not so strongas toentail a duty tosave
him. ButIbelievethatthereareexamplesinwhichnoteventhisisthecase.





detonating any device. One day, you go out to the park and set up an elaborate
explosive display. The display is on a timer to allow you time to get safely away
fromit. Forsomereason,todayitslipsyourmindtobroadcastthewarningsignal.
After you have walked away and are looking back, you see that two local children
haveapproachedthedevice. Oneisalocalorphangirlwhohasnofamilyandno
onewhocaresforher. Theotherisaboywithextremelylovingparentswhowould
be absolutely heartbroken if he is injured or killed. You have enough time to get
onechildawayfromthedevice,butprobablynotboth.
In the previous chapter, I argued that a person can be wronged if one violates
bystanderwould.




little boy, but that it would be positively mistaken to treat this as a reason to save
theboyatall. Thereareevenlybalancedreasonsforsavingeachchild,andthefact
that failing to save the little boy would also wrong some related parties does not
provideatiebreaker. Itisnoreasonatall.
One might think that this does not speak to something unique about wrongs.
One might see it, instead, as an example of the more general phenomenon that
it is mistaken to consider comparatively smaller claims to be tiebreakers between
significant rights claims. As Frances Kamm has pointed out, there seems to be
somethingperverseaboutdecidingwhichpersontosavebasedonthetiebreaking
fact that you could cure some third party’s sore throat (2006, pp.61-63). So, one
might think, perhaps this case is like that one: In the face of the tie between the
majorclaim-rightsofeachchild,theparents’potentialinjuryis“anirrelevantgood”
relativetothelivesatstake.
I think that this explanation is not correct for several reasons. First, bluntly, it
seems to me false to think that a parent’s grief is comparatively small, on par with
a sore throat. Kamm accepts that if a third party stands to lose his legs, then that
factcanserveasatiebreaker. ButIsuspectthatmanyparentswouldprefertolose
their legs than their child. Second, one could easily retool the example to make
theparents’stakehaveadiﬀerentcharacter. Forexample,supposethatyouknow
166thatthelittleboyisscheduledtobeabonemarrowdonorforhisfather. Thisfact
augments the complexion of the wrong you will potentially find yourself having
donetothefather. Butitstillseemsperversetoconsiderthisatiebreakingreason.
What matters are those who have a right against you, and in this respect the two
sidesarebalanced.
Finallyandmostconceptuallyimportant,inthesorethroatcase,thereisn’tthe
same asymmetry between wrongs and reasons. What motivates the sore throat
case is the thought that the person suﬀering from the sore throat would not be
wrongedifyoudon’tcurehisorhersorethroat—thepersonwouldhavenocom-
plaint.¹⁵ The sore throat isn’t a reason, but it also wouldn’t be a cause for com-






is not a reason in the pyrotechnics example, then consider the case in which only
the little boy is at risk (that is, suppose the orphan girl isn’t there at all). Given
that the potential wrong to the parents isn’t a reason in the first case, it’s hard to
¹⁵ Kamm says that the important question is, “Would the tiebreaker have a complaint for his
own sake, based on the seriousness of his own need, if he does not break the tie?” (2006, p.62).
One might think that the reason the parents don’t count as a tiebreaker is that their complaint




167see why it would be in this case either. And if this is correct—if it is only the po-
tential wrongs to the actual rightholders that are normatively significant—then it
seemsnaturaltoconcludethatitistherightthatisdoingthenormativework.
Ihavebeenarguingthattherearecasesinwhichthereisapotentialwrongthat
one could avoid and yet that does not entail a duty or even a reason to act. I will
closethissectionbynotingthatIalsobelievetheoppositeasymmetryispossible.
Onecanhaveadutythatisowedtoanotherpersonandyetthatotherpersonwould
not have a complaint if one fails to perform this duty. That phenomenon is the
subject of Chapter 7. I mention it here in order to be clear that the asymmetry
betweenwrongsandreasonsrunsbothways.
5.3 DrawingAttentiontotheOther
If the arguments I have made are correct (or in the right ballpark), then why
havesomanyphilosophersthoughtthatthepotentialwrongthatwemightcommit
against another constitutes an important reason not to pursue an action — even
theessentialmoralreason? Theanswer,Ithink,isthatfocusingonthewrongthat
one might commit is a way of drawing our attention to the other person. It is, so
tospeak,awayofemphasizingthemoralstakes.
In George Eliot’s Middlemarch, young Fred Vincy recklessly borrows money
thatheisunabletorepay. Oftheepisode,Eliotwrites,
Curiouslyenough,hispainintheaﬀairbeforehandhadconsistedal-
most entirely in the sense that he must seem dishonorable and sink
intheopinionoftheGarths: hehadnotoccupiedhimselfwiththein-
convenienceandpossibleinjurythathisbreachmightoccasionthem,
168for this exercise of the imagination on other people’s needs is not
common with hopeful young gentlemen. Indeed we are most of
us brought up in the notion that the highest motive for not doing a














fice accuracy along another. Notice, for example, that the sorts of considerations
with which I began this paper can also serve an exhortative function. Someone
might,forexample,say,“Don’tgetusintoanylegaltroubleonthis,”withoutmean-
ing to imply that breaking the law is acceptable so long as it isn’t detected. The
person may mean simply, “Take care to obey the law.” The potential legal con-
sequences are referenced more as a way of evoking the significance of legal obli-
gations. Similarly, the self-help industry makes a fortune telling people to “live a
life without regrets,” and this has resonance because it evokes the significance of
169making valuable choices and living a meaningful life. It is a feature of poetic de-
scriptionthatsometimesthebestwaytomakeapersonfeeltheforceofsomething
isnottodescribethethingitself,buttodescribesomeotherconnectedthing. My
suggestion is that thinking of the potential wrong that one might do to another
as a reason for action has this sort of poetic truth to it. It draws our attention to
both the stakes and the source of our moral obligation. Seeing that our action
might wrong another person reminds us both that our moral compliance matters
tothelifeofsomeoneelseandfurtherthatthissomeoneisthesourceofourmoral
obligation—thatmoralityisrelational.
When I consider the wrong that I might commit, I am forced to consider the
personwhomIwouldwrong. Andthisconsiderationwilloftenleadmetoseethat
the other person is a source of reasons for me. Other things can have this aﬀect










I think it would be a mistake to characterize such statements as providing further
170reasons. Theyaresimplywaysofgettingsomeonetoseethereasonsthatheorshe
already had. Similarly, viewing the wrong that one might commit as a reason has
thissortofpoetictruthtoit.
But this poetic truth shouldn’t be mistaken for literal truth. Although think-
ing about the wrong that we may do can serve to draw our attention to the duty
thatweoweanother,itisthisdutyandnotthepotentialwrongthatisnormatively
significant.¹⁶
This point, I think, helps to clarify what it is to have a right—that is, what it is
to have a duty owed to you. It is to be a source of reasons—or, more strongly, a
duty—for someone else to act in a particular way. To be a rightholder is to de-
servesignificanceinsomeoneelse’sdeliberation. Oneisnot,however,thesource




¹⁶ In making this argument, I am implicitly rejecting a conception of reasons according to
which any evidence that something should be done counts as a reason in favor of doing it. This
reasons-as-evidenceviewhasbeendefendedrecentlybyStephenKearnsandDanielStar(2008).
I believe that this view is false in large part because it would treat as reasons the sort of consid-
erations that I have been suggesting are epiphenomenal to normativity. For example, the fact
that I would regret an action will often be evidence that I shouldn’t do it. But it seems to me, as
I have said, that this is not a reason not to do it. The error theory that I am suggesting in this
sectionturnsontheconfusionbetweenmereevidenceandactualreason. Apotentialwrongcan
be excellent evidence—the sort of evidence that can be powerfully motivating—but that does
notmeanthatitisactuallynormativesignificant.
171[T]he concept of compensation is ambiguous in the case of
contracts: expectationdamagesmakethevictimofabreach
whole by reference to a benchmark of performance, whereas
reliance damages make the victim whole by reference to the





Remedies aim to compensate the victim of a wrong. This is a founda-
tional principle of private law, and it is also a moral principle. We generally un-
derstand compensation in terms of returning what was previously taken, making
whole again. In both law and morality, we think that a wrong has been remedied
when the victim has been restored to his or her prior circumstances. This idea
172connects wrongs with rights in an important way. We think that what it takes to
remedy a wrong is a return of what was there ex ante—a restoration of the right
thatwastakenaway.
Inthischapter,Imeantochallengethestraightforwardunderstandingofwhatit
means to remedy a wrong. I argue that the appropriate remedy for a wrong is not
determined only by the nature of the right that was taken away. Rather, the ap-
propriateremedywilldependoncertainfactsthatareonlypresentexpost—facts
about what resulted and about how the transgression is interpreted. These addi-




of breaking a promise is not necessarily measured by how much the promisee ex-
pected to gain. Sometimes, it will be better viewed in terms of injury resulting
fromhavingbeengivenabadpromisetobeginwith. Whichofthesealternatives
is appropriate will depend on context, and it may only be clear after the fact. So




that wrongs are qualitatively diﬀerent from rights. In other chapters, I argue that
there can be wrongs without a corresponding right, i.e. that there is a diﬀerence
in extension between wrongs and rights. In this chapter, I am concerned with a




Blackstone wrote that, “[A]s all wrong may be considered as merely a priva-
tion of right, the one natural remedy for every species of wrong is being put in
possession of that right” (1769, Bk.3, Ch.8). I mean to use this same reasoning
in reverse—as modus tollens rather than modus ponens. If it is not true that every
wronghasthesinglenaturalremedyofreturningtherightinquestion,thenwrongs






in the remainder of the chapter. Once it is clear that remedies can provide a win-




wrongs that they remedy. In one sense, this may be almost indisputable. Reme-
dies are remedies for something, and, as such, to know about a remedy is to know
174something about what is being remedied. A successful medical remedy tells us
something about the nature of a physical injury that it cures. Similarly, a legal or
moralremedyshedslightonthelegalormoralinjurythatitcures.¹
One might try to distinguish two interpretations of this claim. According to
a weak interpretation, the fact that something is a remedy might merely provide
some evidence about the nature of what it remedies. For example, knowing that
ibuprofenmakesthepaininmykneegoawayrevealssomethingaboutthenature





rior cruciate ligament was broken. In this case, the remedy isn’t merely evidence
about the problem. It is the opposite of the problem. The remedy reflects what
wasinneedofcorrection. Thatis, itreflectsthecharacteroftheinjury. Remedies
correspond with an injury much like negative space corresponds with a positive
shape. Thisstrongcorrespondencederivesfromthefactthatremediesarecorrec-
tive.
This distinction is a little misleading, though. Return to the ibuprofen for the
¹ In this context, John Goldberg (2006) usefully distinguishes between two diﬀerent mean-
ings of “injury.” Goldberg argues that the law originally understood injuries as wrongs but that
an understanding of injuries as losses has arisen in modern times. The ambiguity that Goldberg
describesmightsuggestthatonecannotsafelyassumethatremediesreflectwrongs. But,infact,
mymethodologyisgenerallyconsistentwithGoldberg’sargument. Goldbergdemonstratesthe
shifting meanings of “injury” by, in part, demonstrating shifting judicial approaches to award-
ing remedies. That is, Goldberg’s argument, like mine, assumes that looking at remedies tells us
somethingabouttheconceptionofinjurythatisatwork.
175pain in my knee. Ibuprofen is an anti-inflammatory and a pain-killer. The prob-
lem in my knee could simply be inflammation, as when I have tendonitis. If so,
then the ibuprofen remedy reflects the problem in the second, stronger sense. By
reducing inflammation, it answers the problem, namely too much inflammation.
Ontheotherhand,ibuprofenmightonlytemporarilyalleviatethepaininmyknee




of correcting it. True remedies, I want to suggest, reflect the nature of the corre-
spondinginjuryinthestrongsense.






² This argument might seem to place too much stock in the concept of remedy. In doing so,
it may seem to beg the question because we might wonder whether the legal ideas that we call
“remedies” are truly remedies in this sense. For example, Birks (2000) makes a plausible argu-
ment that the law would do well to replace talk of remedies with talk of secondary or remedial
rights. But Birks’s argument does not really challenge the idea that, whatever we call it, legal
recourse reflects the problem being addressed. That is, Birks is not challenging the corrective
function of private law, which is what my argument depends upon. In fact, Birks strongest ar-





176of a remedy, and, in the law, it seems built into the adage that remedies seek to
make the victim whole again.⁴ If a diﬀerent remedy had been appropriate, that
would show that the grievance with my employer was diﬀerent. That is, it would
showthatwhatwaswrongwassomethingdiﬀerent.
As long as this is true, we can use remedies as a window into the nature of
wrongs. Put another way, thinking about remedies will be a way to think about
the nature of wrongs. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to using this strat-
egytothinkaboutthenatureofwrongs. Inparticular,Imeantousetheparticular







to undo. In such cases, all we can oﬀer is compensation, hoping to oﬀer an equivalent level of




insofar as they are addressed to correcting the injury. They aspire to provide a restoration, even
iftheyonlypartiallysucceed.












Olwell sought $25 per month, an amount aimed to recover the benefit that in-
ured to the company as a result of the unauthorized use. The theory behind this
legal action was that Olwell could “waive” his tort claim, and sue in “assumpsit”
or quasi-contract instead. The trial court accepted the remedy of disgorgement,
and issued an award for $10 per week that the machine was used. This amount
was calculated based on the wages for hand-washing that were avoided by using
themachine.
Onappeal,thecompanycontendedthatOlwellhad“anadequateremedyinan
action at law for replevin or claim and delivery.” In other words, the company
contended that the appropriate remedy would be for them to give the machine
back to Olwell. As such, the company argued that a suit in quasi-contract was
inappropriate. Alternatively, the defendant company argued that if any damages
were to be awarded, they should be the rental value of the machine, rather than
178a disgorgement of benefits. According to this argument, the appropriate remedy
to Olwell would be the amount that he would have received from the use of the
machine.
The Supreme Court of Washington rejected these arguments and aﬃrmed the
order for disgorgement. It focused on the fact that the plaintiﬀ had the right to
chosehisclaim. Thelogicofthedecision,therefore,wasclear: (1)Plaintiﬀ“hadan
election”;(2)“Havingsoelected,heisentitledtothemeasureofrestorationwhich
accompanies the remedy.” The Supreme Court did, however, modify the trial
court’s award insofar as it exceeded the amount requested. Olwell was awarded
the$25permonthforwhichhehadasked,notthe$10perweekfoundbythetrial
court.
Two aspects of the case are worth noting. First, there is a vast array of poten-
tial remedies. Consider the following options: (1) return of the machine, (2)
depreciationofthemachine,(3)rentalvalueofthemachine,(4)theopportunity
cost of being unable to use the machine, (5) restitution in the form of money the
company saved through non-paid wages, and (6) restitution in the form of prof-
itsearned,(7)nominaldamagesinsymbolicrecognitionoftheviolation. Anyof
thesecouldplausiblybeviewedasanappropriatewaytorespondtothecompany’s
nonconsentual use of the machine. But these various options are, at least in part,
in competition with one another. If the court were to award Olwell all of these
diﬀerentremediesatonce,hewouldclearlybeovercompensated.
Second,inlightoftheseoptions,thecourtessentiallygavetheplaintiﬀtheabil-
ity to choose the remedy. This occurred in two forms. First, by allowing the
179plaintiﬀ to decide what sort of claim to bring, the court allowed the plaintiﬀ to




According Ernest Weinrib, awarding the company’s profits did not conform with
corrective justice. In Weinrib’s view, corrective justice required that “the remedy
reflect the wrong and that the wrong consist in a breach of duty by the defendant
withrespecttotheplaintiﬀ’sright”(2001,p.20). Thatis,theremedyistakentobe
a direct reflection of the legal right—the two are flip sides of the same coin. Any
particular legal right creates an entitlement of one party with regard to another
party. Whenthatrightisviolated,thelegalremedyistogivetothewrongedparty
thattowhichtheywereentitled. Remediesarenotadhocsocialinstruments,but
rather are part of the conception of a rights relation between two parties. Thus,
the specific remedy must be “the notional equivalent at the remedial stage of the
rightthathasbeenwronglyinfringed”(Weinrib,2001,pp.4-5).





⁶One might think of criminal legal obligations as owed either to the community at large or
tonooneinparticular. Eitherway,thecontrastwithprivatelawshouldbeclear.
180entitlement in one party and a correlative liability in another. And as such, the
contours of a privatelawright correlatewith the contours of the opposingparty’s
liability. Theremedyisareflectionofabilateralpairingbetweenindividuals.
With this conception of corrective justice, Weinrib argues that the Olwell rem-





By issuing disgorgement of benefits, Weinrib continues, the court assumes an
improperframeworkofwhatitwouldmeantomaketheplaintiﬀwhole. ForWein-
rib, the baseline comparison that was used was entirely confused: “Basing the
damages in Olwell on the cost of hand-washing the eggs implies that the defen-
dant was under an obligation to the plaintiﬀ to wash the eggs by hand. This is
absurd.” (2001,p.20). ForWeinrib,thedisgorgementremedywouldsuggestthat
Olwellhada righttothe eﬃciency of usinga machineovermanuallabor. But, of
course, he did not. As Weinrib puts it, “The plaintiﬀ’s only interest in the defen-




terrence and revocation of unjustly acquired gains. But these social purposes are
notwithinthescopeofprivatelaw. Evenifthedefendantshouldbestrippedofits
181profits,theplaintiﬀisnottheoneentitledtothem.
Instead, damages should reflect the rights between the parties. In his words,
“Restitutionary damages, like other remedies in private law, must correct the in-
justice that the defendant did to the plaintiﬀ. Such damages accordingly must






Arthur Ripstein has not, as far as I know, written anything about the Olwell case
itself. But he has discussed, from a Kantian perspective, how we ought to think
aboutrestitutiondamages. InForceandFreedom,hewrites:
[S]ometimesawrongwillbecompleted,andifitis,itseﬀectsmustbe
hindered in order to maintain the external freedom of the aggrieved
party…[I]fImanagetoenlistyouinsupportofmyprojectswithout
yourconsent,ImustsurrendertoyouanygainsImakeasaresult. I
must do so because your right to set your own ends must be treated
asanembodimentofyourfreedom,andsogivenbacktoyou. So,for
example, if you invite tourists to explore the caves under your land,






property exists for the benefit of its owner, the only way to redress
182another’suseofitistotreatthatuseasthoughitweredonesolelyfor
thatperson’sbenefit. (2009,pp.82-83)
Inotherwords, the only way, in Ripstein’sview, toremedyanunauthorizeduseis
to give every benefit received from that use to the owner, as though the use were
performedforhisorhersake.
The basis for Ripstein’s argument is that impeding an infringement of rights is
itself a way to protect the freedom that rights safeguard. For this reason, rights
are associated with an authorization to coerce. Coercion is authorized in such
cases because “it restricts a restriction on freedom” (Ripstein, 2009, p.55). He
believesthatthissameideaofimpedingarestrictiononfreedomexplainsremedial
actionaswell. Hewrites,“Theideaofthehindranceofahindrancehasasecond,
retrospective aspect to it as well. What is hindered in this case is not wrongful
action but its impact on the external freedom of others.” (2009, p.82). So the
remedial action, when a wrong has been committed, is focused on removing the
externalimpactofthewrong.





on the owner’s freedom. And what this means, in practice, is that the user must
disgorgethegainsobtainedbytheunauthorizeduse.
183IthinkthatthecontrastbetweenWeinribandRipsteinisquitestriking. Itlooks
like Ripstein is saying that justice requires the remedy that Weinrib is calling con-




ence is less than it would appear. As I understand him, Ripstein is advocating for
adisgorgementofprofits. Forhim,whateverisdonewithunauthorizedproperty
shouldbetreatedasbeingdoneontheowner’sbehalf. Somysenseisthat,inthe
Olwell case, Ripstein would have awarded the profits that the company made by
selling the eggs washed with Olwell’s machine. This is what Weinrib rejects. But
RipsteinmightsaythatOlwellshouldreceiveonlythoseprofitsattributabletothe
use of his machine and that anything else would overcompensate him.⁷ This, I
suppose, would mean awarding Olwell whatever value was realized from the fact
thattheeggswerewashedratherthanunwashed. Thiswouldtreatthewashingof
the eggs with the machine as though it were done solely for Olwell’s benefit, and
it would deprive the company of any gains from using the machine. This amount
mightbehardtocalculateinpracticeifthereisnotarobustmarketforunwashed
eggs,butnomatter.
What is important for the present purposes is that , however it is interpreted,
Ripstein’s remedy would be conceptually quite diﬀerent from two alternatives.
First, the value contrasts with Weinrib’s suggestion that Olwell receive the rental
⁷IamindebtedtoNickSageformakingthispointtome.
184valueofthemachine. Andsecond,itcontrastswithdisgorgingthebenefitreceived
by the company, namely not having to pay for hand-washing the eggs. In an eﬃ-








I mean to argue that the appropriate remedy depends not only on the nature
oftherightthatwasviolated, butalsoonexpostfeaturesofthecomplaintandits







actual remedy will still depend on how much damage is done within that frame-







These inquiries mark a clear qualitative diﬀerence in the structure of rights vi-
olations and wrongs. Wrongs come in degrees in a way that rights violations do
not. Wecanaskhowbadlywassomeonewronged? Wewanttoknowtheextent or
the magnitude of the wrong. We naturally speak about one wrong being greater or
lesserthananother. Andthisistrueevenwheretherightsviolationisheldconstant.
For any given right, a violation either occurs or does not occur. But the resulting
wrong is not binary in this way; its can come in diﬀerent degrees. If one believes
thatwrongsareconceptuallyequivalenttorightviolations,thensuchcalculations
and comparisons should be a puzzle. If the two are conceptual analogs, then why
doesonecomeindegreesinawaythattheothernot?
Someone who considers rights violations and wrongs to be essentially equiva-
lent might attempt to deny this qualitative diﬀerence by refuting one side of the
disanalogy or the other—that is, either by rejecting the binary nature of right vi-
olations or by rejecting that wrongs come in degrees. Adopting the first of these
approaches, someone might point out that the degrees in wrongs may be, in part,
basedontheimportanceoftherightthatwasviolated. Thatis,wrongsmaybecon-
sideredgreaterbecausetheyareviolationsofrightsthataremorehighlyvaluedor
186more fundamental. (Notably, even here, it is still awkward to speak of a “worse
rightsviolation.”)
While it is very plausible that wrongs can be greater based of the type of right
thatwasviolated,Ifinditimplausibletosaythatthiscanaccountforalldiﬀerences




a machine that, as things turn out, later became desperately needed by its owner.
The latter person has violated the same right, and yet he has committed a greater







and then the remedy seeks to address the harms that resulted. The remedy isn’t a
remedyingthewrong.
Thetroublewiththisreactionisthatitdisconnectswrongsfromremedies—and
⁸ As Nagel describes it: “If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves on to





187from our other moral practices and experiences. This reaction is a form of what I








The previous section argued that there is a qualitative diﬀerence in the internal
structureofrightsviolationsandwrongsinsofaraswrongscomeindegrees,which
aredictatedinpartbytheconsequencesexpost. Thatargument,however,iscom-
patible with the corrective justice view that the nature of rights dictate the form
thatremediesshouldtake. Inthissection,Imeantocallthisviewintoquestionas
well.





say that we are remedying wrongful losses. But this only begs the question. As Weinrib (2012,
pp.121-23)pointsout,thisphrasecanbeunderstoodintwodiﬀerentsenses. Ifonemeanslosses
thatresultedfromwrongfulacts,thenthemoralsignificanceofthiscategorymustbeexplained.









Regardless of which reaction one has to the Olwell case, I want to suggest that
that reaction will not be consistent across all cases. Sometimes the rental value
is too weak, and sometimes disgorging profits is too strong. If this is true, then
conceptual analysis of the right will not provide us with an appropriate remedy a
priori. Wrongs include an extra element, not present ex ante in the right that was
violated.
Consider two ends of the spectrum. First, imagine that, instead of a piece of
heavy-duty, labor-saving equipment, the wrongfully used item had been merely a
pencil, used to write out the business plan. No one would seriously think that,
becauseofthiswrongfulusage,Olwellshouldbeentitledtoalltheprofitsthatre-
sultedfromthatbusinessplan.
At the other end of the spectrum, imagine that Olwell had owned a magical
goosethatwouldveryoccasionallylaygoldeneggswhenitwascaressed.¹¹ Imagine




argument that follows. What is important is that the property’s value is uncertain ex ante such
thatitsactualvaluewhenputtousemaysignificantlyexceedtherentalvalue.
189thatthegooseonlyproducedeggsrarelyandatrandom,makingtheexpectedvalue















to produce revenue. Insofar as the venture was worthwhile, the revenues will be
more than sum of the value of the inputs. So we cannot simply give the value of
the machine’s use back to Olwell and the value of the labor back to the company,
because there will still be more left over—what was created by the productive ac-
tivity.
We might think that the surplus can also be distributed based on the relative










But eventhis principle is inadequate. Suppose thatthe goose wasstolen, but it







remedy for the goose owner cannot be determined ex ante. It depends on what
theappropriationofthegooseyielded. Ifitwasfruitful,thentheownerisentitled
to those fruits. If not, then the owner is entitled to the rental value. One might
thinksomethingsimilarabouttheOlwellcaseaswell: Ifthecompanymadeafor-
tune by stealing his machine, perhaps he should get a share of that fortune. But
if the venture was a complete failure, that shouldn’t prevent him from getting any
191compensation.
It might look like there is still an ex ante principle here: the goose owner gets




content of the wrong depends on something other than the content of the right.
Inthisway,wrongsarequalitativelydiﬀerentthanrights.
6.3.3 DependenceonHowtheGrievanceisFramed
Above, I attempted to show that the appropriate remedy is not given ex ante be-
causeitdependsonwhatresults. Insomecontextsatleast,theplaintiﬀwouldseem
to be owed either the profits or the rental value of the property, whichever turns
out to be greater. But even this description, I believe, ignores an important way
in which the appropriate remedy depends on something ex post. In this section,
I mean to point out another way in which the remedial question is dependent on
theexpostcontext: itdependsonhowtheplaintiﬀframeshisorhercomplaint.
Normally,ifonehasachoicebetweentwoamountsofmoney,onewillchoose
the greater sum. So, where a plaintiﬀ can seek either profits or rental value, we
can normally expect the plaintiﬀ to seek the greater amount. But the appropriate
remedyisn’tactuallydependentonwhichamountturnsouttobegreater. Rather,
it depends on what remedy the plaintiﬀ requests, which in turn depends on how
theplaintiﬀframeshisorhercomplaint.
192This point is clearest when the possible remedies are not both fungible, mon-









In this sense, the appropriate remedy depends on the choice of the employee,
which need not correspond with greater economic value. The employee might
elect to seek lost pay rather than the patent itself, even if that is worth more. Per-
haps he does not want to jeopardize his employment relationship with the com-
pany. Or perhaps he is not interested in having to license and police the patent
himself. On the other hand, an employee might seek the patent, even where its
market value was less than the wages would amount to, if he was particularly at-
tachedtoitsbeinghisidea.
What these possibilities show is that a plaintiﬀ doesn’t simply receive (if suc-
cessful) whichever remedy is greater. He receives the remedy that he elects to
seek. Put another way, the appropriate remedy depends on how the complaining
party frames the complaint. The remedy, that is, depends in part on how the vic-
timperceivestheinjury. Thisisnecessarilydeterminedexpost. Wemaybeableto
193speculateex anteabouthowsomeaction is likelytobe regarded—whatthe com-
plaintwill probably look like—but it is the way that it is actually regarded—what
the complaint actually is—that matters. This is a third way in which the remedial
question depends on something ex post, not simply on the nature of the right ex
ante.
Correctivejusticetheorists—Weinribchiefamongthem—rightlycriticizenon-
corrective accounts of tort law for not capturing the character of private law that
involves doing justice between the parties.¹² They claim that one cannot under-
stand the privateness of private law without appreciating the bipolarity of correc-
tivejustice. Ithinkthatthereismuchtobesaidforthiscriticism.
But it is not true that non-corrective views have no conception of private law.
Asonewriterputsthepoint,“[p]rivatelawisstructuredasadramabetweenplain-
tiﬀanddefendant”(Dagan,1999,p.147). Whatmakesprivatelawprivate,insuch




fendant, then, is put in a position of responding to this complaint. Private law
doesn’t actually respond to rights violations per se, but rather to the complaints
thatwemakeagainstoneanother. Inthisway,privatelawisabouttherelationship
¹² For example, Weinrib writes, “Presenting corrective justice as a quantitative equality cap-
tures the basic feature of private law: a particular plaintiﬀ sues a particular defendant. Unjust







that the only question for the court concerned the nature of the right that was vi-
olated. But more immediately, the appropriate question concerned whether Ol-
well’s complaint was a successful one. Olwell’s complaint, put simply, was as fol-
lows: “You wrongfully stole the benefits of my machine—you owe them back to
me.” Onemightsay,inthissense,thatheaddressedacomplaintmoreinthespirit
recommended by Ripstein.¹³ As the court notes, he might have made a diﬀerent
complaint. For example, he might have said essentially, “You stole the use my
machine—youowemethecostofusingit,”whichwouldhavebeenthecomplaint
Weinrib imagines. But the former, not the latter, is the complaint that he elected
tomakeinlightofthefactsavailableexpost. Inadiﬀerentcontext,hemighthave
madethelattercomplaintratherthantheformer.
The question, then, is whether the egg company can rebut the complaint that
ismadeagainstit. Putsimply,thequestioniswhetherthecompanycanrespond,
“No,thesebenefitsarerightlyours.” Thisresponsewearsitsdiﬃcultyonitssleeve.








law—to how the parties framed the dispute—in another way. Mr. Olwell could
not be given more than he sought. Olwell’s complaint was essentially “you owe
me $900.” It was therefore judged to be an error for the trial court to say, “He’s
right, you owe him $1,560.” The court was limited by how the parties frame the
dispute.
The structural dependence on how the parties litigate the dispute—that is, on
how the grievance between the parties is framed and rebutted—is an important
way in which the remedial question is not just transparent back to the right that
wasviolated. Itisbasedonthatdistinctivefeatureofprivatelawasinvolvingwith
onepartyaddressinganotherparty. Theseaddressesarenecessarilymadeexpost.
And they demonstrate an important way in which remedies, and the wrongs that
theyremedy,arenecessarilyexpost.
The fact that private law turns on how parties actually make and respond to
a complaint might be taken to show that wrongs and remedies come apart after
all.¹⁵ And, in part, it does. Whether one has been wronged does not depend on








do not think that one has an ailment only when one is attempting to treat some-
thing. Butitisthecasethattohaveanailmentisfortheretobesomethingthatone
could, in theory, seek to remedy. In the same way, legal remedies reflect wrongs,
not in the sense that wrongs only exist where we recognize a legal remedy but in
thesensethatwrongsexistwhereonecould,intheory,seekaremedy.
Myargumentinthissectionhasaimedtosuggestthatthenatureofone’scom-
plaint depends, in part, on one’s framing of the issue. And, in this way, I believe
that the wrong suﬀered depends on facts about how the wronged party does or
would view the issue. For example, the wrong done to the employee whose work
has been taken without compensation depends on how he would view the issue.
This thought is compatible with the idea that he is wronged even if he is not dis-














Wrongs have this character. They may arise from the fact that a right has been
taken from us, but their shape is not determined only by the shape of the right
that was taken. It also depends on the context ex post. That is, the nature of a
wrong depends on certain facts that only come into existence once the wrong is
committed. Theseincludefactsaboutthelossesofthewrongedparty,thebenefits




the wrongdoing. But the same pattern is visible in simpler cases. As I noted at
the beginning, a wronged promisee might be compensated by putting her in the
positionshewouldhavebeenhadsheneverreceivedafalsepromiseorbyputting
her in the position she would be in had the promise been carried out. Which of
thesebettercharacterizesthewrongdonetothepromiseewilldependonwhatthe
consequenceshavebeenandonhowthepromiseeherselfviewstheinjury.
As a result, we cannot say that a wrong is simply equivalent to the ex ante enti-
tlementthatwasviolated. Wrongshavetheirowndistinctcharacterthatdepends
on their ex post context. This is not to deny that the two bear on one another.
But wrongs are not just the conceptual antipode to rights. Wrongs—as viewed
198through the remedies that they demand—are also a function of context and con-
sequences.
6.4 Non-CorrectiveAccounts
I have, at thispoint, fully laid out the argument of this chapter. The argument
relies on two claims. First, remedies reflect the character of the wrong that they
areaddressing. Thispremise,Isuggested,issupportedbythebasicideathatreme-
diesarecorrective. Second,remediesdependonthecontextexpost;theyarenot
entirely determined by the nature of the right that was violated. This claim was
illustratedbycontrastingsimilarrightsviolationsthatneverthelessyielddiﬀerent
situations ex post. These two claims generate my conclusion: The character of a
wrongisnotentirelydeterminedbythenatureoftherightthatwasviolated.
In this section, I want to return to the first premise and consider two concep-
tions of the law that deny it. Although I will hint at some sources of my disagree-




reason, we cannot simply read the appropriate remedy oﬀ the right that was vio-
lated. Faced with the various remedial possibilities, it is natural to think that the
choice between these diﬀerent remedies is a public policy question—a question
aboutwhatlegalinstitutionswe,associety,shouldprefer. Becausetheexistenceof
199a rights violation leaves open various ways of responding to that violation, we are
leftwithachoice. Whatwechoosewillbebasedonhowweweighvarioussocietal
values.
Hanoch Dagan has described the variety of competing values in the context
of the Olwell case. A profit-based remedy will strongly deter appropriation and








the choice of remedies as itself shaping the ex ante entitlement. In his words, the
choice among remedies is a “distributive choice” (1999, p.153) about what form




property right actually involved. As he puts it, “Property is an artefact, a human
creationthatcanbe,andhasbeen,modifiedinaccordancewithhumanneedsand
values. Property is an essentially contested concept that is open to competing in-
terpretations and permutations” (1999, p.148). In short, the nature of the right
200itself is still up for debate; that’s what we are deciding when we decide the reme-
dialquestion.
Asappealinglypragmaticasitsounds, thispublicpolicyviewdoesnottakese-















private law is intrinsically ex post—that it presupposes a set of established rights
andisconcernedexclusivelywithrespondingtotheirviolation. Giventhesecosts,
Ithinkthatweshouldhopeforadiﬀerentwaytounderstandtheprivatelaw.
But, it is worth noting that I am in some agreement with the criticism that the
public-policy approach levels against traditional corrective justice theories. The
201public-policy approach emphasizes that, as long as the ex post remedial question
is inexorably tied to the ex ante question about rights and duties, our remedial




in order to question the corrective justice approach. An intermediate position is
available if one accepts that rights violations are the touchstone for legal liability
without simultaneously accepting that rights violations dictate the form that that








on the response of the wronged party. In short, they agree that remedies do not
justderivefromtherightthathasbeenviolated.
These points leadcivil recourse theory to viewlegal remedies as responding to












of recourse against other private parties.” (Zipursky, 2003, p.755) What recourse






and attractive aspect of private law that it aims at restoring justice where injustice
has been done. There is something that our legal remedies are trying to redress.
¹⁷ This feature of civil recourse theory creates some ambiguity, which has been the source of
criticism. Arthur Ripstein, for example, argues that civil recourse faces a dilemma: either the
recourseavailableisshapedbythenatureoftheobligationthatgivesrisetotheaction,inwhich
case the theory collapses into corrective justice, or the recourse is not shaped by the obligation,
inwhichcasethetheorydefendsmererevengeorinstrumentalism. Asheputsit: “Withrespect
to what we might call the narrow principle of civil recourse, according to which plaintiﬀ has a
powertoenforcearight,civilrecourseisnotmerelyconsistentwith,butrequiredby,corrective
justice… [T]he attempt to distinguish a more ambitious idea of civil recourse, understood as
domesticatedangerandretaliation,mustfail. Notonlydoesitfailtointegratewiththerelational







the existing forms of corrective justice theory both fail to account fully for the ex
postnatureofprivatelaw,albeitintwodiﬀerentways. Inthissense,theseparation
of wrongs from rights that I am advocating can be represented as taking seriously




The remedial question is ex post in that it occurs against the backdrop of a preex-
istingtransgression. Contrarytopublic-policy-orientedviews,wecannotuseitas
an opportunity to go back an reshape our ex ante entitlements. Nor can view the
remedialquestionasmerelyachoiceabouthowbesttomoveforward,untethered





I locate this gap at a diﬀerent place in conceptual space. The diﬀerence might be
204representedthisway:
CorrectiveJustice: remedies reflect wrongs reflect rights
CivilRecourse: remedies donotreflect wrongs reflect rights
MyView: remedies reflect wrongs donotreflect rights
Table6.1: Correctivejusticeandcivilrecourse
Wherever it is positioned, this separation between rights and remedies involves
an appreciation that remedial questions cannot be analyzed only in terms of ex
ante entitlements. As such, it represents an understanding that remedies involve
anineliminableexpostcomponent.
Combining thesetwo points, I conclude thatwrongs have anex post character
















Like corrective justice theory, I believe that remedies aim to correct a wrong.
Like civil recourse theory, I believe that remedies depend on factors beyond the
nature of the underlying right. These independently plausible ideas can be main-
205tained simultaneously by thinking that the nature of a wrong depends on more
thanthenatureoftherightviolated.
206[The psychopath] is socially dissimilar from the majority of his fel-
lows in his lack of moral feeling, by his failure to be motivated by
a recognition of the rights of others and the obligations he has to
them. Thus, he is in no position to claim rights for himself. He vi-
olates a condition for the possibility of reciprocity which is…in turn
apresuppositionforintelligibilityofthewholeobligation-rightslan-
guage game…If this is so, of course, then the psychopath cannot be
wronged, can be done no moral injury.
JeﬀrieG.Murphy
Horses,justlikedogsandotheranimals,havesensitivefeelings,only
they cannot complain when they feel hurt as we can. So it happens
that a great many people do not understand that they can have feel-




Not all victims can complain. In the previous chapter, I noted that the na-
tureofawrongmaydependonhowtheinjuredpartyframeshisorhercomplaint.
But some parties can’t frame a complaint at all. This chapter argues that one gap
betweentheexanterealmofrightsandthe expostrealmof complaintsexistsbe-






a rights violation and yet still be a rightholder. First, one might lack standing
whereone’sownconductpreventsanappealtotherelevantnorms. Thusthepsy-
chopath imagined by Murphy (1979, pp.134-36)—as well as the more ordinary
moraltransgressor—maylackthestandingtocomplainwhenthenormthathehas
himselffloutedisnotfollowed. Second,onemightlackthecapacitytoholdothers
accountable. Nonhuman animals, I will argue, fall into this category. Although I
will suggest that we should view them as having rights, they lack the capacity for
issuing complaints or holding us to account. These two general types of cases—













A special kind of standing—the standing to be potentially wronged—is taken
tobeapreconditionforbeingthebearerofrelationalduties,i.e.,apreconditionfor
being a rightholder. One might even think that the relational duties are, in some
sense,basedontheexistenceofthisstanding.
In this section, I want to examine this conception of moral standing. The lens
forthisexaminationwillbesomecriticismsofStephenDarwall’ssecond-personal
accountofmoralitythathavebeenraisedbyR.JayWallace. Wallace’scriticismsare
helpful, challenging the connection between moral norms and the complaints of
others. Ultimately, I will suggest that Darwall can withstand the wedge that Wal-
laceattemptstodrivehere. ButseeinghowDarwallcanwithstandthesecriticisms
points the way to further issues. Although the gap that Wallace tries to exploit is
notthere,asimilargapmightbe.
According to Stephen Darwall, morality is importantly “second-personal.” By
this, Darwall means that our moral obligations are owed to particular persons—
unlikegeneraldirectives—inthattheyarebasedonreasonsthatonepersongives
to another.¹ What is important, for Darwall, is the idea that we can generate rea-
sonsforeachother—wecandirecteachotherpractically,bymakingdemandsdi-
rectly upon our will, rather than just epistemically, by pointing out relevant nor-
¹ In his terms, the second-person standpoint is “the perspective you and I take up when we
makeandacknowledgeclaimsononeanother’sconductandwill”(2009,p.3).
209mativefacts.
Second-personal reasons depend on the possibility of addressing one another
in a special, reason-giving way. That is, the duties that we owe to one another
depend, for Darwall, on a relationship of authority. “When someone attempts to
giveanotherasecond-personalreason,shepurportstostandinarelevantauthority
relation to her addressee” (2009, p.4). This relevant authority amounts to a kind
of standing. As Darwall puts it, “when you demand that someone move his foot
from on top of yours, you presuppose an irreducibly second-personal standing to
addressthissecond-personalreason”(2009,p.13). Inotherwords,thedirected—
that is, the second-personal—quality of moral reasons derives from the existence
ofauthoritybetweenthepersonsinvolved, which, inturn, dependsonastanding
tomakedemandsandholdaccountable.
There is plenty of room for doubt about Darwall’s picture. How the existence
ofcertainmodesofaddresscangiverisetoaspecialtypeofreasonisnotobvious.
For this reason, Darwall’s theory can feel quite elusive. A recent paper by R. Jay
Wallace presses these questions about how the ideas of address and authority are
supposedtoberelatedtomoralnorms. ThemainthrustofWallace’sargumentis
that it is not clear how the authority of second-personal address, which seems to
dependonanactoftheaddressor,canbethebasisformoralnorms,whichdonot






tively second-personal reasons. The claim or demand that is at issue
inthiscaseisthevictim’sprotest,whichweshouldunderstandascre-
ating a reason for you to desist, in virtue of the victim’s authority to
make demands of precisely this nature. This suggests that you did
not have a second-personal reason to refrain from stepping on the
victim’s toe until the protest was issued. This cannot be right, how-
ever. Surelywewanttosaythatyouhaveanagent-relativereasonnot
tosteponsomeone’sgoutytoethatis(tosomedegree)priortoand









are “claims on the will of an agent that are grounded in another agent’s authority
to issue claims of the relevant kind” (2007, p.27). If the reason exists antecedent








at all times. Much like criminal punishment for an action implies an antecedent
legal norm against such action, holding one another accountable morally implies
anantecedentmoralnorm. Asheputsit:
[T]o understand moral obligation as related to moral responsibility
in the way we normally do, we have to see it as involving demands
thatare‘inforce’fromthemoralpointofview,thatis,fromthe(first-
person plural) perspective of the moral community… Once… we




simply wouldn’t exist but for the possibility of the second-personal
addressinvolvedinclaimingordemanding. (2009,p.9)
Wallace,Ithink,misinterpretsDarwall’sargumenthere. HeinterpretsDarwall
to be making a claim about the disposition of the other agent or the moral com-
munitytoholdusaccountable. Hewrites:





an expanded conception of what it is to address a demand to a per-
son. On the expanded account, demands are addressed not merely
when they are explicitly articulated (in the form, say, of a command
or a protest) but also when there is present a disposition to respond






do they require any actual disposition to hold accountable. “Your reason not to
step on the gouty toe of your neighbor… seems equally independent of whether
thevictim,oranyoneelse,isinfactdisposedtorespondtoyourtreadingonhistoes




But I don’t believe that Darwall should be interpreted as appealing to any dis-
position to hold accountable. What is important is not that the gouty neighbor
does protest (explicit demand), nor that he would protest (disposition), but that
he could protest.² He could hold you accountable, i.e., he could blame or resent
yoursteppingonhim,andimplicitinsuchanactofholdingaccountablewouldbe
the presence of a command that you not step on his foot. Notice that the ‘could’
hereisnotjustadescriptionofability. Speakingdescriptively,hecouldresentyou
for not having gout yourself. But such resentment would be unfounded or inapt.
Whenwesaythathecouldresentyoursteppingonhisfoot,wemeannotonlythat
² Note the use of ‘can’ and ‘accountable’ (also a term of possibility) in the following already
quoted passage from Darwall: “Once…we have the idea that there exists a reason to forbear
steppingonpeople’sfeetinthefactthatthisissomethingwecanordoreasonablydemandofone




To recognize that he could hold you accountable in this sense is already to rec-
ognizethepresenceofasecond-personalreason. This, Ithink, istheideabehind
Darwall’s argument—the authority of the other person is present in the poten-
tiality of their legitimately holding you accountable. This is why Darwall appeals
throughoutthebooktotheconceptof‘standing,’atermthatisalmostentirelyig-
noredinWallace’streatment. AsDarwallputsit,“I…arguethatmoralobligations
essentially include demands free and rational individuals have standing to make
of one another as such and that we are committed to the standing to make these
demandsbypresuppositionsofthesecond-personstandpoint”(2009,pp.28-29).
In sum, the demands of morality aren’t demands that are explicitly given, nor are
they implied by an actual disposition to hold accountable, but rather they are im-
plicitinourstandingtoholdeachotheraccountable—theyareimplicitinthefact
thatwecouldholdeachotheraccountable.⁴
Now admittedly, it’s not self-evident how the possibility of legitimate future
protestimpliesanalreadyexistingcommand,andonedoeswishthatDarwallhad




³ In what follows, I will generally use ‘could’ in this stronger sense, implying not only physi-
cal possibility but also a nonphysical possibility or aptness. Where context is ambiguous, I will
sometimes refer to what a person ‘could legitimately’ resent or complain against. This sense of
‘could’isessentialtotheideaofstanding.
⁴ Gilbert (2004) similarly suggests that the directedness of obligations exists in a special
standingtocomplain.
214Still, there does seem to be a diﬀerence between protests of this sort, which
faultlessly comment on past action in order to request its alteration in the future,
andcomplaintsofthereactive-attitudesort,whichmoreclearlypresupposeapre-
existingnorm. Theanalogytopunishmentisahelpfulone. Astatutethatautho-
rizes punishment for a certain act without explicitly specifying a prohibition can
neverthelessimplicitly commandcitizensthatthe actis nottobedone. Andthis
implicit command is still in force—one still has a legally given reason not to do
it—even if the state entirely lacks any disposition to prosecute the act. I suspect




then those with whom you have contracts may demand damages. Nonetheless,
weordinarilyviewcontractlawascontainingnormsthatgoverncontracting. One
mightplausiblythinkthatonehasalegalreasontofulfillone’scontract—andthis
is true even if one know the other party is not disposed to sue. The standing to
sue that is granted to contracting parties presupposes, as it were, the existence of





215Wallace agrees that morality involves relational duties, and he accepts that ac-
countabilityandresentmenttypicallygoalongwiththeseduties.⁶ Whatherejects
isthatreactiveattitudesandaccountabilitycanbetheirsource. Holdingeachother
accountable may be characteristic of relational norms, but it is not the case that
holdingoneanotheraccountableimpliesordrawsuswithinrelationalnorms.
Wallace’s argument that the possibility of reactive attitudes does not presup-
pose relational norms is that reactive attitudes like guilt and indignation can exist
without relying on relational norms.⁷ For example, one can feel indignation to-
wards Robert Mugabe without thinking that he violated any norm owed to you.
But it is not clear that Darwall needs every reactive attitude to correspond with a
particular relational norm. The point that Darwall wants to make, what he calls
Strawson’s point, is that reactive attitudes presuppose a realm of second-personal
reasons.⁸ Thisdoesnotrequirethateachreactiveattitudewillinvolveanisomor-
phic relational obligation; all that it requires is that a realm of relational duties is
presupposed. Avictim’sresentmentofMugabedoesseemtopresupposetheidea
⁶ For example, he writes, “[I]t is characteristic of relational normativity, as I understand it,
that the person who is wronged by you has a privileged basis for complaint against you, an ob-
jection to your conduct that is not shared by mere observers to what was done. The notion that
someone in particular has been wronged by your action is conceptually connected to the idea




are specifically relational norms, linking the bearers of the attitudes to their targets in a bipolar
normativenexus”(2007,p.30).
⁸“Reactiveattitudesinvariablyconcernwhatsomeonecanbeheldto,sotheyinvariablypre-
supposethe authority toholdsomeoneresponsibleandmakedemands on him. Moral reactive
attitudes therefore presuppose the authority to demand and hold one another responsible for






Although I think that Wallace’s criticisms of Darwall are ultimately unsuccess-
ful, I do think that they are helpful. Wallace rightly draws our attention to the
temporalslideinDarwallbetweencomplaintsandattitudinalresponsesthathap-
pen (if at all) in the future and moral norms that seem to be ever present. This
gap between complaints and norms emphasized in Wallace’s argument suggests a
diﬀerent set of objections to Darwall, one that retains something of the spirit of
Wallace’scriticism. Wallacefocusesonthosewhohavenot,orwouldnot,complain
againstaparticulartransgression,andIhavearguedthatDarwall’sviewmaybeable
to answer these cases. Explaining these examples highlights the fact that Darwall
isn’tlinkingmoralnormswithactualcomplaints,butwiththestandingorcapacity
tocomplain.
What we need in order to challenge Darwall’s view is to consider those who
couldnot complainagainstatransgression—thosewhoarenotinapositiontoad-
dress us second-personally. If relational morality exists where a party lacks even
⁹ Wallace seems to recognize this. He writes, “Among the reactive sentiments, resentment
may be a special case, presupposing that one stands in a relational nexus of the kind I have been
discussing. We feel resentment when we believe that another person has wronged us, violating
adirectionaldutytousnottotreatusincertainways;resentment,indeed,canbeunderstoodas
thecharacteristicformofcomplaintthatbearersofrelationalrightsandclaimsareinaprivileged
position to lodge when those rights and claims have been flouted. But these features of resent-
ment hardly generalize to all of the reactive sentiments across the board.” (2007, pp.30-31). It’s
notclearwhythisuniquecharacterofresentmentthatWallacegrantsisn’tenoughtogetDarwall
hisargument.
217the standing to complain, such cases would reflect the general idea that Wallace
endorses: thepracticalauthoritythatinheresinhavingtheabilitytoholdaccount-
ableismerelycharacteristicof,ratherthanthebasisof,relationalnormativity. In-
stances of relational norms without the ability to hold accountable would show
that accountability is only characteristically connected to relational morality—as





not by the fact that the other person does or would complain. The possibility of
such second-personal address presupposes the existence of second-personal rea-
sons. On this view, our moral authority is captured by a kind of standing that we
have with regard to each other. In this section, I intend to present a diﬃculty for
thethoughtthatmoralobligationisbasedonthissortofstanding.
Although the diﬃculty presented is particularly applicably to Darwall’s view
given his focus on the way we address each other, I think that it presents a more
general diﬃculty for theories of relational normativity such as that described by
Michael Thompson and drawn upon by Wallace. This is because, although such
theoriesmaynotfocusonthestandingtocomplaininthewaythatDarwalldoes,
they do emphasize a similar sort of standing. On such views, relational norms
are characterized by the fact that there is someone in particular who stands to be
218wronged by their violation.¹⁰ One might say that standing to be wronged plays a
similar role in such views as the standing to complain does in Darwall. Thus, al-





plain about the violation of a norm. Ordinarily, someone lacks standing to com-
plain when the action in question is not her business—such as, if she has no par-
ticular interest at stake in the matter and she is not owed any particular duty with




ited to violations of principles he acknowledges himself. A complaint is a protest
¹⁰ See, e.g., Wallace (2007, p.28): “Your obligation in this matter has a similarly relational
aspect; it is an obligation to the gout victim not to disregard his well-being, and its violation
would not merely be something that is impersonally wrong or incorrect, but an act that wrongs
thepersonwhoisthusmadetosuﬀer.”
¹¹ Trained lawyers are sometimes confused by the use of the word ‘standing’ in this context.
In law, standing has a narrow meaning, which refers to whether parties must a relevant interest
in the disputed controversy. Since transgressors undoubtedly retain an interest in what is done
to them, this use of the word may make it awkward to speak of losing legal standing by virtue of
one’sownmisdeeds. ButIbelievethatthisisapeculiarfeatureofthelegalusage. Ingeneral,to
challengetheopposingparty’sstandingis,essentially,toposethequestion,“Whatisittoyou?”
Itis a feature of this challenge thatit canbe usedeither to demandwhat interestthe other party
has at stake or to demand what basis the other party has for availing itself of the relevant norm.
Thus, although lawyers do not typically use the word in this way, it seems to me best to think of
thedoctrineofuncleanhandsasanequitablestandingdoctrine.
219addressed to another in good faith. It claims a violation of a principle that both
parties accept.” (1999, pp.190-91). What counts as acknowledging a principle is
a tricky questions, but when one entirely flouts a moral norm, it may become the
case that one cannot legitimately appeal to that norm as the basis for a complaint
againstanother.¹²
Consider an example. You are in a bar discussing sports and you happen to
make known your opinion that Arsenal’s team is a bunch of whiners and cheats.
The hothead at the stool next to you, who may have had a pint or two too many,
immediately lands a right hook to your chin. Suppose that the right thing to do
istoturntheothercheek. Butyougiveintoyourtemptationandretaliatewitha








the conflict by throwing a grenade instead of a punch, he would certainly be in a
¹² For useful discussion of this idea, see Cohen (2006); Cohen (2013). In order to avoid
what may seem like counterexamples to this principle, it is worth distinguishing between cases
in which one appeals to the norm, and cases in which the existence of the norm figures in one’s
complaint. TheremaybeaparticularnormthatIdonotacceptbutwhichIknowtobeaccepted
by those around me. If they violate that norm, it may express a disrespect for me or it may frus-
tratemyexpectations. Insuchsituations,Imightcomplain. ButIwouldnotbeappealingtothe
norm itself. I would be appealing to other norms about respect or reliance. The norm would
figureonlyasadescriptivefactaboutsocialconventions.
220position to complain about that. And he might yet be in a position to complain
aboutyourinsensitiveinsultstohisfavoriteteam. Buthecannot,Ithink,complain
aboutreceivingapunchinresponsetohisownpunch.¹³
There are interesting and complicated questions about the scope of standing




of the way in which standing is lost, there are certainly clear cases and I take the





¹³ Compare Kant (1965, p.86): “human beings do one another no wrong at all when they
feud among themselves; for what holds for one holds also in turn for the other, as if by mutual
consent.” And Cohen (2006, p.119): “while not denying that the action was performed, and
that it is to be condemned (which is not to say: while agreeing that it is to be condemned), [a
person] can seek to discredit her critic’s assertion of her standing as a good faith condemner of
therelevantaction.”
¹⁴ This is not to say that they are the same. The existence of identical violations is certainly
toostrongarequirement. Theguyatthebar,forexample,couldnotrationalizehiscomplaintby
saying, “I acknowledge a principle that retaliation is wrong—one should always turn the other
cheek—and you did not. But I didn’t violate that principle. And I acknowledge no principle
thatsaysoneshouldn’tdefendthehonorofone’sfavoritefootballclubbyviolence. SoIamnot
tryingtoappealtoanyprinciplethatIdonotmyselffollowinmakingthiscomplaintagainstyour
actions.” This reply is not successful in part because it sounds so disingenuous. But even if the
person sincerely believes there to be a principled diﬀerence between the actions, this does not
meanthathehasstandingtocomplain.
¹⁵ It’s certainly possible that moral transgression or avowed rejection of a principle is not the
only way that one can suﬀer a discrete loss of standing to complain. Frances Kamm asked me
whethersomeonemightbeunabletocomplainagainstanotherduetoone’sdebtofgratitudeto
221In the law, this idea is captured by various equitable doctrines, particularly the
doctrine of unclean hands.¹⁶ This doctrine often goes under the slogan, “those
who seek equity must come with clean hands.” It holds, essentially, that a party
seeking to lodge a legal complaint may be unable to make that complaint if the
party has unclean hands, either legally or morally. In the quite famous example
ofRiggsv. Palmer,¹⁷amanwhokilledhisgrandfatherinordertoinheritfromhim
was denied the inheritance dictated by the will. In a more recent example, the
artist Shepard Fairey appealed to the doctrine in a litigation battle with the Asso-
ciated Press. Fairey had used an Associated Press photograph as the basis for his
stylized“Hope”posterofthen-candidateBarackObama,whichquicklybecamea
ubiquitous image. Seizing on the burgeoning commercial use of the image, the
that other person. This does seem plausible, although we might distinguish two possible types
of cases. First, when one owes someone a debt of gratitude, it may be unseemly to complain
against comparatively small or isolated transgressions. If you saved my life, then it may seem
inappropriate for me to complain that you borrow a small sum of money and do not repay it
promptly. But my inclination is to say that in such cases, the grateful person could complain
(thecomplaintwouldbeaptandwell-founded),buttheysimplyoughtnot. Theyhavestanding
todoso,butitisnotastandingtheyshouldexercise. Anditseemstomethatwemighttherefore
still say that the person is wronged, albeit in a way that the person should excuse or forgive. A




I have violated a duty (in this case, a duty of care) owed to you, and yet you not only ought
not complain but cannot complain. Perhaps, in such cases, gratitude results in a loss of standing
to complain. If it does, then I think that there has been no wronging in such a case. (For the
viewthatthebenefittedpartymightstillbewronged,seeShiﬀrin(1999).) Althoughyoursavior
violated a duty of care that was owed to you, you have not been wronged because he did you
so much of a greater good. I am not sure whether there are cases of this second type (that is,
whether there are cases that should be described in this way), but, if they do exist, they provide
anothersetofexamplesfortheargumentbeingmadeinthischapter.
¹⁶ Here, again, lawyers may view it as odd to see this doctrine as a matter of standing, as it is
notnormallycategorizedthisway. ButIthinkthisissimplyaterminologicalhappenstance.
¹⁷115N.Y.506(1889).
222Associated Press alleged that Fairey had gone beyond fair use of its photograph
without having obtained a license. Among the responses in Fairey’s countersuit,
FaireyarguedthattheAssociatedPressitselfusesimageofartists’works,including
his own, without obtaining licenses. Fairey cited dozens examples of the Associ-
atedPresscopyrightingandprofitingfromphotographsofartists’work,including
his own.¹⁸ In making this argument, Fairey was not alleging that he comported
with the norms of copyright law. One might say that the argument was not ad-
dressed to absolving Fairey’s conduct. Instead, it suggested that the Associated
Presslackedthepositiontocomplain.
In explicating Darwall’s account in the previous section, I argued that, for him,
the moral norms stem from the standing of another party to complain. Morality
placesusundersecond-personaldemandsofothersinsofarasthosenormsareim-
plicit in the fact that other could complain and hold us accountable. In the sorts
of cases I have been describing, however, it seems that the other party could not
complain—party has lost its standing to complain. But although the other party
could not complain, this does not mean that there is no norm. It is still wrong to
punch the guy in the bar, and Fairey did still violate copyright law. The fact that
the other party could not complain leaves open the question of what morally we
owe them. Incidentally, this was precisely Rawls’s understanding: although the
intolerant cannot legitimately complain against suppression of their views, there
remainsaquestionofwhetherweshouldoughttosurpressthem.




paradox—what he calls “the paradox of moral complaint.” Smilansky argues that
the paradox arises because there are two basic but conflicting ideas about moral
complaints. According to the “non-contradiction condition for complaint,” it is
the case that, “morally, a person cannot complain when others treat him or her in




seemto have a basis in a general “legislative” conception of morality. The legisla-








But, as I have alreadynoted, the diﬃcult questionsaboutthe extenttowhich one
¹⁹ “The moral principles one puts forth apply equally to everyone, in relevantly similar cir-
cumstances. And actions count: when one performs morally significant actions, one thereby
legislates,insomesense,thataccordingtoone’sprinciplesitispermissibleforrelevantlysimilar
otherstoperformsimilaractionsundersimilarcircumstances.” (2006,p.284).
224forfeits moral complaints by moral transgression should not obscure the fact that
someforfeituredoesseemtobeasignificantfeatureofmorality. AndSmilanskyis
righttosaythatthisfeatureofmoralityisintensionwiththethoughtthatthereare
some norms that are unconditional, if that means that the other party will always
havegroundstocomplain.
Smilansky does note one way that we might escape the conclusion that there
is a deep contradiction in our thinking about moral complaint. This avenue is
disconnectingmoralcomplaintfrommoralconstraint. Ifonerejectstheideathat
violations of moral norms always produce moral complaints in others, then one
canresolvetheparadox. Wrongdoersmaybeunabletocomplainiftheyaretreated
in certain ways, and yet it may still be impermissible to treat them in such ways.
This is, I think, entirely correct. It coincides with what I think is our intuitive
understandingofcaseslikethatofthebarfight. Thefactthattheotherpartycould






grounds for complaint if anyone treats E in that way” (2006, p.289). Because he




moral norms would involve rejecting the principle that Smilansky describes. In
fact, that principle amounts to nothing more than a statement of material condi-
tional that the cases of lost standing to complain seem to shed doubt on. So why







this should hardly seems unfathomable. Suppose that in returning the punch in
thebar, youknockyouradversaryintoaninnocentbystanderwho is hurt. There
isnothingpeculiarinthethoughtthatthebystander,butnottheadversary,could





The real reason, I take it, that Smilansky is unwilling to accept a disconnect be-
tween moral complaint and moral constraint is because he views such a move to
be in tension with his ‘legislative’ conception of morality. How this is the case
226is not really developed in Smilansky’s paper; it doesn’t obviously follow from the




ilar circumstances, so that, when one acts for a reason, one is ratifying a principle
forothersaswell.
But Smilansky seems to think that the legislative conception of morality im-
pliessomethingaboutcomplaintsandaccountabilityaswell. Inthis,Isuspectthat
SmilanskyismovedbysomethingsimilartowhatmovesDarwall. Theideaisthat
morality is “owed to” others insofar as its norms are norms to which we can hold
each other accountable. Normative principles implicate complaints and account-
ability,andviceversa. Sowhenweenactnormativeprinciples,wearedecidingnot
only what one ought to do, but what complaints we can make of one another. If
oneacceptsthisconnectionbetweenmoralityandaccountability,thenthelegisla-
tive conception of morality takes on a stronger form. When I act, I am legislating
principles about what I think we owe to each other, which is to say, what we all
candemandfromeachotherandwhatwecancomplainagainst. NoticethatDar-
wall’s thesis is essentially the contrapositive of this: When we complain against
something,weareimplicitlymakingajudgmentaboutwhatactionsareimpermis-
sible. In short, both views see a necessary connection between moral complaint
andmoralnormsasbeingattheheartofmoralreasoning.
My claim, however, is that such a connection does not square with the moral
227phenomenon of transgressors losing their standing to complain. Just as Smilan-
sky views such cases as presenting a deep paradox for the legislative conception
of morality (as he envisions it), so too should such cases be viewed as presenting
a deep problem for Darwall’s second-personal account. If the fact that someone
hasstandingtocomplainisthebasisforoursecond-personalmoralreasons,then
there cannot be moral reasons in the absence of such standing. It seems to me,
however,thattherecanstillbemoral,deontologicalreasons.²⁰
Onemightrespondbydenyingthislastpoint—thatis,bydenyingthatthereare
any distinctly moral or second-personal reasons at play in these cases.²¹ On this
view,theremaybereasonsnottopunchtheguyinthebarorforFaireynottotake
the AP’s images or for society not to suppress the intolerant, but they are not the
distinctivelysecond-personalreasonsofmorality. Theobligationsofmoralityare,
for Darwall, just those for which someone could hold us accountable.²² Because




²⁰ In one way, my argument is that we can still have the legislative conception of morality
withoutthestrictconnectiontoaccountabilitythatDarwallandSmilanskyassume. Ouractions
canbesubjecttolawsthatstemfromtheauthorityofotherpersonswithoutitbeingthecasethat
those other persons can make complaints against us. Put metaphorically, I can see others have










He is a person, and you owe it to him not to treat him that way—whether or not
he has standing to make this demand. Put another way, you have the same kind
ofreasonnottopunchhim,regardlessofwhetherhecancomplain.²³ Similarly,I
think that we should say that Fairey’s legal obligation not to use AP photographs
without permission is based on the AP’s legal rights, even if it lacks the standing
to complain against the violation of those rights. Notice that if it were not the

















229further say that that person has not been wronged. In the bar fight, for example,
it seems to me that, not only should we say that the adversary has no complaint
when you retaliate, but he is not wronged if you do so. But one might plausibly
saythathislackingstandingtocomplaindoesnotshowthatyouhavenotwronged
theotherguy,butonlythathecannotassertthewrong.²⁴
It seems to me, however, that the idea of a wrong is bound up with the moral
standing of another to hold one accountable. Here, I suppose, I am in some sol-
idarity with Darwall. To say that you have wronged X—and not merely that you
have acted wrongly toward X, i.e., not done what you owed to X—is to say that X
could hold you accountable. To describe you as having wronged X is to say that
X stands in a certain moral relation to you—not merely that he did stand in a re-
lationtoyoupriortoyouraction. Forthisreason,itseemstome,theexistenceof
a wrong requires the standing to complain. It describes something, a possibility,
thatexistsafterthefact. Tobewrongedis,Ithink,tobeinapositiontocomplain.





the word “wronging” as a placeholder for the violation of rights. My claim is that
²⁴ In support of this point, one might note that you might apologize for your punch—and
that this suggests that there must be a wrong to apologize for. But apologies can serve a variety
of purposes, not all of which are responses to actual wrongs. In particular, they can be used
as a symbolic way of repairing moral relationships by acknowledging wrongdoing. To say that
by apologizing one would be acknowledging wrongdoing is not to say that by apologizing one
wouldbeacknowledgingthatonehadwrongedtheotherparty.
230thereisadiﬀerentrelationthatalsooftengoesundertheheading“wronging.”Itis
the divide between these—between ex ante norms and ex post accountability—
that is of essential interest. Because I take there to be strong reasons, which I de-
scribe elsewhere, for thinking that our commitments about wronging do not al-
ways coincide with the moral duties that are owed to someone, I subscribe to the
view that a wrong involves having a complaint. But I do not take anything in this
sectiontosettlethatquestion.
7.3 Lacking the Capacity to Complain: Non-Human Ani-
mals
I have been arguing that theories that strongly connect relational obligations
to complaints—in particular, that of Darwall, but more generally those that un-
derstand being owed a duty to be a matter of being in a privileged position as the
onewhostandstobewronged—facecertainchallengingcases. Theproblemarises
where it appears that a party could not complain, and yet it also appears that we
do owe an obligation to that party. In the previous section, I focused on cases in
which a party could not complain because she lacks standing to complain based
on her own transgressions. But another set of cases arises where a party cannot
complainbecauseitlacksthecapacitytocomplain. HereIwillfocusonadiﬀerent
sort of case, epitomized by nonhuman animals. I mean to argue that we can owe
dutiestononhumananimals,eventhoughnonhumananimalscannotmakemoral
complaints or judge us to have wronged them. We owe it to animals to treat that
incertainways,butnotbecausetheycanholdusaccountable.
2317.3.1 TheComplaintsofNonhumanAnimals
Throughout the Middle Ages and as late at the 16th Century, nonhuman animals
were routinely brought to trial. E.P. Evans collects many such cases with fasci-
nating and absurd details. For example, he describes an occasion in which rats
werechargedwith“havingfeloniouslyeatenupandwantonlydestroyedthebarley-
crop” (1906, p.18). Lawyers debated what sort of summons would properly pro-
vide notice to the rats and whether they could safely appear in court. Other odd-
ities range from a counsellor being appointed to represent slugs that were threat-
ened with excommunication to extensive disputes over whether accused animals
shouldbetriedasclergyorlaypersons.
Tous,thesepracticesseemabsurdlymisguided. Evanshimselfdescribedthem




of each other’s action. We are accountable to each other, and we hold each other
toaccount. Andwehavelegalinstitutionsthatarebuiltontheserelations. Butwe
cannot relate to nonhuman animals in this way. They cannot give us justification
for their actions or recognize our contention that they have acted without justifi-
cation. And we should not expect them to do so. As a result, it seems absurd to
haulapackofratsintocourt.
²⁵“Itwastheproductofasocialstate,inwhichdenseignorancewasgovernedbybruteforce,
and… tended to foster[club-law] by making a travesty of the administration of justice and thus
turningitintoridicule”(1906,p.41).
232Justasanimalscannotanswerthecomplaintsthatwemake,animalscannotad-
dress us with complaints. They can whine, growl, whimper, struggle, and other-
wisedisplaytheirdissatisfaction. Buttheycannotcomplaininthespecialwaythat
humans can complain. They cannot engage in a dialogue about how we ought to
act or ought to have acted. In this sense, rats are no more fit to be plaintiﬀs than
defendants.²⁶
By saying that nonhuman animals lack the capacity to complain, I mean that
they lack the capacity to complain that is essential to a view like Darwall’s. On
such a view, the capacity to complain does not simply mean the actual ability to
articulate a protest. If I am bound and gagged such that I am prevented from any
expressive action, this does not mean that I lack the capacity to complain that is
relevanttoDarwall. Insuchacase,Iamcapableofthinkingthecomplaint,evenif
my circumstances prevent its expression. So when I say that nonhuman animals
lacktocapacitytocomplain,Idonotsimplymeanthattheylackthelanguageabil-
itiestoaddresscomplaints. Ofcourse,theirinabilitytocomplainisrelatedtotheir
inability to use language, but I mean that they cannot complain in the sense that
they cannot form the thought of a complaint. Even if nonhuman animals could
expressalltheirthinkingtous,theygenerallywouldnotexpresssomethingofthe
form“yououghtnotdothattome”(wherethe‘ought’hereismeantinanormative
and not predictive sense, a point to which I will return). Perhaps this is not true







Of course, as I have already noted, there is another sense in which animals do
seem quite capable of complaints. If I am eating a particularly smelly piece of
cheese and my dog is in a feisty mood, she might whine or bark, which seems an
awfullotlikeacomplaintthatsheisn’tgettingashare. IfIstoprubbingherbelly,
she will invariablypawatme tocontinue. And if I try totakehertothe groomer,
shemightwhine, orsitstubbornlyandrefusetomove, oreven“punish”meafter-
wards with misbehavior. These sorts of behaviors are a testament to the way that
nonhumananimals,especiallydomesticatedones,arecapableofexpressingthem-
selves to us. And among the things that they can express is the idea, “I don’t like
that,”or“Stopit.”
Butthiskindofexpressionisnotthesameasaddressingasecond-personalrea-
son.²⁷ It is an expression that we may take to give us a reason, but the animal
does not understand the idea of giving or exchanging reasons. As Christine Ko-
rsgaard (2013) puts it, ”we human beings, unlike the other animals, think of our-
²⁷ Darwall writes, “[T]o the extent that we find the thought that we owe obligations to non-
rational beings a natural thing to think, it seems likely that we also impute to them a proto- or
quasi-second-personality, for example, as when we see an animal’s or an infant’s cry as a form of
complaint”(2009,p.29). Thereissurelysomethingcorrectaboutthisobservation,butitdoesn’t
seem to me that it really gets Darwall out of the diﬃculty. Proto- or quasi-second-personality
can only be the basis for proto- or quasi-duties, and I think we want more than that. But more
importantly,itseemstomethatDarwall’sobservationaccidentallybespeakstheknowledgethat
the order of explanation goes the other direction that what Darwall would have it. We recog-
nize the duties owed to them and then impute a complaint. But on Darwall’s view, the reasons
and duties are supposed to come from relating second-personally. It seems to me that Darwall




plaint or holding accountable requires the ability to understand action in norma-




we are well aware of this inability to distinguish justified and unjustified actions.
Itiswhatproducesthedistinctsortofregretwefeelforcausingevenjustifieddis-
comfort to animals. We know that our animals cannot understand that there is a
good reason for spaying them, or giving them vaccination shots, or caging them
fortheirownsafety. Evenrelativelyyoungchildrencanbeoﬀeredreasons(orthe
assurance that reasons exist) for the unpleasant things that we put them through,
butnonhumananimalscannot. Theirinabilitytoappreciatereasonsispartofthe
distinctiveinnocencethatwefindinnonhumananimals.
But it means that there is an important relation that we cannot have with non-
human animals. We cannot act toward them in ways that are justifiable or un-
justifiable to them; we cannot stand in relationships of justification with them.²⁹
²⁸ See Korsgaard (2011, p.103): “Reason looks inward, and focuses on the connections be-
tween our own mental states and attitudes and the eﬀects that they tend to have on us. It asks
whether our actions are justified by our motives or our inferences are justified by our beliefs…
[T]he diﬀerence between human beings and the other animals is not that we are self-conscious
andtheyarenot. Itis,asitwere,bothsmallerandbiggerthanthat. Humanbeingshaveapartic-
ularformortypeofself-consciousness: consciousnessofthegroundsofourbeliefsandactions.






235For this reason, the relationship of wronging—that of having a valid complaint
against—seems inapt for our relationships with animals. My dog is certainly the
sortofthingthatstandstobeharmed,butsheisnotthesortofthingthatstandsto
have a complaint. And, in this way, I can stand in relationship to her as one who
has harmed and one who has been harmed, but I cannot stand to her as one who
has wronged and one who has been wronged.³⁰ A dog lacks the capacity for the
thoughtrequiredforsucharelationship.³¹ Inthissense,thoughanimalssuﬀerlike
wedo,theydonotsuﬀerwrongslikewedo.³²
The animal’s inability to complain here is significantly diﬀerent than the moral
transgressor’s. AsInotedearlier,whenoneaskswhethersomeonecouldcomplain
referringtoaquestionofstanding,thesenseof‘could’ismorethanmerephysical
³⁰ See Gaita (2005, p.176): “Animals lack almost entirely [rationality]. That is one reason
whywecannotwrongthemwhenwearecrueltothemaswewouldwrongafellowhumanbeing
to whom we are cruel. It is why we cannot wrong them when we kill them as we would wrong
a human being if we murdered him. And that is why we speak so naturally of us and them, of
humanbeingsandanimals,ratherthanhumanbeingsandotheranimals.”
³¹ Implicit in the argument here is an assumption that, in order to be wronged, something
must be the sort of thing capable of understanding what it means to be wronged. I think this is
correct. In fact, this highlights the relational character of wronging. For X to wrong Y requires
something of both X and Y. It is, as Michael Thompson emphasizes, a two-place predicate that
requiresanentityofaspecialsortonbothsides.
³²Somereadersmayfindithardtosaythatonecannotwronganimals. Asnotedintheprevi-
ous section, I don’t want to get bogged down in discussing the use of the word “wronging.” My
central argument is that they cannot complain or hold us accountable in Darwall’s sense. But I
want to make a few observations to mitigate any linguistic resistance to my claims here. If one
asks, “Does a person who tortures an animal wrong the animal?” one might be inclined to say
yes. But this, I think, is largely because we don’t want to say no. In the context of the question,
the primary thingthat wewanttocommunicate is thatthe tortureis a violation of whatis owed
to the animal. As I have noted elsewhere, we can use the word “wronging” as a placeholder for
rights violations, and I think that is what we do here. The more relevant question is whether we
naturally invoke notions of wronging when talking about animals. I think that we do not. We
cannaturallyspeakofharming,hurting,orinjuring. But“Ihavewrongedmydog”and“thedogs
were wronged” are, I think, awkward and unnatural constructions. An examination of actual
usagepatternsconfirmsthis.
236possibility. The transgressor cannot complain, although she has the physical ca-
pacity to do so, because she lacks the authority to appeal to the relevant norm.
Nonhuman animals, in contrast, just lack the capacity to complain. But this, too,
is more than mere physical inability. If nonhuman animals could complain, they
wouldbeadiﬀerentkindofcreaturealtogether.
7.3.2 OwingObligationstoNonhumanAnimals
Although nonhuman animals cannot complain against our actions, I believe that
we can owe obligations to such animals (and not merely have obligations regard-
ing them). That is to say, I believe that nonhuman animals do have rights, even
though they are unable to hold us accountable. If this is correct, then it presents
aproblemfortheviewthatdirectedobligationsareboundupwiththecapacityto
holdaccountable.






we are required to do in order to ensure that our actions are justifiable to others,
then we cannot have directed duties to entities to whom requirements of justifi-
cationareinapplicable.³³ OrtoputthepointinDarwall’slanguage,wecouldnot







This view need not be callous. Such a view can acknowledge that we have rea-
sonsandduties—perhapsverystrongreasonsandduties—nottotreatnonhuman
animals badly. Some of thesereasons may be based on what we owe to other hu-




Still, I want to suggest that we should view ourselves as having obligations that
areowedtononhumananimals.³⁵ Therearethreegeneraltypesofconsiderations
governedbyafurtherclassofreasons.”
³⁴ See Darwall (2009, p.28): “Of course, even if we do not, even if, say, harming wilderness
or members of other species were not in itself to violate and demand for which we can be held
morally accountable, there would still be weighty reasons against such harm.” Scanlon (1998,





man animals despite their inability to engage in the shared lawmaking of moral thought. Her
argument, roughly, is that we can make sense of ‘owed to’ in the sense that something is the
source of the interests that a norm is meant to protect. She then argues that we confer value on
our own animal nature—pleasure and so on—and that we thereby construct norms that make
it wrong to cause pain or otherwise to harm animal interests. The nonhuman animals, which
also have these interests, can be owed obligations in the sense that their interests are protected
by the moral norms that we construct. I have reservations about both stages of this argument,
which may ultimately stem from a general agnosticism about Korsgaard’s contructivism. First,








But why think that what is owed depends on the capacity to view matters in a
particular way, retrospectively? Suppose, albeit quite fancifully, that there was a
human with the complete inability to remember anything that has happened in
the past, even the immediate past. There is a real condition that is vaguely like
this called anterograde amnesia (which reached popular awareness after the film
Memento). But what I am imagining would be quite a bit more extreme than any
realcase. Suchaperson,byvirtueofcognitivedisability,wouldnotbecapableof
making complaints or holding us accountable. But it would be odd to infer that
therecannotbeobligationsowedtosuchaperson. Undoubtedly,suchadisability
wouldmakesomeoneincapableofhavingthesamesortsofrelationshipswithus.
norm is suﬃcient to generate the idea of being a rightholder, i.e., the subject of an obligation
‘owed to’ that person. One wants the idea that the rightholder, in some sense, possesses the
norm, not merely the benefit conferred by the norm. Second, it seems to me that Korsgaard’s
argumentmakesthemoralstatusofnonhumananimalstoocontingentontheirsimilaritytous.
Nonhuman animals get protection because they happen to have interests that overlap with our
own. But this seems too accidental. Suppose that humans did not have animal interests—that
is,supposewewereangelswithonlynonmaterialconcerns. Wouldsuchcreaturesnotoweobli-
gationstoanimals? Ontheotherhand,ifmerelyhavinginterests—similartooursornot—isthe
key, then we should owe duties to plants as well as animals. Broadly speaking, my reservations
arise from the sense that Korsgaard’s account is too focused on humans, accounting for animals
onlyderivatively.
239Therewouldbenodiﬀerenceinourrelationshipwiththatpersonwhetherweacted
justly toward him or not. But it does not seem to me to follow that this person
cannot be the recipient of directed obligations. What I think this suggests is that
being owed an obligation has more to do with being entitled to a certain sort of
treatmentthanithastodowiththecapacitytoholdusaccountable.³⁶ AndIthink
there are several features of our obligations concerning animals that give them a
directedquality.
First,themoralphenomenologyofourrelationswithnonhumananimalsisthat
of owing obligations to them, not merely about them. When we see ourselves
as having obligations regarding how to treat other animals, I believe that we see
the nonhuman animals as entitled to that treatment. This is why we can speak of
animal rights. Unlike beautiful art or untamed wilderness—objects that might
have intrinsic value suﬃcient to generate reasons to treat them in various ways—







the cats we were studying. However, when I got ‘Speedo,’ a very
intelligent cat that I’d secretly named—secretly, because we weren’t
³⁶Beingowedadebt,forexample,doesnotseemtodependonone’sabilitytocallinpayment.
There is nothing perplexing about thinking of an unenforceable debt. I see no reason why we
shouldnotsimilarlyconsidertheretobe“uncomplainablerights.”
240supposedtoname‘subjects’—forthefinalexitfromhiscage,hisfear-
lessness disappeared as if he knew that this was his last journey. As
Ipickedhim up, helookedatme andasked, ‘Whyme?’ Tears came
tomyeyes. Hewouldn’tbreakhispiercingstare. ThoughIfollowed
through with what I was supposed to do and killed him, it broke my
heart to do so. To this day I remember his unwavering eyes—they
told the whole story of the interminable pain and indignity he had
endured. (2007,p.51)
Whatoneseesintheeyesofananimal—“thefiercegreenfire,”asAldoLeopold
(1949, p.138) famously described it—is not inanimate or impersonal. I may rec-
ognize beauty in a work of art that I was about to destroy and suddenly view it as
inappropriate to destroy it. To do so is to see a value in the world that gives me a
reasonforaction. Buttoseetheemotioninananimal’seyesismorethanthis. It
istoseeanotherbeingengagedinthestruggleofliving.
In this way, animals are not merely the impersonal loci of value (pleasure) and
disvalue (pain). As Bekoﬀ put it, it is not merely pain but also “indignity” that
the animal’s eyes make a claim against. We recognize in animals a moral status
demandingrespectthatisnotsimplytheacknowledgementofempiricalqualities
like sentience.³⁷ Raimond Gaita describes an incident in which he considered
“puttingdown”abadlywoundedcatbyhittingitovertheheadwithashovel:
MyawarenessofthebrutishnessofwhatIhadintendedtodotoTosca
had nothing to do with my estimate of whether it would have been




goes beyond the idea that its pain is a bad thing: it is something for which we should feel guilty
totheanimalitself,justaswecanfeelguilttoahumanbeing.”
241think too little of what our actions mean. We think about the pain
we will cause but not the dishonor we will inflict. To see the dif-
ference one need only reflect on how desperate the circumstances
would have to be before one would consider killing a human being
by crashing a shovel onto her head, and how terrible it would be to
do it no matter what the circumstances and no matter whether one
thought (rightly or wrongly) that they justified it… Was I wrong to
intend to kill Tosca that way? I think I was… One day—and it may
not be too far way—we may… become deeply ashamed of how im-
poverishedoursensewasofanimaldignity. Wemaybecomeincred-





A second reason for thinking that we have obligations that are owed to nonhu-
man animals is given by the deontic character of those obligations. Our duties
with regard to nonhuman animals, like our duties to each other, seem to be sub-
ject to distinctively moral constraints against aggregation and trading oﬀ. These
constraints represent the understanding that moral obligations are owed to a par-
ticularotherandarenotsimplyamatterofmaximizingvalue.





tations. And this also suggests why the clearest examples involve domesticated animals, with
whom we have developed relationships that demand respect. But it seems to me that it is more
the capacity to interact, rather than the existence of a substantive relationship, that is morally
significant. Ineednotseemyselfashavingarelationshipwiththeraccoonintheroad,noreven
thinkthatitwouldcausepain,torecognizeareasontobrakeforit.
242of maximizing some value, but they depend on a consideration of to whom the
good (and bad) that are created is attached. That I cannot take your organs and
distribute them in order to prevent the death of five other people reflects the fact
thatIowesomethingtoyouandnotmerelytotheworldgenerally.
Itseemstomethatourrelationswithanimalshaveasimilarcharacter. Itwould
be wrong, I think, to kill one dog in order to distribute its organs to five other
dogs. Most would agree that the wrongness of dogfighting does not depend on
the amountof humanentertainmentthatit provides. Butsuppose, not implausi-







donor or the innocent charity pit dog. The actions are forbidden not by general
reasons, but by the entitlements of individual nonhuman animals to be treated in
particularways. Hereagain,weseetheideathatnonhumananimalsarenotsimply
³⁹ Apparently, not everyone shares this intuition. Ralph Wedgwood wrote in a blog post:
“surely you could permissibly kill one bear if that is the only way for you to save five other bears
from being killed by someone else.” “Scheﬄer’s paradox: Persons vs. animals,” PEA Soup, Jan.
25, 2010. I think more needs to be filled in before we can fully judge the case, but my intuition
isthatthereisnotanyseriousasymmetrybetweenbearsandpeople. Ithinkonecanswitchthe
trolleywithpeopleonthetracks,andIthinkonecaniftherearebearsonthetracks. Ithinkone
cannot slaughter people as a source of ready organs, and I am inclined to think the same about







In general, it is not our place to intervene against others just because they act









erwise quite stingy in its recognition of nonhuman animals, anti-cruelty statutes
havelongaﬀordednonhumananimalsasetofrights,albeitquitenarrowandsub-
stantiallyunder-enforced. Anti-crueltystatutesinvolvestatecoercion,butIthink
that the same point can be made about even private coercion. Most of us would
consider it morally permissible for someone to intervene with physical force, if
necessary, to stop the brutal beating of a horse or dog. But this is not because
physical intervention is permissible whenever obligations are being violated. In-
⁴⁰ Kant, for example, thought that the realm of rights is demarcated in part by the fact that it
involvesthosemattersoverwhichcoercionispermissible(1784,27:1334).
244stead, I think our intuitions suggest that the case is morally akin to situations in
whichapersonactsindefenseofotherpeople.⁴¹
Interventioninsuchacaseispermissiblenotbecausethereisanobligationthat
isbeingflouted, but becausethereis a rightbeingviolated. Wecanintervenebe-
cause there is a being that is entitled not to be treated in a certain way, and this
entitlementauthorizesustoactonitsbehalf. Theinterventioniswarrantedasact-
ing on behalf of the entitled party in order to vindicate its rights, and not merely




⁴¹ There are interesting legal cases in which people have attempted to invoke the defense of
othersorthenecessitydefenseincriminaltrialsconcerningprivateattemptstopreventharmsto
animals. From what I have seen, this move has been generally unsuccessful, although I suspect
thatspeaksinparttothetypeofcasesthatareprosecuted. Forexample,inHawaiiv.LeVasseur,
613 P.2d 1328 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980), an undergraduate student freed two dolphins from labo-
ratoryresearch. Thecourtheldthatthedolphinsdidnotqualifyas“others”withinthescopeof
the state’s choice-of-evils statute. In State v. Troen, 786 P.2d 751 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), a court
rejected the defense of a fifty-seven-year-old former elementary school teacher who had partic-
ipated in breaking into a University of Oregon laboratory and removing 125 research animals.




cognizable neglect or cruelty. Courts’ reactions to such cases have been mixed. In McCall v.
State,540S.W.2d717,720-21(Tex.Crim.App.1976),aTexascourtexplained,“Appellantkept
the dogs in an open field clearly in view of neighbors and passersby. If it was apparent that the
animalswerenotbeingproperlycaredforinpossibleviolationofthelaw,itwasnotunreasonable
togoontothepropertyandseizethemandtheintroductionintoevidenceofphotographsofthe
animals was not error.” In Carr v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. App. 1994), a
court held that the Humane Society could argue necessity as a defense against trespass, where
it entered a property to seek evidence of animal cruelty. In Commonwealth v. Grimes, 982 A.2d
559 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009), however, a court held that the use of “another” in the state’s choice-
of-evils statute referred only to “persons,” thereby denying the defense from a woman who had
illegallytakenaneglecteddogafternotifyingtheHumaneSocietyandseeingnoprogress.
2457.3.3 HypotheticalorTrusteeComplaints
I have been arguing that nonhuman animals constitute an example in which we
owedutiestoanotherpartyeventhoughthatpartycouldnotcomplainiftheobli-
gation is violated. If this is correct, then it presents a diﬃculty for the view that




man animals cannot complain or demand justification, perhaps the sense that we
owe them directed duties can be captured by the fact that we could complain or
demandjustificationontheirbehalf. Scanlonsuggests,withoutfullendorsement,
this possible response for contractualists: “A contractualist view can accommo-
datethisintuition[thatobligationsareowedtoanimals]ifitholdsthatindeciding
which principles could not reasonably be rejected we must take into account ob-
jections that could be raised by trustees representing creatures in this group who
themselves lack the capacity to assess reasons” (1998, p.183). Stephen Darwall
makesasimilarlynon-committalsuggestionofthisapproach:
[A]lthough I am bound to insist that moral obligation, like the con-
ceptofaright,cannotbeunderstoodindependentlyofauthoritative
demands, the thought that moral obligations can be owed to beings
wholacksecond-personalcompetencemightbeabletobeelaborated
intermsoftrustees’(forexample,themoralcommunity’s)authority
to demand certain treatment on their behalf (perhaps also to claim
certainrights,compensation,andsoon,forthem). Thus,Dr. Seuss’s
character the Lorax (a free and rational being) declares, ‘I speak for
246thetrees.’ (2009,p.29)
The idea of having trustees to exercise the legal rights of animals is also suggested
asawayforwardfortheawkwardlegalstatusthatnonhumananimalsarecurrently
given(Favre,2000,p.476).
There is something appealing in this idea. I think that why it is appealing is
somethinglikethefollowing: whatisimportantisthemoralstandingtocomplain;
nonhumananimalsdoseemtohaveasignificantmoralstanding;theymerelylack
the ability to exercise this standing; so we can allow others to exercise their com-
plaintsfortheminlightoftheirowninability. Thatis,thetemptationtoappealto
trusteesisatemptationtofocusonstandinginthemoralcommunity,ratherthan
on any actual set of capacities. This allows one to say that nonhuman animals do
havestandingtocomplainwhentheyareharmedincertainways;theysimplylack
thecapacitytoexercisethisstanding.
I think, however, that the allure of this idea diminishes when one thinks more
carefully about it. What does it mean to say that animals have the standing to
complain or demand justification, but they merely lack the capacity? It cannot
mean that the moral status of animals is based on the fact that they could make








wrong to quarry marble. Holding that fact fixed, even if the marble were capable




This explanation, I think, gets at the idea behind the view, but it also suggests
its weaknesses. In one way, the idea can seem relatively empty. If what is meant
bysayingthatcatscouldcomplainismerelythattherearenormsconcerningcats,
then this view doesn’t capture the intuition that the obligation is owed to the cat.




is all that the trustee view involves, then it is merely an ad hoc way to preserve
the coextensionality of moral norms and potential complaints. And it does so at
theexpenseoftheviewthatthemoralstandingprovidesgroundingforthemoral
norms. Elsewhere, I have noted that we are sometimes tempted into using the
conceptofarightinamerelyplaceholderway,denotingnothingbutthatsomeone
stands to be wronged. Here is opposite. For similar theory-driven reasons, one
is tempted to use the idea of complaint or wronging in a merely placeholder way,
denotingnothingbutthatthereisanobligationowedtotheparty.
248Onthefirstofthesetwopoints(theconcernaboutemptiness),Ithinkthereisa
diﬀerencebetweenwhatScanlonandDarwall say. Tohiscredit, Scanlonaccepts
thatanappealtotrustees’complaintsmustaddsomething. Forthisreason,Scan-
lon explicitly rejects the idea that we could incorporate objects like trees, which
haveagoodbutwhichlackconsciousnessoraction. Asheputsit,“Nothingwould
beaddedbybringingintheideaofwhatatrusteefortheseobjectswouldhaverea-
son to reject” (1998, p.183). As Darwall’s own example suggests, in contrast, he
seemstothinkthatourobligationswithregardtotreesmightberenderedsecond-
personalifthereweresomeonewhocould,liketheLorax,“speakforthetrees.’” It
seems to me that Scanlon is correct here. For the appeal to trustees to have any




to trustees is ad hoc rather than explanatory), I think Scanlon and Darwall are in
similar predicaments. The problem arises because the initial theories hold that
the obligations we owe to each other can be explained by virtue of some form of
standing, either to complain or be treated in ways that are justifiable to us. One
cannot then resolve the apparent phenomenon of owing obligations to creatures
thatcanneitherlevelcomplaintsnorgiveandreceivejustificationbysimplyposit-
ing others who might make complaints or demand justification on their behalf.
To do so seems ad hoc. The theories originally purported to go from the moral
standingtocomplainordemandjustificationtothenormsofmorality. Butitnow
249appearsthattheyarepositingsomeonewiththestandingtocomplainordemand
justification in order to accommodate the moral norms that we view there to be.
Atthatpoint,whynotsimplyconcedethattherecanbeobligationsthatareowed
to individual nonhuman animals and yet are without any particular complaint or
demandforjustifiabilityundergirdingthem?
7.4 CriminalsandAnimals
At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted Jeﬀrie Murphy, arguing that the
psychopath cannot be wronged. Murphy goes on to argue that the psychopath is
“more profitably pictured—from the moral point of view—as an animal” (1979,
p.136). As he puts it, “the psychopath, by his failure to care about his own moral
responsibilities, his failure to accept them even if he recognizes them, becomes
morally dead—an animal rather than a person” (1979, p.136). This is a philo-
sophical endorsement of a cliché piece of rhetoric. It is frequently said of those
whotransgressagainstmoralitythattheyare“animals.”
Thiscomparisonwillstrikesomeasunfairinbothdirections. Tooneconcerned
with criminal rights, the suggestion that criminals should not be treated as fellow
humans is oﬀensive. But one might equally say that the comparison is oﬀensive
toanimals,which,despitetheirinnocence,areanalogizedtomorallydebasedper-
sons and which are thereby implicitly presupposed to lack any moral standing at
all. Theuseof“animal”tomeansubhumanseemsterriblyoﬀensivetoanimals.
If what I have argued is correct, then we can see the truth in the comparison
without endorsing the extreme callousness of it in either direction. Moral trans-
250gressors and nonhuman animals are both, in diﬀerent ways, without the ability
to call us to account for our actions—to expect or demand that we stand in rela-
tionsof mutualjustifiability with them. Transgressors lackthe moralauthority to












obligations are distinctively bound up with the standing to complain or demand
justification. For a theory like Darwall’s, it should be impossible for there to be
moralobligationsowedtoanother—obligationsofasecond-personalcharacter—
without a corresponding possibility of complaint. But if what I have argued is
correct, then this is not only not impossible, but it is a relatively common moral
phenomenon. These cases of absent standing or capacity to complain are, I be-






not to think or dream about the world you would like to be
in. Lookatpeople’ssuﬀerings,physicalandmental,youhave




While Wittgenstein’s comment in a personal correspondence quoted above
(Malcolm,1995,p.125)iseasilyreadasjustanordinarypieceofprudentialadvice,
what I find appealing in it is the sense that the advice is not just prudential, but
alsomoral. Less poetically than Wittgenstein, there is a bumper sticker that says,
“Think Good Thoughts.” This chapter defends that view. More precisely, this
252chapterdefendstheclaimthattherearemoralobligations,owedtoothers,tothink
certainthoughtsandnotothers,irrespectiveofanyeﬀectonexternalconduct. My
sense is that some will find this claim bumper-sticker obvious and some will find
thisclaimdeeplytroubling. Thisreflects,Ithink,atensionbetweenoureveryday
moral sensibilities and theoretical commitments about morality and rights. This
chapter aims to alleviate this tension by appealing to a distinction between what
weowetootherpeopleandwhattheycanclaimfromus. Myhope,bytheend,is
tomaketheideaofimpermissiblethoughtsappearlesstheoreticallyproblematic,




is not my topic. I am going to try to steer mostly clear of the complicated ques-
tions that arise around the ethics of belief. I will not generally be considering
whetheritismorallywrongtoformaparticularbelief—atopicthatraisesdiﬃcult
questionsaboutdoxasticvoluntarismandtherelationshipbetweenepistemicand











everyday moral concepts and some common philosophical commitments. On









In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the idea that morality governs thoughts as well
as action is familiar. To take one obvious example, the Ten Commandments de-
mand, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife,” and, “Thou shalt not covet thy
neighbor’s house.” Read naturally, these are prohibitions on thoughts and atti-
tudes,notonaction. Maimonides,ourfirstphilosophertroubledbyaprohibition
onpurethought,attemptedtodistinguishtheExoduscommandments,whichsay
254“covet,” from the Deuteronomy commandments, which say “desire.” Coveting,
he maintained, implied some actual deed or scheme to acquire the object; desir-
ing,heargued,wasprohibitedonlybecause“one’slovefortheobjectwillbecome
strongeruntilonedevisessomeschemetoobtainit”(1987,p.251). Maimonides,
however, is the exception that proves the rule. Judeo-Christian scholars have al-
mostuniversallytakentheBibletoprohibitthoughtsaswellasactions.
Sharing Maimonides’s philosophical orientation, Aquinas believed that “sin is
nothingelsethanabadhumanact.” HereconciledthisviewwiththeChristiantra-




to govern only what is voluntary, he includes within its aegis the interior realm of
thought and intention. Men “are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end
[ofGod]”(1920,Q.1,Art.1).
The Christian image of internal sin is certainly alive in modern culture. In a
famous Playboy interview, then-Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter said the fol-
lowing:
I try not to commit a deliberate sin. I recognize that I’m going to
do it anyhow, because I’m human and I’m tempted. And Christ set
somealmostimpossiblestandardsforus. Christsaid,“Itellyouthat
anyonewholooksonawomanwithlusthasinhisheartalreadycom-
mitted adultery.” I’ve looked on a lot of women with lust. I’ve com-
mittedadulteryinmyheartmanytimes.
While the statement generated a lot of satire, it may have helped Carter because




ical and who think of him- or herself as morally permissive will balk at the moral
permissibility of certain thoughts. The list of taboo thoughts is easy to conjure if
uncomfortable to describe. For one, I think most people would find it immoral
to consciously harbor racist thoughts. As one author puts it, “White racist con-
tempt… isinitsveryconstitutiondisturbingandimmoral”(Kim,1999,p.123).
Entertaining or harboring some sexual and/or violent fantasies is also likely to
seemimmoral. Evenifitdoesnotalterone’sexternalbehavior,itishardtoimagine
that one is morally permitted to do what one may with another person so long
as it is in one’s mind. In his final interview before being executed, Ted Bundy
described how he harbored fantasies of sexual violence before ever acting upon
them: “I knew it was wrong to think about it… I was on the edge, and the last
vestigesofrestraintwerebeingtestedconstantly,andassailedthroughthekindof
fantasy life that was fueled, largely, by pornography.”¹ It is, of course, possible to
maintain that Bundy did nothing wrong until he acted upon these fantasies, but
forBundy(andIthinkanyreflectiveagent)theconsciousharboringandengaging
withsuchfantasiesalreadycrossedoverintoimmorality.
¹JamesDobson,Fatal Addiction: Ted Bundy’s Final Interview,Jan.24,1989.
256AttentionandAccuracy
These examples may seem so extreme as to be of little philosophical interest, but
I don’t believe that they are altogether diﬀerent in kind from more pedestrian in-
ternal moral activity. Iris Murdoch oﬀers an example of more subtle but morally
significantmentalactivity:
Amother,whomIshallcallM,feelshostilitytoherdaughter-in-law,
whom I shall call D. M finds D quite a good-hearted girl, but while
not exactly common yet certainly unpolished and lacking in dignity
and refinement. D is inclined to be pert and familiar, insuﬃciently
ceremonious,brusque,sometimespositivelyrude,alwaystiresomely
juvenile. M does not like D’s accent or the way D dresses. M feels
thathersonhasmarriedbeneathhim. Letusassumeforpurposesof
the example that the mother, who is a very ‘correct’ person, behaves
beautifully to the girl throughout, not allowing her real opinion to
appear in any way. We might underline this aspect of the example
bysupposingthattheyoungcouplehaveemigratedorthatDisnow
dead: the point being to ensure that whatever is in question as hap-
peninghappensentirelyinM’smind…
[T]ime passes, and it could be that M settles down with a hard-
ened sense of grievance and a fixed picture of D, imprisoned… by
thecliché: mypoorsonhasmarriedasillyvulgargirl. However,the
M of the example is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, ca-
pable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention to
an object which confronts her. M tells herself: ‘I am old-fashioned
andconventional. Imaybeprejudicedandnarrow-minded. Imaybe
snobbish. I am certainly jealous. Let me look again.’ Here I assume
thatMobservesDoratleastreflectsdeliberatelyaboutD,untilgrad-
ually her vision of D alters. If we take D to be now absent or dead
this can make it clear that the change is not in D’s behaviour but in
M’s mind. D is discovered to be not vulgar but refreshingly simple,




Murdoch uses the example to show the possibility of mental activity. She is bat-
tlingagainsttheidea—comingfromexistentialismandbehaviorism—thatourin-
ternallifeisinsomesensenotreal. Theargumentattemptstorebuttheemptiness






not to form unwarranted negative opinions. While considering it outside the
realm of rights, Judith Thomson notes the way that we use moral language to re-
fer to such relations: “But what if I think you killed Cock Robin, when as things
turn out you did not? I think we might in the ordinary way say I wronged you
and did you a wrong, though it can hardly be thought that my merely harboring
thatthoughtwasmyviolatingaclaimofyours”(1990,p.122).² Inshort,regarding
othersinundeservedwaysseemslikenotmerelyamistake,butawrongtothem.
² David Owens (2012, pp.62-63) makes a similar point: “Undeserved attitudes can also
wrong. Suppose I come to believe, without any great evidence, that my brother drove my fa-
ther to an early grave. When my brother learns of this belief, he will feel traduced. Perhaps I
never express the belief to anyone and he discovers it quite inadvertently by reading my diary.
Outrage, indignation, etc. are in order here quite apart from fear of further harm or damage:





Thomson’s example gains particular force when we imagine behind it some back-
groundrelationship,likefriendship. IfyouandIarefriends,thenImayespecially
owe it to you not to think that you killed Cock Robin. That is, friends may owe a
particularleveloftrusttoeachother.







way that he acts upon his suspicions. Rather, the conscious harboring and active
cultivating of suspicions itself constitutes a large part of his misdeed. Othello’s
wrong occurs not merely when he kills Desdemona, but earlier, as he declares:
“Arise, black vengeance, from thy hollow cell! / Yield up, O love, thy crown and
hearted throne /To tyrannous hate!”⁴ Now, I don’t suppose that people actually
saythingsquitelikethistothemselves,buttheinternalstruggleisrealistic. People
donurturethoughtsthattheyoughtnot—andeventhoughtsthattheyknowthat
³ Act III, Scene 3: “Think’st thou I’ld make a lie of jealousy, / To follow still the changes of
the moon / With fresh suspicions? No… / …exchange me for a goat, / When I shall turn the
businessofmysoul/Tosuchexsuﬄicateandblownsurmises,/Matchingthyinference.”






Generally, philosophers describe morality as principles governing how we act to-
ward one another. In consequence, morality is taken to govern behavior—what
wedotoothers.
Thereare,Ithink,awidevarietyoftheoreticalinfluencesthatdrivethisassump-




is that of an oﬀence. It possesses clearness by itself; it presents an
image; it addresses itself to the senses, it is intelligible to the most
limited mind. An oﬀence is an act from which evil results. To do a
positive act is to put one’s self in motion; to do a negative act, is to
remainstill. (Bentham,1838,p.160)
ForBentham,anoﬀensemustbesomethingdonetoanother. Benthamillustrates
several important themes behind the philosophical assumption. First, for Ben-
tham,moralityhastodowithconsequences—withhowouractionsaﬀectothers.
Oneneednotbeautilitarian,likeBentham,tosharetheideathatconsequencesare
important, and that something that aﬀects no one else is not a matter of morality.
Sticksandstonescanbreakmybones,butthoughtsaren’tlikethatatall.
260Second, Bentham focuses on what one does to another because it “presents an
image”and“addressesitselftothesenses.” Thatis,Benthamfocusesontheexter-
nal act toward another because it is observable and, in this sense, objective. Ben-
thamviewsamoralityconcernedwithwhatwedotoeachotherbecausethatalone




Third, Bentham is highly reliant on an analogy between morality and the law.⁵
Thelegalanalogy—theideathatmoralityisasetofrulescreatedbyalegislator—
gently suggests that morality governs conduct, not thought, because the laws of
thestategovernconduct,notthought. Atleast,thisisanimportantfeatureofthe
liberalstate;thoughtcrimesexistonlyinOrwelliandystopias.
It may be useful here to draw attention to the idea of rights because it is an im-
portant part of the analogy to the law. The law imposes boundaries on how we
may treat one another, marking out for each person a unique sphere of control.
Rights,likeBentham’sideaofanoﬀense,seemstobeaboutoutoutwardconduct.
Although we may frown upon certain thoughts, we intuitively resist the idea that
there is a right concerning other people’s thoughts. Racist thoughts may be ab-
horrent,butwemaythinkthattheystilldon’tviolateanyone’srights. Theanalogy
⁵ Compare Scanlon (1998, p.153): “[Contractualism] holds that an act is wrong if its per-









to be quite certain, in even a single action, of the purity of his moral
intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even when he has no
doubt about the legality of the action… In the case of any deed it
remainshiddenfromtheagenthimselfhowmuchpuremoralcontent
therehasbeeninhisdisposition. (1965,6:393)
Kant’s point seems to be that what happens within the agent is obscure even to




erating agent’s choice. Here, Kant distinguishes “pathological love” from “practi-
callove.” Theformer,hethinks,cannotbeaduty. Hewrites,“[T]herecanbeno
direct duty to love, but instead to do that by which one makes oneself and others
one’send”(1965,6:410). Thisisnotbecauseloveforanotherisnotmoralinchar-
acter.⁶ Instead, pathological love is not a duty because it is not exactly a matter
of choice. As will be discussed further below, contemporary thinkers like T.M.
Scanlon have similarly picked up on the argument that our motives and reasons
arenotamatterofchoice.
⁶Kantviewspathologicalloveasapreconditionofbeingamoralagentatall(1965,6:399).
262These diﬀerent commitments—the importance of consequences, the need for
somethingobjective,theanalogytolaw,andtheinscrutabilityoruncontrollability
ofourfeelings—arediverse. But,inaloosesense,theyareunitedaroundtheidea





These diverse commitments crystallize in one argument that I find particularly
convincing. This is an argument, first raised by Judith Thomson, against the so-
calleddoctrineofdoubleeﬀect. Thedoctrineofdoubleeﬀectholdsroughlythat
one may cause a bad outcome in order to bring about a suﬃciently better out-
come if and only if one does not intend the bad outcome as a means to the good
outcome. For example, if a trolley is headed toward five people but it could be
redirectedontoanothertracktokillonlyoneperson,thedoctrineofdoubleeﬀect
says that it is okay to redirect the trolley as long as one doesn’t intend to kill the
one—aslongasthatisjustanunintendedsideeﬀect.
Thomson’sargumentaimstorefutethisdoctrinebyshowingthatanagent’sin-
tention is not relevant to determining the permissibility of an action. As such, it
is not explicitly a rejection of the morality of thoughts, but the challenge should
be clear: if the argument is right, then permissibility is a matter of external con-
duct,notinternalthoughtsandattitudes—inparticular,notintentions. Tomake
263theargument,Thomsonimaginesahusband,Alfred,whowantstokilloﬀhissick
wife.⁷ He buys a substance thinking it poison, but, unbeknownst to him, it is the
only cure for his wife’s disease. Thomson then argues that it must be permissible









sees the trolley headed toward the five. He has no interest in sav-
ing the five per se, but he knows that it is his enemy who will be the
one person killed if he redirects the trolley. He does not want to be









⁹ It is actually an interesting question to what impossibility is a legal defense to a criminal
charge for an attempted crime. At times, courts have distinguished factual impossibility, as
when someone pulls the trigger of an unloaded gun, from legal impossibility, as when some-
onetriestostealanobjectthathasbeenlegallygrantedtothem. Thereisalsosomethoughtthat
extreme cases of factual implausibility—for example, attempting to murder by voodoo—might
not be criminal. But, in general, courts are unreceptive to the impossibility defense. And the









of-mind principles.” That is, the question of permissibility is pushed outward.¹⁰
T.M.Scanlonhasalsorecentlyarguedthatpermissibilityisamatterofanaction’s
relation to the world and not a matter of the agent’s intention: “what makes an
action wrong is the consideration or considerations that count decisively against




of morality? If Kamm’s bad man acts permissibly, how can Murdoch’s M be said
toactimpermissibly?
8.2 SomeUnsuccessfulExplanations
Now I want to consider four possible explanations for the tension. Each ex-
planation has truth in it. My claim, however, is that none can oﬀer a full account
ofthetension.
¹⁰“Whenitisimpermissibleforanagentwhointends[evil](asameansorend)todoanact,
it will be because of some characteristics of the act or its eﬀects (or their relation) independent
ofhisintention.” (2006,p.135)
2658.2.1 EffectsonExternalAction
The first response to some of the examples I oﬀered above is likely to be that the
thoughts are wrong not in themselves, but rather because of the consequences
these thoughts have for external conduct. “C’mon, Ted Bundy and Othello,” one













consequence and yet still seems wrong. For example, one response that I have
¹¹ Note that the consequentialist explanation requires that the agent take a somewhat odd
stance towards herself. Under this explanation, the agent will only take herself to have an obli-
gation to avoid a particular thought if she believes that thought would cause her to do certain
actsX which she oughtnot do. Inotherwords, she musttakeherself not tobeundercontrol of
whethershewilldoX. Wedo,nodoubt,assumesuchanattitudetowardsourselvessometimes,
but it is an abdication of agency—“if I let myself do this, then I will unavoidably do that.” For
theagentwhotakesthedecisiontoXtobefullyunderhiscontrol,theconsequentialreasonnot
tothinkthethoughtsthatmayleadtoXwillnotbeavailable.










expense of only a minor increase in awkwardness during workplace interactions.
But it does not seem like the impermissibility of the fantasy depends on how the
consequences balance out. And this is not simply because one’s own welfare can






even when it positively impairs one’s external actions. Imagine that young hus-
band,H,andwife,W,learnthatWhasanincurabledisease. Intheirfinalmonths
together,theyhaveanumberofdiscussionsaboutwhatHwilldowhenWisgone.
W repeatedly insists that H should not feel bad about moving on and insists that
267she hopes he is able to find love again. She asks only that H promise that he will
think of her every day for the rest of his life. H, of course, is happy to make this
promise (and assume that it is a very explicit promise—not mere words). After a
fewyears,Hdoesremarry. Hisnewwife,N,appreciatestheimportanceofWtoH







In fact, it may be true that the thoughts are a mild distraction or impairment. If
thisiscorrect,thenonemayhaveanobligationtothinkcertainthingsevenwhen




tivity because one has a duty to cultivate one’s moral character. Having a good
moral character involves having the right moral emotions and dispositions, and
¹² I think this is true even if it means that H is somewhat impaired in performing his duties
at work or at home. In such cases, there will be two competing duties. While the duties of
certain thoughts may often give way in such cases, I do not think that they automatically do so.
IthereforedisagreewithFrancesKamm’sassessment: “Butiftheactisnotonlypermissiblebut




If one is not careful, this idea may simply reduce to a form of the consequen-
tialist account above. That is, if the reason that one must cultivate a good moral
character is because the external eﬀects of one’s behavior will be better, then this
accountdoesnotaddanythingotherthanadescriptionofthecausalmechanism.
But the picture need not be consequentialist. One might think that one simply
ought, in virtue of being a moral agent, develop one’s moral capacity. The person
whoentertainsmaliciousthoughtsisstuntingherownmoralcapacity;sheiswill-











describes the duty to cultivate morality as “wide” (1965, 6:393), meaning that it
issomethingthateachindividualhaslatitudeindeterminehowheorshewillful-
fill it. These classifications of the duty to cultivate oneself seem right—the duty
269imposes a general and flexible sort of obligation on us, but it does not narrowly
proscribe any particular act. I may have an obligation not to let my life and capa-
bilities go to waste, but this doesn’t mean that I can never indulge in some coun-
terproductive frivolities. I probably shouldn’t let myself get fat and useless, but a
donut now and then isn’t morally objectionable. The kind of bad thoughts that I
havebeendescribing,however,donotseemtobelikementaldonuts. Rather,the
obligations against them seem to provide strict prohibitions. Indulging in a racist
thoughtseemstobeviolatingaspecificrequirement. So,whileitisveryplausible
that we have a duty to cultivate ourselves and that this duty does require certain
kindsofmentalactivity,itdoesn’tseemlikesuchadutycouldbestrictenoughto
captureallofourobligationstoavoidcertainthoughtsorfantasies.
Second, this account doesn’t reflect the way the duty is owed to someone. The
dutytocultivateone’smoralcapacitiesisowedtooneself,ortoGod,ortohuman-
ity generally. But at least some duties of thought are owed to others. I think the
fact that such duties of thought can be owed to another is especially clear in the
example of the husband’s promise. The duty in that case is acquired through a
promise and, like other promises, its performance is owed to the promisee. The
more common case, however, is where a thought is owed to the person who is its
object out of respect for that person. M owes it to D to see her justly. Othello
owes it to Desdemona not to distrust her. And you owe it to your friend not to
believethathekilledCockRobin.
Toemphasizethewaythatthesedutiesareowedtoothers,considertwofurther
characteristics. First, the moral character of a particular thought will be quite dif-
270ferentifthepersoninitisrealorfictitious. Asaboygrowingup,Ihadsomething
ofcrushonMaidMarion. NowsupposethatIengagedinsomemoderatelyexten-
sive fantasizing and daydreaming about Maid Marion. If it wasn’t too consuming
or perverse, then it seems fairly innocent, I think. But the same fantasies, if they
areaboutthegirlwholivesdownthestreetandhasnoidea,mayhavearatherdif-
ferent character (although not necessarily wrong). The diﬀerence is that there is
a real person to whom I owe respect. As a result, the obligation takes on a more
strictanddirectedquality.
Second, the fact that obligations of thought are owed to the person whom the
thoughtconcernsisillustratedbythefactthataperson’sactioncanalterthechar-
acter of the obligations. I may owe my female coworker a duty not to think of
her as sexual object, while at the same time I may not owe such a duty to Britney
Spears. The diﬀerence, I think, is that Britney has made millions by permitting
herself to be thought of, at least within certain bounds, as a sexual object. Sexu-




the way that they reflect fault in the agent. That is, bad thoughts are a reflection
of bad moral character. They are not actually impermissible, but they appear to











Assuming that this is what blame amounts to, I do not doubt that one’s men-
talactivitiesdoreflectfeaturesoftheperson’scharacterthatmayjustifyamending
our intentions and expectations toward that person. Moreover, blameworthiness
can provide a partial explanation for the (presumed) illusory appearance of im-
permissibility. Consider Kamm’s Bad Man. One might alleviate the sense that he
actsimpermissiblybypointingoutthatheisstillblameworthy. Moreover,thiswill
reflect back onto his deliberations: from his vantage point, killing his enemy may
appear impermissible because other might blame him. The appearance of imper-
missibility,here,isreallytheresultofblameworthiness.
Perhaps this might similarly explain my first-personal sense that I ought not
think certain things, but I have my doubts. Consider what I said about the hus-




general for not thinking of her. A better attempt to recast the apparent norm of
permissibilitymightbe,“IamdestroyingmyrelationshipwithWbynotthinking
ofher.” Still,thismakesthereasonthatHtakeshimselftohavetothinkofWcon-
tingent on valuing the relationship. He might respond by deciding, regretfully,
thatitistimeforhimtocastoﬀhisrelationshipwithW. ButIthinkthattheobli-
gation will appear less optional than this. In short, I don’t think an account like
thiscanfullycaptureeithertheforceorthedirectednessofobligationsofthought.
Of course, an appeal to blameworthiness is not meant to capture these things
entirely. It is meant to explain an illusion of impermissibility on the assumption
that it is, in fact, an illusion. As such, the account will depend on an argument




that having a bad intention is not impermissible is because what reason someone
actsonisnotwithinhisorherchoice. Thisisatwo-stageargument. First,Scanlon
argues that the question of permissibility only applies to matters of choice. He
writes,
The question of permissibility is the question, “May I do X?” which
istypicallyaskedfromthepointofviewofanagentwhoispresented
withanumberofdiﬀerentwaysofacting. Thequestionis, whichof
these may one choose? The question of permissibility thus applies
only to alternatives between which a competent agent can choose.
(2008,p.30)
273In other words, we can only say that something is impermissible if an agent had




all, and that the only thing that would be permissible would be to
bring it about for the right reasons. If I am correct about the con-
nection between permissibility and choice, this makes sense only if
acting for those diﬀerent reasons is something the agent can choose
todo. Idonotbelievethatsuchachoiceispossible. (2008,p.31)
To sum up the argument: something is impermissible only if something is a
matterofchoice;anagentcanonlychoosewhattodo,notwhatreasonstoacton;
therefore, it is not impermissible to act on the wrong reasons. The Bad Man, for
example, could only choose to switch the tracks or not—he couldn’t choose the
compound[switchthetracksinordertosavethefive].
Iamnotconvinced. Scanlon’sargumentseemstometorelyoneliminatingthe
activity of choosing and focus only on the choice made. Consider the analogous
argumentformentalactivity. SupposeIthinkthatyoukilledCockRobinbecause











the ethics of belief that I vowed to avoid. But that is really not essential; we can
focusonacaseofmentalactivityotherthanbeliefformation. SupposeIharbora




of pain. For religious reasons, he wouldn’t take his own life, but he longs for it to
beoverandwouldwelcomedeath. Assumethatthisfactwouldbeagoodenough
reason for someone who cared about him to at least think about ways for assist-
ing him in reaching a painless death. But it’s not my reason. My reason is based




we act on when we choose to act. This seems plausible. But choosing itself in-
volves a form of conscious mental activity—at least some of the time. Choosing
ofteninvolvesentertainingarguments,attendingtoparticularfacts,contemplating
various options, and so on. The Bad Man presumably engaged in the same kind
of murderous thoughts that I entertain regarding my ill neighbor. Shouldn’t we
275saythat,likemythoughtsregardingmyneighbor,theBadMan’sthoughtsregard-
inghisenemyareimpermissible—eveniftheydoleadtounobjectionableexternal





Man acts impermissibly insofar as his mental activity—his practical reasoning—
hasbeenimpermissible. Hehasnotattendedtothereasonsthathehas,andhehas
allowed himself to think in ways that he ought not. This may be true, one might
say,eventhoughhisphysicalactinswitchingthetrackswasnotobjectionable.
8.2.4 TwoActions
I have argued thus far that one cannot explain the apparent moral prescriptions
against having certain thoughts through derivative or deflationary accounts. That
is, there genuinely are obligations against entertaining certain thoughts. These
obligations are not derivative results of external eﬀects the thoughts might have
on external action. And these are genuine obligations—things I ought not do—
notmerelyapparentobligationsthatareshadowsoftheideaofmoralcharacter.
Thereis,Ithink,aplausiblereplyatthispoint,whichissuggestedbythediscus-
sion of Scanlon above. One might believe that morality applies to thoughts for a
relatively straightforward reason: morality applies to the internal realm as well as
theexternalrealmbecauseactionoccursintheinternalrealmaswellastheexter-
276nal. ThisisessentiallyAquinas’spicture—therearebothmentalandphysicalacts.
Morality applies to action, but this may include an act of the mind as well as an
externalact.
This division allows a clear explanation of the cases described previously. My
actoffantasizingaboutkillingmyneighborisimpermissible, eventhoughitdoes
notinvolveanyexternalaction. AndwecanthensaythesamethingabouttheBad
Man. His interior act is immoral—that is, the mental activity behind deciding to
kill his enemy is activity that he ought to avoid—but his exterior, physical act—
switchingthetracks—isnotimmoral.
Perhaps this is the correct response. I do believe that we choose to do certain
things with our minds as well as with our bodies and that recognizing this is im-













As I said, however, I’m not convinced that that this isn’t the correct response.
ThepointsthatIjustraisedgivemepause,buttheymaynotbeconclusive. Still,I




My strategy is to distinguish two ways in which an obligation may be owed
to another person. These two forms of obligation correspond with two diﬀerent
sensesoffulfillingone’sobligationsand,insomesense,withtwodiﬀerentideasof
permissibility. As a result, in one sense—what I think of as the primary sense—
boththeBadMan’sactionandthebadthoughtsconstituteimpermissibleandim-
moral action. In the other sense, however, neither the Bad Man’s action nor the
badthoughtsareimpermissible.
Bothideasaboutpermissibilityhavealreadyariseninwhathasbeensaid. First,





other person, there is a lingering sense that these obligations are diﬀerent than
other obligations that we owe to each other. Although these obligations seem to









of those to whom they are owed. The duty is owed to the other person, but it is
nottheirstodemand.
Thissuggestionmaysoundmysteriousatfirst. Ifsomethingisowedtosomeone,
isn’t it that person’s right? In one sense, perhaps. But there is another sense of
havingarightthatisboundupwithaspecialformofactivity—claimingorasserting
theright. AsJoelFeinbergputsit,“thereisnodoubtthat[rights’]characteristicuse






unique, normative way that one can assert that one is owed ten dollars. When
I assert that you owe me ten dollars in this sense, I am not merely describing a
279purportedfact,butIampurportingtogiveyouareasontoact. Iamattemptingto
exercise a power or authority with regard to you. It is predicated on my having a
certainprerogativewithregardtoyouruseofthetendollars. Thiskindofassertion








When we think of rights in this way, we can readily make sense of the idea that
somethingcouldbeowedtoapersonwithoutthatpersonhavingarighttoit. This
circumstance will arise where there is some disability to asserting or claiming or
demandingwhatone is due. One exampleof this is gratitude. We generally think
thatgratitudeisowedtoabenefactorandyetgratitudeisnotthatperson’sright. If
I saved your life once, you may owe it to me to give me assistance if you are subse-
quentlyinapositiontohelpme. Nevertheless,itmaybesomethingthatIcannot
demand or claim as a right.¹³ Something similar, I believe, is true about thoughts.
Ourreticencetocalltheobligationsofthoughtamatterofrightsrelates,Ithink,to
¹³SeeAdamSmith(1869,II.ii.1): “Themanwhodoesnotrecompensehisbenefactor,when
he has it in his power, and when his benefactor needs his assistance, is, no doubt, guilty of the
blackest ingratitude… His want of gratitude, therefore, cannot be punished. To oblige him by
forcetoperformwhatingratitudeheoughttoperform,andwhateveryimpartialspectatorwould






thoughts? It cannot simply be due to the fact that we do not know about each
other’s thoughts because we might learn and because, in other contexts, we can
haveclaimsevenwhenweareinignoranceofthem. Iwillveryroughlysketchtwo
possibleanswers.
First, one might draw on the parallel with gratitude. Gratitude, by its very na-
ture, seems like it must be given, not demanded. It is built into the concept that
it cannot be demanded or claimed as a matter of right. Gratitude that isn’t freely
given isn’t really gratitude at all. One might think that something similar is true
of respect. It is a modern slogan that “respect cannot be demanded, it must be






moral principle that we cannot make claims or demands about what each other
think.¹⁴ Ofcourse,thesearejustsketchesofpossibleexplanationsforwhyweare
¹⁴ Along these lines, one might note that demanding certain thoughts as a condition for a




Separating what is owed and what can be claimed allows an explanation of the
Bad Man. The Bad Man acts wrongly, although he does not act in a way that is
contrarytosomeclaimofhisenemy. InThomsonandKamm’sargumentagainst
thedoctrineofdoubleeﬀect,thequestionissupposedtobewhethertheactionin





ought, at this point, to say to yourself, “No, I should not contemplate that.” His
failure to do this is, after all, why he is a bad man. I don’t believe that we should
thinkofthisasmerelyanevaluativeclaim—itseemstomethatheactswrongly.
But the Thomson/Kamm argument makes sense because there is another way
to understand the question of permissibility. “Is this permissible?” might mean
“CananyoneclaimthatInotdothis?” or“DoesanyonehaveademandthatInot
do this?” This is, in a way, a diﬀerent sense of permissibility. When another per-
sonhasaclaimonusthatwedosomething,thereisaspecialwayinwhichacting
contrarywouldnotbepermissible. Todosowouldbetoviolatetheclaim. Inthe
Bad Man example, if this is the question, then the action does seem permissible.
WhatmakesKamm’sBadManaconvincingcaseisthefactthathekillshisenemy
becauseheknowsthatnobodycandemandthatheactotherwise. Hisactionisre-
282sponsive to the claims that others can make on him. Insofar as the Bad Man does
notviolateanyone’sclaims,thereisasenseinwhichthebadmanactspermissibly.
Mysuggestion,then,isthatwecansaythatanintentionisimpermissibleinthe
first sense, but at the same time deny that that it is impermissible in the second
sense. That is, as an agent deliberating, I ought not engage in these thoughts, but





what I do in my mind, but this should not stand in the way of my having certain
duties to them out of respect for them. Recall that a unifying theme behind the
philosophical resistance was the sense that thoughts do not bear on others in the
relevant way. There turns out to be some truth in this idea. But it is not that
thoughtsaretoodetachedfromtheworldforustohavedutiesregardingthem,but




the rough outline of this distinction begins to come through. First, recall Thom-
son’scharacterizationofherintuitionsregardingtheCockRobinexample: “Ithink
we might in the ordinary way say I wronged you and did you a wrong, though it
can hardly be thought that my merely harboring that thought was my violating
283a claim of yours” (1990, p.122). Thomson is only noting that our linguistic in-
tuitions about “wrong” do not track perfectly the idea of a claim-right. But one
might take the insight seriously and think that there can be directed duties even
when the other person cannot make a claim. Second, consider the following ex-
ample from Kamm, used to argue against Raz’s account of rights: “[I]f I have a
duty to help you by praying to God for your recovery, you still might not have a
right that I relate to God in this particular way” (2002, p.483).¹⁵ Kamm, here, is
clearlyimaginingthatyoumighthaveadutytoanother,andyetthatotherperson
might not have a right—a claim—to your performance. The example works be-
causewefeelthatthisisarealmwhereonepersonisnotentitledtodemandthings
from another—you cannot dictate how I ought to relate to God. Although there
may be an obligation, it is not the sort of thing that we can demand or claim and,
inthissense,isnotaright.
If this overall picture is correct, I think there is an important insight about our
obligations to others. Typically, the philosophical concepts of respect, rights,
claiming, wronging, and directed duty all seem to come and go together. In our
thoughts, however, thequestionsabouttherights, claims, anddemandsofothers
areremoved. Ithinktheresidueisphilosophicallyilluminating. Evenwhereoth-
ersmaynotbeabletolayclaimsonus,westillowethemanobligationtothinkof
them justly and accurately. We may still fail to give others their due, and we may,
inthisway,wrongthem.





at one another, at a loss to know which of them he meant. One of
them, the disciple whom Jesus loved, was reclining next to him. Si-
monPetermotionedtothisdiscipleandsaid,“Askhimwhichonehe
means.”LeaningbackagainstJesus,heaskedhim,“Lord,whoisit?”
Jesus answered, “It is the one to whom I will give this piece of bread
when I have dipped it in the dish.” Then, dipping the piece of bread,
he gave it to Judas, the son of Simon Iscariot. As soon as Judas took
the bread, Satan entered into him. So Jesus told him, “What you
areabouttodo,doquickly.”Butnooneatthemealunderstoodwhy




Most of the time, both rights and complaints can be voluntarily relin-
quished. Withregardtoboth relations, wetypicallyrefertothisas awaiver. Ican
waive a right or I can waive a complaint, meaning in both instances that I give up
something that morality would otherwise aﬀord me. This chapter focuses on the
divergence between these diﬀerent forms of waiver as an argument for seeing a
285divergencebetweentherelationsthatarebeingwaived.
9.1 Waiver,Permission,andForgiveness
We have important moral practices built around waiving both rights and
complaints. When a right is relinquished, the waiver operates as a grant of per-
mission to the person who was previously under the right’s correlative duty. For
example, if I have a property right to exclude you from using my well and I waive
that right, then I have made it permissible for you to draw water from the well.
When a complaint is relinquished, the waiver operates as a grant of forgiveness.¹
For example, if you have injured me by cutting down my apple tree without per-




does so by relieving a duty that another person owed to the speaker. In this way,
it dissolves the right that correlates with that directed duty.³ Forgiving changes
¹ Something like this idea is famously found in Bishop Butler’s Fifteen Sermons (1726), in









but not with waiving a more generalized right. If I grant you permission to kiss me, I have re-
moved your obligation not to kiss me. I have, in this way, given up a Hohfeldian claim-right,
namely the claim that you not kiss me. But I have not thereby given up my more general right
286our moral relationships by making it the case that the speaker can no longer con-




grant of permission typically occurs before the action in question is undertaken,
whereasthetypicaltimeforforgivingisaftertheactioninquestionhasbeencom-
pleted.
If one accepts the view that rights and complaints are necessarily connected as
reciprocalsofoneanother,thenthedistinctionbetweengrantingpermissionand
forgivingwillendhere. Moreprecisely,suchaviewwilltakethisdiﬀerenceintem-
poral perspectives to be the singular and essential distinction between waiving a
rightandwaivingacomplaint.
To see this point, some metaphor is helpful. The picture of rights and com-
to decide who can kiss me, of which the aforementioned Hohfeldian claim-right is just one in-
stance. Ifocusongrantingpermission—andthusonwaivingHohfeldianclaim-rights—because
it provides the appropriate parallel with complaints and wrongings, which are focused on a par-
ticular actor and action. So, when I am discussing waiving a right, I am talking about waiving a
rightthatXdoφ. Thisshouldnotbeconfusedwithwaivingallrightthatanyonedoφ,whichcan
sometimesbeimpliedbythesamelocution.
⁴ We also have another idea of forgiving that is not a performative. In this sense, one can
forgive a person in one’s heart alone, without ever doing anything. This is not my subject here.
I am interested in forgiving insofar as it involves waiving one’s complaint. This also means that





who forgives, can no longer condemn the wrongdoing. I am skeptical of this claim. Either way,
though,Iaminterestedinforgivinginsofarasitinvolvesmakingitthecasethatonecannotcom-
plainoneself.
287plaints as binding together two moral agents aﬀords a natural rendering of what
happenswhenthereisawaiver. Ifrightsrepresentasortofnormativeconnection
between two parties—“an arc of normative current passing between the agent-
poles,” as Michael Thompson puts it, “like the opposing poles of an electrical ap-
paratus”(2004, p.335)—thenwaiver can be viewed as the cutting oﬀ of that con-
nection by one side—or, in Thompson’s metaphor, as one pole’s charge being re-
moved and the current therefore ceasing to flow. Of course, not just any discon-
nection will count as a waiver. It must be accomplished by the right-bearing or
complaint-bearing party. If the connection is disrupted by outside forces, then it
will not count as waiving the right or complaint. In this sense, an apt metaphor
may be that waiver is like unleashing—something that can be done only be the
leash holder and not by the dog or a gust of wind. But regardless, the represen-
tation of rights and complaints as connecting pairs of moral agents implies a rep-
resentationofwaiverasthedisconnectingofmoralagents. Thisis,Ithink,avery
naturalandhelpfulwaytounderstandwaiver.⁶
This image of morality as uniquely binding two parties together can be joined
withtheideathatrightsandcomplaintsarepartandparcelwithoneanother—the
familiarfoeofthisdissertation. Accordingtothisidea,theimportantthingisnot
simply that rights and complaints are both two-sided relations that bind together
moralagents. Itaddsthatthesetiesarefundamentallyunified. AsDarwallputsit,
⁶ The talk of “disconnecting” shouldn’t be taken to mean that all connection between the
agents is necessarily cut oﬀ. Many particular rights come in bundles. If I waive my to exclude
you from taking my well water today, that doesn’t mean that I waive my right tomorrow. My
righttoexcludeyou,ingeneral,maybeviewedasabundleofmoreparticularentitlements. One
cancutaparticularstrandwithoutcuttingtheentirerope.
288“Itis part of thevery ideaof a moraldemandthatweareaccountablefor comply-
ing” (2009, p.99). Agents that are bound up in a rights relation are, according to
Darwall, also bound together with regard to holding accountable. There are not
twoseparateconnections;theyareoneandthesame.
If this is correct, then there is an important sense in which waiving a right and
waivingacomplaintbothconstituteareleaseofthesameconnection. Insofarasa
moraldemandandholdingaccountablearepartoftheverysameidea,thengiving













This chapter argues that this is not true. Waiving a right and waiving a com-
plaint are not the same interaction, just occurring at diﬀerent times. Or, to put
⁷ThisquotehasbeenwidelyattributedtoRearAdmirableGraceHopper,butithasbecome
aubiquitousmottofortakinginitiative.
289the point another way, forgiving is not the same as retrospectively granting per-
mission, and vice versa. I reject the idea that both remove the same normative
connection. Waivingaright, Icontend, isthereleaseofsomethingdiﬀerentthan




tively, whereaswaiverof a rightoccurs prospectively. Somewriters viewthe tim-
ingasanecessaryconditionforthesepractices. Forexample,onewriterexplains,
Forgiving someone for something is quite a complex act, as can be
seen from the fact that the utterance ‘I forgive you for doing A’ only
hasitsfullintendedillocutionaryforceifanumberofconditionsare
satisfied. In the first place, it must be the case that you have already
doneA—Icannotforgiveyouforwhatyouhavenotdone(although
I can either predict that I shall forgive you if you do A, or give you
permissiontodoit, thusremovinganyquestionofhavingtoforgive
youforitinthefuture). (Londey,1986,p.4)
This quote captures the thought that, necessarily, forgiving is retrospective, and
thatgrantingpermissionisitsprospectiveanalog. Ibelievethatthisisnotcorrect.
Thistemporalorderingmaybetypical,butitisnotnecessary. Inparticular,Imean
to suggest that one can waive a complaint preemptively. That is, contrary to the
abovewriter,onecanforgiveatrespassevenbeforeitoccurs.
Certainly, our linguistic practices support this idea. In this vein, people say
things like, “I won’t hold it against you” or “I forgive you if…” or “You won’t hear
290me complain” or “I wouldn’t have a problem with it.” Ostensibly, these locutions





But ordinary language is hardly decisive, and one might insist that these aren’t
truly examples of waiving a complaint or forgiving. In fact, the existence of these
ways of talking might seem to lend credence to the idea that waiving a complaint
and waiving a right are bound up with one another. After all, locutions like these
seem to be ways of granting permission. “You won’t hear me complain” could be
a colloquial way to say, “you have my permission.” Reading significance into the





as a way of waiving rights, we do not seem to do the reverse. That is, we don’t





291tually granting permission retrospectively. In this sense, it is not really analogous
to saying, “I wouldn’t complain,” which is not merely a prediction but a change
in the moral relationship. This asymmetry begins to suggest that there is some-
thingspecialaboutgivingpermission—thatis,aboutwaivingaclaim-right—that
amountstosomethingmorethancancelingaccountability.




If one accepts the argument concerning third parties in Chapter 4, then this
shouldbereadilyapparent. Athirdpartycannotwaivearightthatheorshedoes
not have, but a third party may be able to waive a future complaint. For exam-
ple,amothercannotgenerallywaiveanyrightthatherdaughternotbeinjuredby
some action, but a mother could forgive someone who has injured her daughter.
Thus, to the extent that one accepts that rights and complaints can come apart,





a party holds both the right and the potential complaint (unlike the mother, who
hasonlythelatter). Consideranexample. Supposethattwosoldiersareonpatrol,
when an explosive device wounds one of them. Although the camp is only a few
292miles away, the wounded soldier is simply unable to get down the steep hillside,
evenwiththeothersoldier’shelp. Theyareabletocallforassistance,buttheyare
informed that it will be several hours before aid can be dispatched to their loca-
tion. The unharmed soldier promises that he will stay by the wounded soldier’s
side until help comes. But after an hour of sitting in the cold rain, the unharmed
soldier is visibly shivering uncontrollably. Moreover, they hear gunfire and worry




he has violated the obligations that he owed to his fellow soldier. But how can
we make sense of this evaluation in light of the wounded soldier’s statement? It
cannot be a violation of the soldier’s obligations if the other soldier released him
fromthoseobligations. One possibleresponseis tosaythathedidn’treally mean
it. That is, one might understand his statement only to look like a waiver of the




⁸ Here is an alternative example: Suppose that you promise a friend that you will stay by his
side through a diﬃcult medical procedure and the ensuing recovery. Your friend warns that it
will be unpleasant, but you assure him that this is what friends do for one another. When in
the operating room, however, you discover that the procedure creates a nauseating odor. The
room is stuﬀy, and your mother keeps sending you text messages with concerns that are not
terribly urgent. Although clearly in some distress himself, your friend sees that you are very
uncomfortable and distracted. He declares, “I won’t hold it against you if you need to leave.”
Youtaketheopportunitytoescapetheunpleasantsituation.
293hold it against the soldier, it turns out that he perfectly well could hold it against
him.
Iwanttosuggestthatthereisanotherpossibility. Wecanthinkthatthewounded
solider, in this situation, has waived his future complaints and yet has not waived
the obligations that are owed to him. This possibility takes the wounded soldier’s
statement at face value: he won’t hold it against the other soldier. But it does not
treat that as equivalent to waiving the right, i.e., the duty that you owed to him. If








missible for the soldier to leave, but it waives any complaint if he does—that is, it
forgiveshimifhedoes.
This idea of preemptively forgiving is well established. One example comes
fromoneofthemosttoldstoriesintheWesterntradition. Althoughitsmeaningis
the subject of some controversy, Jesus’s conduct toward Judas may by read to ex-
press something like the statement, “I forgive you for what you are about to do.”⁹
⁹ The passage in John seems to portray Jesus’s treatment as forgiving, if not, encouraging Ju-
das’s betrayal. Matthew paints a somewhat darker picture: “He who has dipped his hand in the
dishwithme,willbetrayme. TheSonofmangoesasitiswrittenofhim,butwoebetothatman
bywhomtheSonofmanisbetrayed! Itwouldhavebeenbetterforthatmanifhehadnotbeen
294But it should not be read as a grant of permission. Judas’s action is still wrong.
The idea that Jesus forgives Judas in advance for his betrayal shouldn’t imply that
hecondoneditorthatitwasanylessabetrayal. Theforgivenessalteredthesense
in which Judas would be accountable for his sin, but it did not make the betrayal
any less of a sin against Christ. Whether or not this is the correct biblical inter-
pretationisunimportant. Insofarasthisinterpretationisintelligible,itillustratesa
certain moral possibility. The story provides an example of preemptively waiving
one’s prerogative to hold another accountable without, at the same time, waiving
one’sentitlementtobetreatedjustly.
Onewaytoseethatthewaiverofcomplaintintheseexamplesdoesnotoperate
as a waiver of the duty is to consider the evaluation of a neutral observer. While
the wounded soldier in the first example and Jesus in the second example may
both have relinquished any complaint about the wrongfulness of the act done to
them,thiswouldnotstopsomeoneelsefromassertingthattheactswerewrongful.
Notonlycouldwesaythattheactsarewrongful,but,moreimportantly,wecould
say that the acts were a violation of duties owed to the other person. Although
wounded soldier may be barred from saying it, the rest of us can say that, in leav-
ing him, the healthy soldier violates the duty he owed to him. And, regardless of
whetherJesuspreemptivelyforgavehim,therestofuscansaythatJudasbetrayed
Jesus—violated his duties to him. If this is correct, then waiving the complaint
born.” (26:23-24.) Butthecontrastbetweenthesetwodescriptionsinsomewayshighlightsthe
point that I want to make. It should be possible to say that Judas’s betrayal was forgiven (as we
getinJohn)eventhoughitwasverywrong(aswegetinMatthew). Thisforgivinginterpretation
is reinforced by the famous plea: “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do” (Luke
23:34.)















emptive forgiving to occur, I also don’t think that it is coincidence that it appears
intheseexamples. Thesensethattherightsintheseexamplesarelargelyunwaiv-
ableoperatestocanceltheconversationalimplicaturebetweenwaivingone’scom-









to life. Nor can the right be waived. It cannot be waived because
any agreement to being treated as an animal or an instrument does
not provide others with the moral permission to so treat us. One
can volunteer to be a shield, but then it is one’s choice on a particu-
lar occasion to be a shield. If without our permission, without our
choosing it, someone used us as a shield, we may, I should suppose,
forgivethepersonfortreatingusasanobject. Butwedonotthereby
waive our right to be treated as a person, for that is a right that has
been infringed and what we have at most done is put ourselves in a
position where it is inappropriate any longer to exercise the right to
complain. (1976,p.53)¹¹
Morris’s claim here is that there is an inalienable right to have one’s choices re-
spected. Theinalienabilityisdemonstratedbythefactthatthemostonecandois
preemptivelyforgive,or,asheputsit,putourselvesinapositionwherewecanno




(even if not complete) helps explain why the utterances in the previous examples
don’t operate to imply a grant of permission. While preemptively waiving one’s
¹⁰ The distinction between these ideas was mentioned in Chapter 3, but, for a discussion of
thediﬀerence,seeFeinberg(1978).




Still, I don’t believe that this unwaivability is a necessary feature of the sort of
divergencethatIhavebeendescribing,althoughitdoesprovidetheclearestexam-
ples. Theimplicationcanbeblocked,Ithink,byexplicitstatementratherthanby
the circumstances. Consider an example. A guy promises his best friend, who is
going through a tough divorce, that he will take him fishing on a particular week-
end. As the weekend approaches, however, this guy receives an invitation to go
to a concert from a woman that he has been romantically interested in for quite a
while. It is rare opportunity to get closer with her, and he is very tempted. He
goes to his friend and explains the situation, essentially requesting to be released
fromhispromise. Nowimaginethefriendsayssomethinglikethis: “Ifyouwant
me to let you oﬀ the hook, the answer is ‘no.’ You promised me, and you owe me
this. Butlook,man,Ican’tmakeyougo. Ifyoudecidetobailonme,Iunderstand
and I forgive you. I know you’re really into this girl, and we’ve all been there. So
I won’t complain.” What I want to claim is that there is nothing contradictory
or incoherent in this statement. The friend refused to release the promise—i.e.,
waivehispromissoryrightandgrantpermission—buthenonethelessforgivesthe
prospectivebreakingofthatpromise—i.e.,releasesthefuturecomplainthewould
otherwise have. Both these things must be explicitly stated because, otherwise,
the one would naturally be taken to imply the opposite of the other. But this im-
plicationcanbeblockedbyexplicitdisavowal,anditishere.
298There is an element of this example that I want to highlight. The statement,
“we’ve all been there,” helps makes sense of the preemptive forgiving in the ex-
ample. The statement helps the listener understand how the speaker can, on the
onehand,insistontheexistenceofthedutyandyet,ontheotherhand,forgiveits
transgressionbeforeithasevenoccurred—or,putanotherway,howhecanretain
his claim even while forsaking any future complaint. The forgiving is facilitated
inpartbytheacknowledgementofsharedimperfectioninalwayslivinguptoour
obligations. In fact, this same idea is part of the Christian idea of forgiveness at
work in the Judas example. One of the familiar Christian dogmas is the idea that
weareallsinners. Thisideacanprovideacertainbasisforpreemptiveforgiving—
or any forgiving for that matter. One relinquishes all complaint not because one
views the other as unaccountable, but because one recognizes the same potential









titudes without, at the same time, committing oneself to what Strawson (1962)
¹²Forsomepsychologicalevidencethatitmightbe,seeExlineetal.(2008).
299calledtheobjectiveattitude. Theforgiverdoesnotceasetoviewtheotherperson
as a normative agent. He doesn’t give up the view that, in some sense, reactive
attitudes would be appropriate. What he gives up, instead, is his own position
to apply such reactive attitudes or engage in the practices of holding accountable.
Thewaiverdissolvesonewayofmorallyrelatingtoanotherwithoutdissolvingthe
moral relationship of owing and being owed moral obligations. If this is a possi-




that the sort of examples that I have described don’t really involve waiving one’s
futurecomplaintbutratherpromisingnottocomplain. Forthetheoristwhosees
rightsandaccountabilityasgoinghandinhand,thiswillbeanattractiveresponse




There is not a great deal to say about this response because it is largely a stipu-
lation. What I have been describing are cases in which one seems to have a right
andyetatthesametimeoneseemstohavegivenupthemoralentitlementtocom-
plainupontheright’sviolation. Havingacomplaintisunderstoodintermsofbe-
ing able, morally speaking, to do something—namely, to hold the other person
accountable. Thetheoristattractedtotheresponsedescribedabovesimplyposits
300another, diﬀerent sense of ‘having a complaint’ that has nothing to do with be-
ing able to do anything. ‘Having a complaint’ in this sense simply means having




sake one’s moral complaint, and only possible to promise not to use it? And the
same points might apply to waiving a right. Why not say that one never waives a
right,butonlypromisesnottoexerciseit?
Thesequestions,Ibelieve,highlightthefactthatatleastoneimportantsenseof




in at least one important sense of the idea, one can preemptively waive a future






the other way around? Can one waive a right without waiving the future com-
301plaint?














right was waived, there could not have been a violation of it. I think this line of
thought, though logically valid, is misguided. What is important is not whether
onecancomplainabouttheviolationofaright, butratherwhetheronecancom-
plainagainsttheactiontaken. IfIwaivemyrightthatyoudoφ,thenitisnecessarily





302Therelevantcomparisonis betweenarightanda complaintwith the sameob-
ject, namely the action φ. Put more precisely, the two relevant types of proposi-
tions are (1) ‘X has a right that Y do φ,’ and (2) ‘X has a complaint against Y for
failing to do φ.’ Waiving a right is a way of making a proposition of type (1) no
longertrue. WhenXwaiveshisrightthatYdoφ,itisnolongerthecasethatXhas
arightthatYdoφ. WhatImeantoargueisthatsuchawaiverdoesnotnecessarily
negate a proposition of type (2). Put another way, a proposition of form (2) can
truthfully coexist with a proposition of form (3) ‘X has waived his/her right that
Ydoφ.’
Thisoccurs,Ibelieve,whensomeoneactswronglytowardanotherperson,but
where the wrongness is not attributable to violating a right, because any right has
been waived or disavowed. This circumstance can arise, I think, in a number of
ways. Iwilldescribethree.
First, consider a literary example. In War and Peace, Prince Andrei Bolkonski,
awealthy,thirty-one-year-oldwidower,andNatashaRostova,avivacious16-year-
old girl who has just come out in society, fall in love with one another. Prince
Andrei proposes to Natasha, and she joyfully accepts. But Prince Andrei’s father
disapprovesofhissonremarrying,anditisagreedthatthemarriagewillbedelayed
for a full year. Prince Andrei says to his young lover, “[I]t will give you time to





onski was not announced; Prince Andrei insisted on that. He said
that as he was responsible for the delay he ought to bear the whole
burden of it; that he had given his word and bound himself forever,
but that he did not wish to bind Natasha and gave her perfect free-
dom. Ifaftersixmonthsshefeltthatshedidnotlovehimshewould
have full right to reject him. Naturally neither Natasha nor her par-
entswishedtohearofthis,butPrinceAndreiwasfirm.
(1937,Bk.6,Ch.xxiv)
Several months later, having been apart from one another, Natasha nearly elopes
with an unworthy adventurer and, in the midst of her irresponsible passion, calls
oﬀherengagementwithPrinceAndrei.
AlthoughPrinceAndreiexplicitlyandfirmlygrantedNatashapermissiontodo
just this, there is little doubt that she nevertheless wrongs the Prince. She feels it
this way, declaring, “I know all is over… I’m only tormented by the wrong I have
done him. Tell him only that I beg him to forgive… me for everything…” (1937,
Bk.8,Ch.xxii).¹⁴ Forhispart,PrinceAndreiatonepointthinkstohimself,“[H]ow
many people have I hated in my life? And of them all, I loved and hated none as I
did her.” And he says to a friend, “I said that a fallen woman should be forgiven,






Andrei, prayed for him, and asked God to forgive her all the wrongs she had done him” (Bk.9,
Ch.xviii). Shealsowonderstoafriend,“Willheeverforgiveme? Willhenotalwayshaveabitter
feelingtowardme?” (Bk. 9,Ch.xx).
304not take Prince Andrei’s grant of permission seriously—that it should be consid-
eredanemptypoliteness. ButIthinkthatitwouldbeamistaketosaythis. Prince
Andrei firmly gave up his claim to an engagement. Natasha was not promised
to him, and she does not act wrongly because she violates Prince Andrei’s rights.
Rather,sheactswronglybecauseshethrowsawaytheirloveinadisreputableand
foolishmomentofweaknessandyouth. Hehasacomplaintbecauseshehasacted
wrongly regarding him, even though he has waived any rights that he might have
had.¹⁵
Todrawoutthepoint,onecanimaginethatasituationinwhichtherightsthat
are waived and the acting wrongly are more clearly disconnected. Suppose that
your family farm was sold several years ago to a local organic farmer. Your family




able as a cookie-cutter subdivision than as organic sunflowers. He wants to know
ifyouwillexerciseyouroptiontobuy. Youdesperatelydon’twanttoseetheland
yourfamilyworkedforgenerationsturnedintosuburbia. Butyouknowthatyour
younger sister will buy the farm—she has expressed her intention to do so if the
situationeverarose—anditisbettersuitedforher—shehastheresourcesandthe
green thumb to make it work. So you decline. That is, you waive your right to
¹⁵ As will be discussed in Chapter 10, it is not the fact that she acted wrongly per se that is
important, but the fact that she cannot justify herself to Prince Andrei. In most cases, like this
one,thesetwoideasconverge.





the farm was preserved. In other words, you have a complaint against the devel-
opment even though you waived your right that the development not take place.
Ifthischaracterizationiscorrect,thenwaivingone’srighttoφdoesnotmeanthat
one waives one’s complaint if φ is not done. More explicitly, “you waived your
right that the farmer not subdivide the farm” is true and so is “you have a com-
plaintagainstthefarmerforsubdividingthefarm.”
Now this example is admittedly laden with complicating factors. First, the ex-
ampleobviously trades on the same third-party relationship discussed previously
in Chapter 4. You are aggrieved even though your right hasn’t been violated be-
cause your sister’s right has been violated. But, in my view, this is not essential.
Your sister’s right is significant in that it is the source of the obligation that the
farmer violates. But something else could play this role. Suppose, for example,
that there had been implemented strict zoning and/or historic preservation laws
such that you knew that the family farm could not be demolished and the land
subdivided. Ifyouhadturnedtheoptiondownbelievingyourinterestswouldbe
protectedonthisbasis,onlytofindthelawsflouted,Ithinkthattoowouldbethe











right. Still, the complaint and the right are connected in the sense that they have
the same subject. The subject of the complaint, like the subject of the right, is an
action—here,theactofsellingtoadeveloper. Youhadaright(albeitconditional)
that this not be done, and you have a complaint that it was done. The subject of





you would not have waived your right if you had known what the farmer would
do. You relied on an expectation that the farmer would abide by his obligations.
Even though he made no particular representations to you, you will feel misled
orexploited. Partofthecomplaint, therefore, doesdependonthewaiverandthe
sense that it was unfairly garnered. Your complaint isn’t based on the violation of
307yourright,butyourrightispartofwhatgivesyoustandingtocomplainaboutthe
violationofothernorms.
This description naturally leads into a third example—or class of examples—
in which I believe that one waives a right and yet still might hold a complaint in
thefuture. Ibelievethatcasesofconsensual,mutuallyadvantageousexploitation
are properly described in this way.¹⁶ “Exploitation” can refer to a wide variety of
interactions. WhatIwanttofocuson,though,arecasesinwhichapersonwillingly
consentstoanexchangewithanotherpersonandthatexchangeis,infact,mutually
beneficial, but we would nevertheless say that one party is “exploiting” or “taking
advantageof”theotherperson. Therearemanyclassicexamplesthatmight,under
proper circumstances, fit this description—a sweatshop laborer, a sex worker, an
organseller,asurrogatemother,etc. Theexploitedpartymayknowinglyconsent
to the exchange, and they may do so out of a reasonable belief that they will be
better oﬀ by doing so. Of course, in many actual cases, there may be no genuine
waiverasthepersonmayhavebeencoercedordeceived,butthatgoesbeyondthe
sortofexploitationonwhichIwanttofocus.
My claim is that, in cases of mutually advantageous exploitation, the exploited
partywaiveshisorherrightsagainstsometreatment,andyetthatpersonisnever-
theless wronged by the treatment. For example, a sweatshop laborer consents to
workinoppressiveconditionsandyetshehasacomplaintagainstworkinginsuch
conditions.¹⁷ A surrogate mother waives her parental rights with regard to her




308child and yet she may be wronged by having her child taken from her. In short,
the exploited party genuinely waives his or her rights—usually driven to do so
bypoverty—and neverthelesswe think that the exploited party is wronged by his
or her exploiter. This last bit is important. An impoverished individual may be
wrongedbythesocialsystemthatputhimorherinthatposition,butanexploited
individual is uniquely wronged by the exploiter. In fact, the idea of exploitation
can seem to imply the idea of wronging. As one writer puts it, “to exploit people
is to wrong them, however much or little they may lose or you may gain from the
act” (Goodin, 1987, p.182). For many rights theorists, this creates a puzzle: how
cansomeoneconsentandyetstillbewronged?
A typical response is to deny one side of the paradox or the other: either the
povertyissopowerfulthatitcountsascoercionandtherewasnogenuinewaiver
or, alternatively, the exploiter does not actually wrong the exploited party.¹⁸ But
neitheroftheseoptions,norsomecombinationofthem,strikesmeasaplausible
strategy for explaining every circumstance. There will be some individuals who
will think something like, “I know that I signed up to be treated this way, and I
know that I could quit if I wanted, but I still feel aggrieved and resentful at being
treatedthisway.” Ithinkthatourmoraltheoryshouldn’tdemandthatwesaythat
¹⁸ There are actually two possible routes within this position. Some writers, especially from
thebusinessoreconomiccommunity,viewtheconsentoftheexploitedpartiesasmeaningthat
the exploitation is permissible. See, e.g., Maitland (2003); Zwolinski (2007). On the other
hand, it is possible to believe that exploitation is wrong, but not a wrong to the exploited party.
Joel Feinberg, for example, writes, “In these cases there is no wrongful loss for the exploitee,
who can himself have no grievance” (1988, p.176). Feinberg sees the mutually advantageous
exploitation as a “free-floating evil.” My own view shares a certain similarity with Feinberg’s in
that I see the wrongfulness of exploitation as free-floating, but, because I do not believe that a





Tomakethispoint, it maybe worthfocusingforamomentona singleform of
exploitation. In 2007, The Guardian interviewed a sex worker in a London sub-
urb.¹⁹ The woman interviewed was not the victim of human traﬃcking or drug
addiction, but a fifty-something former administrator. What is striking about the
interview is that, despite viewing it as her own choice, the woman clearly views
her trade as exploitative. In fact, her words could hardly be stronger in condemn-
ing the sex industry as exploiting women: “I believe there is a conspiracy to turn
women into readily accessible semen receptacles. Men are twisting this now to
make women think it’s a level playing field and it’s equal and liberating. No, it
suits men, it’s convenient for men. That’s what is so insidious.” Describing her
work itself, she says, “Some people say that prostitution is actually a man paying
to rape a woman. I think that is true in a lot of cases. Although it is a business
arrangement,heisgettingoﬀonthefactthatthewomandoesn’twantit. Basically
you’veconsentedtobeingrapedformoney.” Laterinthearticle,sheadds,“Some-
times I think, it’s just a performance. But it’s not, it’s more than that and it’s very
harmful.” Asthesequotationsillustrate,herresentmenttowardhermaleclientele
plainlycomesthrough. And,Ithink,herfeelingsandcomplaintsarereasonable.
But it is hard to view the woman in the article as not freely choosing her trade.
Theeasierstorywouldbetoassumethatshe“hadnochoice”or“didn’tknowwhat
¹⁹ErmineSaner,“You’reconsentingtobeingrapedformoney,”TheGuardian,Dec. 10,2007.
310she was getting into” and that her exploitation was the result of duress or decep-
tion. But this easy story does not necessarily fit. She explains her initial choice
bysaying,“Istartedgoingonblinddatesanditslowlystartedtoevolveintohaving
sex with strangers… I had a bad month, financially, as I invariably would, and it
startedasatrickle. Ihadalwaysbeencuriousaboutdoingit—IthinkIwastrying
to prove to myself that actually prostitution was OK.” Financial need is a factor,
but her employment hardly comes across as an act of desperation. I would ven-
turetocallitapaternalisticfictionthatallexploitedsexworkersarenecessarilynot
makingafreechoice. AsonescholarwroteafterspendingtimewithCaribbeansex
workers, “I have been particularly alarmed at the media’s monolithic portrayal of
sexworkersinsex-touristdestinations,suchasCuba,aspassivevictimseasilylured
by the glitter of consumer goods. These overly simplistic and implicitly moraliz-






consented and thereby waived her right not to be treated in this fashion. The
waiveroftherightdoesnot,inthesecases,equatewithhavingforfeitedallground
forcomplaint.
One response to this argument is to suggest that there is a right not to be ex-
ploited. Bypositingthisright,inadditiontotheunderlyingrightagainstbadtreat-
311ment, one can make sense of the divergence that I have been describing: the ex-
ploitedpartywaivesthelatterbutnottheformer. Accordingtothislineofthought,
for example, the sweatshop worker waives his right not to be made to work eigh-
teen hours per day, but he nevertheless has a complaint, founded upon his right
notbeexploited,whichisviolatedbyhisexploiter.
Even if there is such a right, I do not think that the complaint of the exploited
party is neatly circumscribed by the violation of that right. It would be artifi-
cial,Ithink,tosaythatthesweatshopworkercancomplainaboutbeingexploited
but cannot complain about his employer demanding eighteen hours per day of







resents something like demanding only reasonable amounts of work in humane
conditions,statementsofthesetwoformsmaysimultaneouslybetrue. Appealing
to a right not to be exploited does not alter this analysis. It simply substitutes a
diﬀerent content for φ. To address my claim, what would be required is an argu-
mentthatoneofthestatementsIamsuggestingtobetrueisinfactfalse. Positing
²⁰Analogously,inthefamilyfarmexample,yourcomplaintisagainstthedevelopmentofthe
farm generally. It is not limited to the discrete idea that you were taken advantage of. In fact,
suchasegregationseemshardtoconceptualize.
312arightnottobeexploiteddoesn’taccomplishthis.²¹
This may seem like a technical point, but it reflects an important and intuitive
idea: the subject of a complaint is an action of another person. It is the action—
thetreatment—thatisthetargetofanexploitedparty’scomplaint. Insofarasthis




Marxist tradition that expresses a general skepticism towards rights, particularly






I believe that properly distinguishing rights and complaints can alleviate some
ofthesefears. Inthefirsthalfofthischapter,Iarguedthatonecouldwaiveafuture
²¹ The idea would have to be that the right not to be exploited grounds a complaint, and that
thismakesitacceptabletosaythatthecomplaintIamdescribingdoesn’texist. Sincewecansay
thattheexploitedpartyhasacomplaint,itisokaythatwecannotsayshehasacomplaintagainst
the particular action being done to her. This makes sense if all we care about is saying that the
exploited party has some complaint, i.e., that (2) is true for some φ. If this is all we care about,
thenwecanaccomplishwiththefollowing: ifφ isrefusingtoexploit,then(2)istrueand(3)is
false, but, if φ is demanding inhumane labor, then (3) is true but (2) is false. But my argument




concerning the same subject matter. What these arguments share is the idea that
waivermaytransformthemorallandscapelessthanonemightthink.
Waiver is sometimes described a sort of magical power to transform a person’s
moral relationship with another person. But, in this chapter, I have tried to em-
phasize the fact that, for all that waiver may transform, it may also leave a great
deal intact. Waiving a right or a complaint does not mean that important moral




sight presses in favor of separating rights and complaints. We can accommodate
thediversityofactualcasesonlybyviewingthewaiverasoperatingononeorthe
other—rightsor complaints—but not both. This is, I believe, an important argu-
mentinfavorofviewingrightsandcomplaintsasdistinctmoralphenomena.
314I’ve studied all the lore of separation









315for the sake of accuracy to our moral practices. To the extent that the reader has
acceptedthesearguments,shemayhavedonesoonlyasabitterpillthatmustun-
fortunatelybeswallowed. Inthischapter,Iwanttotrytoalleviatethisbitterness.





nature of rights and wronging. In Chapters 4 through 9, I presented a variety of
reasonsforthinkingthatrightsandwrongingsare,infact,distinctmoralphenom-
ena. Methodologically, my argument relied on showing divergences in where we
findthetwophenomenaandinhowtheyfigureinourmorallives. Wehavesettled
commitments about wrongs—commitments about the appropriateness of com-
plaint, resentment, apology, forgiveness, compensation, and so on. And we also




gest that rights and wrongs are not coextensive. For example, I think that our ev-





(e.g. Hart’s mother, Mrs.
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intuition-pumping. Some of our commitments concern the role that these rela-
tionshipsplayandhowtheyareexperienced. Forexample,thereasonnottoposit
that the parent has a right not to have his or her child injured is that we want to
reserve the idea of a right for a particular role—one involving guiding action and
being claimed or waived. In the course of the previous six chapters, a number of
such qualitative diﬀerence have emerged. Some of these diﬀerences are summa-
rizedinTable10.1.
Of course, this is just a very crude summary. The point is that, in addition to
demonstratinghowthesemoralrelationshipscanexistwithoutoneanother,Ihave









indirectly catalogued a variety of facts about rights and wronging. My hope now




are expressions of the way that morality can connect one party with another—
expressions of the way that our conduct may be owed to others and something
for which we are accountable to others. I believe that this thought is half correct:
rightsandwrongsdorepresentmoralconnectionsbetweenpersons. Themistake
liesinthinkingthatourmoralconnectionsareultimatelyallofasinglesort.
I think that diﬀerences between rights and wrongs that emerge from the pre-
viouschaptersparallelsomedeeptensionsinhowwethinkaboutmoralrelation-
ships. This parallel, I mean to argue, makes separate analysis of rights and wrong-
ings seem quite natural, even felicitous. Rights and wrongings come apart, I will
argue,becausetheyinvolveotherthingsthatalsocomeapart.
318Ibeginbydescribing—or,insomeinstances,returningto—threediﬀerentten-
sions in the ways that we think about rights, directed duties, and moral relations
generally. These tensions can seem irreconcilable, and I mean to embrace that.
Myclaimisthat,withoutgivinguponthecommitmentsthatseemtobeintension,
the tensions can nevertheless be alleviated by distinguishing rights from wrong-
ings. In this way, I hope to show that the division that I have been urging, which
may have initially seemed unpalatable, is actually a way to preserve seemingly in-
compatibleideasaboutrightsandinterpersonalmorality.
10.1.1 TheoriesofRights
In Chapters 2 and 3, I described two approaches to thinking about rights. I sug-
gested that each view had appealing aspects, but that neither of them seemed to
capture everything that we want to say about rights and wronging. The interest
theory,Iargued,seemstohavesomethingcorrectinattendingtotheideasofharm
andjustification. Butitispronetogivingrightstothird-partystakeholders,andit
struggles to capture how a right involves a duty owed to the rightholder and how
having a right is tied to being able to perform certain activities. The will theory,
in contrast, features the very ideas that the interest theory lacks. It explains the
waythatadutyisowedtoanotherbyattendingtotherightholder’sabilitytoexer-
cisenormativecontrol. But,althoughthisapproachcapturesthesensethatmany
rights are about ownership of normative control, it loses touch with the idea that
rights guard against some of our deepest injuries. By transforming all violations
into trespasses on each person’s individual sphere of sovereign control, the will
319theoryrestrictsthetypeofcomplaintsthatwecanmakeagainstoneanother.
Thereisanobservablepatternhere: thestrengthsandweaknessesofeachview
on rights seem to mirror one another.¹ The interest theory produces too many
rights claims, and the will theory produces too few wrongs. The interest theory
focuses on the ideas of harm and justification, and it struggles to describe the di-
rectedness of duties and the powers involved in rightholding. The will theory fo-
cusesonexplainingthedirectnessofcertaindutiesintermsoftherecipient’spow-
ers to engage in certain normative activities, but it struggles to cover the diversity





est and will theories can be interpreted as attending to diﬀerent concepts, rather
thanessentiallyindisagreement. Theinteresttheory’sfocusonharmsandjustifi-
cationareatthecoreofwhatitistobewronged,whichisnaturalgiventheprimacy
that the interest theory gives to injuries and wrongings. Conversely, the will the-
ory’s focus on directed duties and normative control provides a more compelling
conception of a right if one does not view this as constraining the complaints we
canmakeagainstoneanother—ifonehastheresourcestoacknowledgethestake
¹ Lief Wenar observes this mirroring: “The will and the interest theory are both inadequate
to our understanding of rights, the weakness of each being the strength of the other” (2005,
p.243). I think that Wenar is right to see the interest and choice theories as essentially mirror-
images of each other and as focused on diﬀerent concepts so as to be somewhat orthogonal to
each other. So I think the spirit of his diagnosis is a good one, but I do not find his positive
accountexplanatorilyilluminating.
320thatwehaveineachother’slivesbeyondthosethingstowhichweareentitled. Put










with acting justifiably being simply a component or byproduct of treating others
withrespect. Orjustificationmaybewhatgivescontenttotheotherwiseindeter-
minatecatchwordofrespect. So,whilefewwouldrejectthesignificanceofrespect
or justification, one or the other is taken to be explanatorily primary. In this way,









This connection between rights and respect has an obvious Kantian heritage.
The idea is that rights are the proper respect for the status that all of us have as
membersofhumanity. InKant’swords,
[A]humanbeingregardedasaperson,thatis,asthesubjectofamorally
practical reason, is exalted above any price; for as a person he is not
to be valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his









A person is constituted by his body and his mind. They are parts or
aspectsofhim. Forthatveryreason,itisfittingthathehaveprimary
say over what may be done to them—not because such an arrange-
mentbestpromotesoverallhumanwelfare,butbecauseanyarrange-
ment that denied him that say would be a grave indignity. In giving
himthisauthority,moralityrecognizeshisexistenceasanindividual
with ends of his own—an independent being. Since that is what he
is, he deserves this recognition… It is not that we think it fitting to
ascribe rights because we think it is a good thing that rights be re-
spected. Rather we think respect for rights a good thing precisely
because we think people actually have them—and… that they have
thembecauseitisfittingthattheyshould. (1993,pp.170,173)
322Robert Nozick appeals to the respect for the moral status of persons as a way to
explainthenon-aggregativefeatureofright. Hewrites:
Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian princi-
ple that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not











tance, the right is still not a response to his interest in being impor-
tant, but simply to his importance. (The interest gets protected as a
side-eﬀect, not as the point, of the right.) The strength of the right
is not a mark of the strength of the interest it protects, but a mark of
thefactthattherightisaresponsetoacharacteristicofpersonsthat
makespersonsimportant. (2002,p.487)
And Joel Feinberg argues that having rights may simply amount to the ability to
demandrespectfromothers:
Having rights enables us to “stand up like men,” to look others in
the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way equal to anyone. To
think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but prop-
erly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be
worthyoftheloveandesteemofothers. Indeed,respectforpersons
(this is an intriguing idea) may simply be respect for their rights, so
323that there cannot be the one without the other; and what is called








There is, however, another theme that philosophers often emphasize in think-
ing about rights and directed duties. This is the thought that actions should be
justifiable to those upon whom they bear. Having a right, on this view, involves
thefactthatothersareaccountabletoyou. Forexample,ThomasNageloﬀersthe














324This sort of focus on justifiability to has famously become the foundation for
modern contractualist ethics. Scanlon, for example, says that he “takes the idea
of justifiability to be basic in two ways: this idea provides both the normative ba-





What makes an action of mine morally wrong is the fact that it can-
notbejustifiedtosomeoneaﬀectedbyitontermsthatpersonwould







moral obligations. Whereas respect focuses on the sense in which moral agents
should recognize other persons as having an authoritative status, justification fo-
cusesonthewayinwhichagentsareaccountabletootherpersonswhoareaﬀected
by our actions. Both concepts highlight a diﬀerent way in which other persons
matter to our actions and, conversely, diﬀerent ways in which we relate to other
people’s actions. These two ways of relating to each other—as demanding one




WhatIwanttosuggestis thatthesetwodescriptionsactually pickout twodif-
ferent moral relationships. Furthermore, I want to suggest that the diﬀerence be-
tweenrespectandjustificationparallelsthedistinctionbetweenrightsandwrongs.
Thinking of rights and wrongs as distinguishable phenomena makes it possible
to capture both of these fundamental moral concepts independently. Rights are
basedontherespectthatweowetooneanother. Wrongs,ontheotherhand,relate
tothesensethatweshouldbeabletojustifyouractionstoeachother. Thisisnot




Notice how this suggestion dovetails with the earlier points about the interest
theory and the will theory. Respect and justification seem to animate the diﬀer-
ence between the interest theory and the will theory. The interest theory begins
fromafocusonunjustifiableharmstoourinterests. Tohavearightistohaveone’s




Interpersonal morality involves both forward-looking and backward-looking per-
spectives. Before an action is undertaken, two agents can be related as one who
owesadutyandonetowhomthedutyisowed. Afteranactionisperformed,the
perspectiveisdiﬀerent. Agentsmayberelatedasonewhodidsomethingandone






son’s ability to claim, waive, control, or even transfer the duty in question. After
anactionhasbeenperformed(oromitted),apersonmaybeinapositiontohold
another accountable for a failure. The victim might resent the transgressor, com-
plain about the injury, demand compensation, or seek to forgive the trespass; the





looking context. The practices of giving or demanding justification most natu-
rally take place against a backdrop of an action that has already been performed.
Theyparadigmaticallyhaveformslike“Whydidyoudothat?” and“x,y,andzrea-
327sons supported my doing that.” It is true that there are some partial exceptions.
In a forward-looking manner, we can inquire whether an action would be justifi-
able. But even this question involves assuming something of a hypothetical ex
post perspective. Roughly speaking, it asks what could be said, if the action were




to deny that justification can occur in a range of contexts, I think that it typically
involvessomeformofabackward-lookingperspective.
Respect,incontrast,isbasicallyforward-looking. Respectingsomeone’sstatus
as a person involves giving that person a proper place in one’s considerations. It
involvesgivinganotherpersonweight. Respectcapturestherelationshipinwhich
anagentisguidedbyanotherperson’smoralsignificancegoingforward. Wecan,
of course, evaluate after the fact whether an action manifested proper respect for
another person. But I think that this is essentially a retrospective evaluation of
the agent’s forward-looking deliberations—his or her approach. Actually giving
anotherpersonrespectissomethingthatisdonegoingforward.
² We can even give justification for something that might or might not happen, as when the
coachexplainstoanathletethathewillbecutthenextdayiftheteamsponsorshipdoesn’tcome
through. But even this has the same backward-looking structure. It assumes that the chips are
downandallthatisleftistoseehowthecardsfall. Mypointisthatonedoesnotgenerallygive
or demand justification when a choice has yet to be made—when the decisions is still up in the
air. Before making a choice, we can think about what justifications we could oﬀer if we chose
one way or another, but this is basically a matter of thinking about what would follow after the
choice. Inthissense,givingordemandingjustificationalwayshassomethingofanafter-the-fact
perspective.
328As I said, there is undeniably a temporal diﬀerence between the ex ante and ex
post relationships. But I believe that the diﬀerence between ex ante and ex post
relationships represents more than simply diﬀerent temporal perspectives on the
same relationship. Through a variety of arguments, I have tried to show that the
structures and practices involved in ex ante and ex post moral relationships come
apart in certain ways. How we relate morally to one another ex ante and ex post
are, I believe, quite diﬀerent. For this reason, rights and wrongs do not always
come as a unified package. At a broad, structural level, one might say that this is
because ex ante we relate to each other in terms of giving and demanding respect
andexpostwerelatetoeachotherbygivinganddemandingjustifications.
10.2 Wronging
My thesis is that rights and wronging are best understood when they are
decoupled from each other. I have oﬀered a number of arguments for this sep-
aration, but, thus far, I have not attempted to give an actual analysis of these two
concepts. Ihavearguedonlythat,bylinkingthetwoconceptsfortheoreticalsim-
plicity, we may obscure the actual relationships that the concepts describe. But
whataretheserelationships? Whenhasonepersonwrongedanotherperson?
The philosopher who is asked to imagine a wrong is likely to conjure up an
example of deliberate rights violation. One might envisage physical violence—
punching,murder,andsoon. Oronemightimaginedenyingsomeonesomething
thatisrightfullyhers—stealingordestroyingproperty,breakingapromise,andso




is wronged by the harmless trespasser. The mother is wronged by the negligent
driver who kills her daughter. The coworker is wronged when one indulges in
violent sexual fantasies about her. Cass Mastern wrongs the slave girl who is the
unwittingvictimofhisillicitaﬀair. WalterO’MalleywrongstheBrooklynDodgers




at least as often as it resembles a punch in the face. Wrongs are quite frequently
unintendedandunforeseen. Oftentheyinvolveharm,buttheydon’thaveto. And
thewrongedpartyneednothavehadsomerightthatwasviolated.
But this is not to say that there is no recognizable pattern. I would suggest
that a run-of-the-mill chain of events leading to a wrong looks like this. You do
something that you could not justify to someone else. Usually—although not




for what you have done. You have hurt someone’s feelings, or caused someone a
hassle,ortreatedsomeonewithoutproperrespect,orviolatedwhatsomeonewas
330entitledtoexpectfromyou. Sometimesthepersonwhocancomplaincouldhave
been identified beforehand, but sometimes someone is aﬀected whom you never
would have anticipated. That person’s interests may figure in the explanation of
why what you did was wrong, but that too is not necessary. What is important
is that your action ends up bearing negatively on someone else and you cannot
justifyyourconducttothatperson.







ing does have these two separate elements. But they are deeply connected. The
connection can be illustrated by recasting ‘matters to’ in terms of the standing to
demand justification. One is wronged, I mean to suggest, when one is in a posi-















suggested, a requirement that the other person have standing to demand justifi-
cation.³ We cannot generally hold each other to account for everything each of
us does. If you want to demand justification for an action of mine, you must be
able to answer the question “what’s it to you?” Demanding justification can be
viewedas lodginga provisional complaint, and one musthave grounds for such a




you” or “you have a stake in the matter.” The most obvious way that this condi-





such cases, it is still the wronged party demanding justification, though they do so through an
agent.
332the Brooklyn Dodgers fan who lost her team are in positions to demand justifica-
tion because they are harmed. In this way, the harm functions as a sort of moral
property. It gets the harmed party past the threshold inquiry of why the action
concerns them; it entitles the harmed party to demand justification. But harm
does not itself constitute a wrong. In many cases, harm may result to others de-
spitethefactthatweactinperfectlyacceptableways. Forexample,Iinventanew
productthatmakesyourproductobsolete. OrIsaysomethingbadaboutyou,but
it is both true and something others should know. In such cases, the harm does
notgiverisetoawrong—damnumabsqueinjuria. Butthefactthatoneisharmed
meansthatonecaninquirewhetherthatharmcanbejustified.⁴
Harm, however, is not the only thing that can satisfy the requirement that the
personhasastakeinthematter. AsRipsteinemphasizes,standingalsoexistswhen
onepartyharmlesslytrespassesonanother’srights. Ifyouharmlesslyusemybed
or kiss me while I’m under anesthesia, I have a stake in that. “You used me” or
“youviolatedmyrights”areveryintelligibleanswerstothequestion“whatisitto
you?” But, I don’t believe that having a right is required, even in the absence of




⁴ This doesn’t mean that the harm is necessarily separate from the questions about justifica-
tion. Oftentheharmwillitselfbepartofallofwhatmakesanactionunjustifiable. Forexample,
yourmakingnoisemaybeunjustifiedpreciselybecauseitbothersyourneighbor. Butsometimes
the harm that gives rise to standing does not figure in making the action unjustified. For exam-
ple, I have suggested that the harm to a victim’s mother is not part of the explanation for why
negligentdrivingisimpermissible.
333cerns or matters to her in some identifiable way, but this standing requirement is
broad. Itcanbesatisfiedwhenanactionharmssomeone,whenactactionviolates
someone’s rights, and even sometimes when an action merely involves someone.
The way that the action concerns or matters to the person must, however, be in
some way negative. By this, I don’t mean that a person can only be wronged by
actions that are bad for her.⁵ All that there must be is some way that the action
bears on her adversely. There must be something that the person could complain
of.
Beinginapositiontodemandjustificationdoesnotrequirethatoneactuallybe
able to complain. For one thing, you are wronged when you are murdered, even
though your death would prevent you from actually complaining or demanding
justification. Furthermore you can have a complaint, even if you do not know
it. If the CIA ran experiments on you in your sleep, you would be wronged by
that even though you had no idea. When your coworker thinks horrible things
aboutyou,youmaybewrongedwithoutknowingit. Soactualabilitytodemand
⁵ One might think that an action that benefits a person cannot wrong the person. I don’t
thinkthisiscorrect. First,ifyoudosomethingbadformysakeandIbenefitfromyourwrongful
act, you may wrong me by making me a participant and a recipient of wrongful gains. Second,
it seems possible that to be wronged by an action that nevertheless leaves one overall better oﬀ,
wherethebenefitisconferredinanimpermissibleway. Forexample,SeanaShiﬀrin(1999)notes
that dropping gold cubes from airplanes might wrong the people below even while benefitting
them overall. Third, it even seems conceivable that someone might be wronged by having such
a large good conferred on them that they are burdened by the obligations, either of gratitude or
noblesseobligethatresult.
Still, it does seem like there could be some actions that concern me, but not in any way that I
could complain about. If an action only caused me a slight incidental benefit, then I might not
be able to overcome the “what’s it to you?” threshold. In terms of your standing to complain, it




In another sense, however, the ability to complain or demand justification is
required. A nonhuman animal is not like the person who simply never knows
about a violation. In the latter case, we have no diﬃculty saying that the person
has a complaint but doesn’t know it. Were the person aware of certain predicate
facts,heorshewouldbeinapositiontoactuallycomplain. Thepersoncouldcom-
plainbutforthelackofknowledge. Theanimal’sbarrier,incontrast,isn’talackof
knowledge or a lack of continued existence. The problem is that the nonhuman
animal is not the sort of thing that can make complaints or demand justification.
Ratherdiﬀerently,awrongdoermightnotbeinapositiontodemandjustification
duetohisorherownpastactions. Inthatcase,thepastactionsdisabletheperson
from satisfying the threshold question about having a stake in the matter: “Yeah,
we lied to you. What’s it to you?” Because the demand for justification is also a
provisionalcomplaint, beingunabletoappealtothe relevantnorm functionslike
not having a stake. In sum, the first element of wronging requires that an entity
could,intherelevantsense,complainordemandjustification.
When someone is in a position to demand justification—because an action
harmed her or violated her rights or otherwise concerned her—then that person




ever, have a very good answer to my query. If you can say something like “I did
335it to save your life” or “I was legally required to do that,” then I have probably not
been wronged. If your only answer is that you enjoy seeing my pain, then you






tion. The wrong is the result of a denied claim, namely the claim to justification.
But this thought is incorrect. The wronged party is wronged by virtue of there
beingnojustification. Oneiswrongedevenbeforesheasksforjustification—but




To say that an action could be justified to you is, roughly, to say that the actor
could give reasons to you that you should accept for the action. There is much
more that must be said than I can oﬀer here. Still, there are a few points that I
wouldliketohighlight.
First, justification is a relational concept. It is justification to the other person
that matters.⁶ In part, this means that whether one can oﬀer justification will de-
⁶Iamagnosticabouttheextenttowhichthejustificationmustappealtothepersoninques-
tion in order to be satisfactory. For example, it is debatable whether saving someone else can
count as a justification to someone whose rights are infringed in order to save the person. If it
doesn’t, then it is possible that, in such cases, one wrongs the person whose rights are infringed
336pendonthenatureoftherelationshipbetweentheparties. Forexample,suppose





the forsaking of certain values so an appeal to such values would carry no weight.
It is important to distinguish, here, that the point is about the existing relation-
ship between the parties, and not about what the harmed party would accept as
justification. If an innocent bystander turned Clyde in, Clyde might be equally
unwillingtoacceptthejustificationforthataction. Butwewouldnotsaythatthis
person has wronged Clyde. What matters in the first example is not that Clyde
wouldn’t accept Bonnie’s justification, but that Bonnie’s oﬀer of that justification
has no traction given their relationship. Bonnie is, so to speak, estopped from of-
feringit.
This relationship-dependence can work in the opposite direction as well. A
relationshipbetweentwopartiescanmeanthatcertainreasonswillcountasjusti-
fications that might not otherwise. For example, Bonnie might be able to justify
some act to Clyde on the grounds that it will facilitate their robbery. But this
relationship-dependence is not limited to justice among thieves. Whenever peo-
ple share in a set of institutions or social cooperation, that relationship can make
eventhoughoneactspermissibly. Ontheotherhand,ifwethinkthatsavingthepersonisajus-
tification to the rightholder, then it will not constitute wronging that person. It strikes me as a
virtueofthepresentaccountthatitremainsopentoeithercharacterizationofcaseslikethese.
⁷ThisexampleisborrowedfromChristineKorsgaard.
337certain reasons count as justifications that, without the background relationship,
might not. In particular, we can aﬀord each other certain prerogatives to act on
ourowninterests. Forexample,insomecommunities,themerefactthatsomeone
wants a three-car garage might be a justification for casting shade on a neighbor’s
vegetable garden. In some neighborhoods, however, it might not be. Where it
is,theperson’sdesirealonecountsasajustificationbecausethereisabackground
agreementthat each person will have the prerogative to do that sort of thing with
theirpropertyshouldtheysodesire.








Both elements of this account of wronging—the requirement that a person be
⁸ One might be tempted to think that if justification can be this minimal, then there really is
no requirement for justification at all. But I think this is incorrect. Even where someone has
a prerogative to treat self-regarding reasons as decisive, they could act in a way that cannot be
justified to another person. Suppose, for example, that I justified adding the garage by saying,
“I wanted to block the sunlight from reaching your vegetable garden because I wanted to spite
youforbeatingmeinthehousingdevelopment’stennistournamentlastmonth.” Insuchacase,
theneighborinawayappearstobewronged—hemightreasonablyresenttheadditioninaway
that wouldn’t have been appropriate if it was just normal suburban growth. There seems to be
a sense in which one can be wronged even by permissible actions when they are done with bad




be given to that person—contain directed, relational elements. In this way, the
account of wronging is doubly ‘bipolar.’ It involves a connection between moral
agents in two ways. First, the wrongdoer must do something to the other person.
Thepartiesareconnectedbytheactioninquestionbecauseonepersonhasacted
andtheotherpersonhasbeenactedupon. Second,thewrongdoermustbeunable
to oﬀer a justification to the other person. This requirement connects the parties
as the giver and receiver of reasons, and it invokes the context of their particular




in which each is absent. We sometimes witness another person acting wrongly,
whocouldnotjustifyhisorherbehaviortousifcalledupontodoso. Buttheac-
tionmaynotconcernus. Weareneitherharmednorviolatednorevenconcerned
in the matter. In such circumstances, we are not wronged. Still, some lesser ana-
logexists. Strawsondescribesthenegativereactionarisinginsuchcasesas“moral
indignation”—“the vicarious analogue of resentment” (1962, pp.70-71). Moral
indignationislikeresentmentbecauseitarisesoutofafailureofjustification, but
is a weaker vicarious analog because it is not one’s own harm for which justifica-
tion is sought. Another lesser analog of wronging arises when the requirements








Rights have a different character than wrongs. In the preceding chap-









what to do. This force can involve trumping, or excluding, other considerations.
Rightscangovernouractions,Iargued,evenwheretherightholderisnotinapo-
sitiontoholdusaccountable. Rights, insum, areaboutshapingourdeliberations
beforeweact,andnotaboutaccountabilityafterwards.












They involve obligations to treat another in a certain ways because he or she has
some normatively significant property.⁹ This thought roughly begins to capture a
senseofrespectandasenseinwhichtheotheristhesourceofduty.
But not every instance of recognizing another entity as normatively significant
constitutesrespect. AsdiscussedinChapter2,apartymayincidentallyfallwithin
thescopeofanotherperson’sobligation—andthusholdnormativesignificance—




⁹ More formally, we might say something like: X has a duty to treat each member of type Ψ
inacertainmannerbecausethatmemberbelongstotypeΨandYbelongstotypeΨanddoingφ
istheappropriatewayforXtotreatamemberoftypeΨ. Thepointisthattheobligationisowed
to the other person insofar as it is based on the other person’s normatively significant property.
But,asdescribedinwhatfollows,thisthoughtisincomplete.
341oneneedsisthethoughtthatthestatusinquestionisanormativelysignificantcat-
egory on its own.¹⁰ In fact, one might say that it is precisely because someone can




I mean to suggest that respect involves seeing another as significant on his or
her own if the significance is not just instrumental or indirect. The problem with
appealingtothecategory“mustached”isthatthecategoryisonlyimportantasan
instrument to fulfilling your promise. Unlike tipping the hat to mustached gen-
tlemen, which one does as a means to satisfying one’s promise, treating another
with the respect he or she is due is not a means to satisfying some further goal.
Respect involves recognizing significance of non-instrumental form. But, to bor-
rowadistinctionfromKorsgaard(1983),non-instrumentaldoesn’tmeanintrinsic
significance. Someone may have a status that generates respect and rights in part
due to its extrinsic significance. For example, the status of being a speaker may




who just walked by, there are two response that you might oﬀer: (1) I promised to tip my hat
toallmustachebearers,and(2)thatmanhasamustache. Youmightoﬀer(2)asanexplanation
if the inquiring person already knew (1), but if one is inquiring into the source of the duty, (1)
would be the appropriate explanation. In fact, in normal conversation, the response “because
he had a mustache” would be taken as a joke—giving normative significance to a category that











or a natural wonder its own normative significance. It is quite plausible that, out





groves have rights, it is not unnatural to think that one owes it to Hamlet to stage
theplayincertainwaysortothinkthatitwouldbewrongtothesequoiastochop
them down for toilet paper. So, even here, some link exists between respect and
the sense that obligations are directional. Rights, however, seem to involve more
thanjustthis.
Rights involve a deeper form of respect. Rights do not imply simply that the
thecasethatthevalueoftheright—orthevalueofthatgeneralpatternoftreatment—isatleast
partially extrinsic. For example, when the government avoids silencing a speaker for his or her
viewpoint, it does not do so as a means to further some end. If it did, then a speaker could be
silenced whenever that end is not being advanced. Respecting a speaker does not just have this
instrumentalsignificance—itispursuedforitsownsake. Thisistrueevenifthereasonthatsuch
categoricaltreatmentisvaluabledependsonitsbenefitstosocietyatlarge.
343rightholder is normatively important—a source of reasons. Rights mean that the
rightholder is normatively important in a distinctive way—as authoritative, or as
asourceofaprivilegedkindofreason. Therespecthereisnotjustthatinvolvedin
recognizing qualities. It also involves recognizing a decision-maker. Though they
deserve our respect in a way that may guide the weight we place on certain con-
siderationsandthusthedecisionswemakeaboutthem, Hamlet andthesequoias
don’ttakedecisionsoutofourhands. Toaﬀordsomeonearight,incontrast,isto
recognize that some matter is not even up to you to decide. It involves respect in
thedeepersenseofacknowledgingauthorityoutsideoneself.







stoodasasphereofactivitythatisspeciallyprotected. Respect, inthiscontext, is
respectfortheother’sactions.
These two conceptions of rights and respect have already made prominent ap-
pearances in earlier chapters, both as contrasts with wrongs. Consider two of the
examplesofrightsthathavebeenconsidered. InChapter8,Iarguedthatweresist
the idea that there are rights concerning each other’s mental activity because we
cannotmakeclaimsonwhatotherpeopledointheirminds. Isuggestedthat,even
344thoughtheremaybedutiesowedtooneanother,therearenotrightsbecausethe
activity of claiming is unavailable. We have no authority over each other’s mental
life. This invoked a conception of rights as claims that we can make on one an-
other. Incontrast,inChapter7,Iarguedthatwrongdoersandnonhumananimals
can have rights, even if they are not in a position to complain. I suggested that
thiswasthecasebecausetherearedutiesthatareowedtotheminsensethatthey
are entitled to certain treatment. This idea that they are entitled to certain treat-
mentwasevidencedbycertainspecialcharacteristicsofourdutiestowardthem. In
particular,thedutieshaveadeonticstructurethatresiststradeoﬀs,aphenomenol-
ogy of being owed to the other and not just to the world at large, and an attached
prerogative of others to make sure that we abide by these duties. This invoked a
conception of rights as entitlements—as special constraints on how we must be
treatedbyothers,i.e.,ascorrelatedwithspecialkindsofduties.
It may appear as though these conceptions are in tension with one another;
rights must be one or the other. I don’t know that this is correct. I think that we
use the word “right” ambiguously to refer to both these ideas, and I don’t know
that anything is gained by privileging one use over the other. In fact, I shall argue
thatthesetwoconceptionsareultimatelydependentononeanother. Ontheone
hand, when one makes a claim, one seems to be claiming something. The natural
thoughtisthatoneisclaimingwhatoneisentitled. Thisdescriptionmakestheac-
tivity of claiming seem to depend on the existence of entitlements to be claimed.
On the other hand, an entitlement isn’t just something that we ought to receive;
itmustbesomethingthatwecanclaimasrightfullyourown. Thiswayofframing
345matters makes it look like entitlements depend on the activity of claiming. In my
opinion, both of these dependence claims are essentially correct and neither one
isprivileged.
Thesetwoconceptions,Ibelieve,representtwoperspectivesonthespecialsig-
nificance that rights play in our deliberations. In this sense, they are two perspec-
tivesonthespecialrespectthatrightsinvolve. Respectingarightholdermeansrec-
ognizing that one does not have authority over that person in some matter. This
can be viewed either as recognizing the other person as the authority or as recog-
nizinglimitationsonone’sownauthority. Forananalogy,recallHart’ssuggestion
that a rightholder is “a small-scale sovereign,” discussed in Chapter 3. A nation
mightrespectits neighbor’ssovereignty either byrecognizingthe othercountry’s
authorityoveritslandsorbyappropriatelyrecognizingthatitsownauthoritydoes
not extend into the other’s territory. The respect involved in rights can be under-
stood in both ways as well—either as recognizing the other as an authority or as
recognizing that there are boundaries which aﬀord the other a sphere of control.
The former involves thinking of rights as claims, and the latter involves thinking
of rights as entitlements. And, as I have said, I think that these two conceptions,










involves having the ability to do something of normative significance. This under-
standingseestherightholderasnotsimplythepassivebearerofnormativesignif-
icance but the active source of normative demands. Although other candidate
activitieshavebeenmentioned,Ibelievethatthedistinctiveaspectofrightsisthat
they involve one party making a claim on the other party. A rightholder can en-
gageintheactivityofclaiming. Moreformally,wemightsay:
X has a right that Y do φ iﬀ Y has a duty to φ and X can claim that Y
performthatduty.





pect of rights. He distinguishes between “performative claiming,” or “claiming
to,” and “propositional claiming,” or “claiming that.” The latter sort of claiming is





In addition to showing that claiming is a distinctive feature of rights, Feinberg
makes a further suggestion. He contends that the activity of claiming is not only
distinctive but, in a sense, explanatorily prior. This second element of Feinberg’s
argument is more or less a rejection of the conception of rights as passive entitle-
ments. Inthisvein,hewrites,
“What is it to have a claim and how is this related to rights? I would
liketosuggestthathavingaclaimconsistsinbeinginapositiontoclaim,
thatis, tomakea claimto orclaimthat. Ifthissuggestioniscorrectit
showsthatprimacyoftheverbaloverthenominativeforms. Itlinks
claims to a kind of activity and obviates the temptation to think of
claims as things, on the model of coins, pencils, and other material
possessionswhichwecancarryinourhippockets.” (1970,p.253)
Thisthought—thatclaimsmustbeunderstoodintermsofanactivity—combines
with the view that rights are valid claims, to yield the idea that having a right in-
volvesbeinginapositiontoclaim. Thatis,rightsarenotentitlements(thingswe
just carry around with us) but rather normative powers to do something, namely
make a valid claim. Feinberg seems to saying that the activity of claiming is, in
some sense, prior to the thing claimed. There being claims depends, for him, on
therebeingtheactivityofclaiming.
I believe that Feinberg’s account is very attractive. It explains a way in which
rightholding can be about more than just having certain properties or interests,
andinsteadabouthavingcertainauthority. Asaresult,Ithinkthatitoﬀersanim-
portantcharacterizationoftherespectowedtoarightholder. But,despitewhole-
348heartedly endorsing these aspects of Feinberg’s argument, I am not convinced of
the explanatory priority. Feinberg seems to think that the activity of claiming is,
insomesense,priortothethingclaimed. Iamunsureaboutthis. Itseemstome




be populated by a variety of moral concepts, including wrongness and duty, but
thatitwilllackrightsaslongasthereisnopracticeofclaiming. Feinbergsuggests
to his reader that a world without rights would be importantly lacking, and that
what would be missing is not any set of norms but rather the activity of making
claimsononeanother.
Among the elements that Feinberg says might exist in a world without rights
is some notion of personal desert, in the sense it might be “fitting” for people to
receive certain treatment. At times Feinberg describes actions based on desert
or fittingness as “supererogatory” or “gratuity,” but this seems to be a bit of a red
herring,makingtheactionsseemoptional. IfFeinbergadmitsintoNowheresville
theconceptofdutyandtheconceptoffittingness,thenthereshouldbenoreason
why the two should not combine. That is, if Feinberg’s argument is correct, then
therecouldbedutiesthatarebasedondesert.
Thiscanstarttolooklikearight,eventhoughwehavesaidnothingaboutclaim-





it’s not fitting. Now suppose that the innocent person asserts this principle as a
reason for us not to send him to prison. Does he thereby make a claim? That
is, does he engage in the activity of claiming by virtue of pointing us to a reason
thatreferencesthedutiesthatariseoutofgivinghimwasitsfitting? Itmayappear
that he does. That is, if there is a concept of desert and individuals can draw our
attentiontothethingsthattheydeserve,thenthatseemstoalreadyintroducethe
practiceofclaiming.¹²
Although not wrong, this is a bit too hasty. Pointing out that one is deserving
of something—that is, pointing out thatanother is under a duty to do something
because it is fitting that you be treated this way—is not exactly the same thing as
claiming it. It is true that, when one makes a claim, what one is doing is pointing
out that one is entitled to something. But not every instance of the pointing out
an entitlement involves making a claim. For example, a guest at a dinner party
might laughingly note, “you really ought to serve the guest first,” with a tone that
makes clear a complete indiﬀerence to whether this rule is followed. Or, to use
an example that has arisen elsewhere, someone might point out that another per-
¹² This is much the same criticism that Jan Narveson raised in his commentary on Feinberg’s
original article. He writes, “I don’t see why people who are the proper and deserving benefi-
ciaries of various duties and benevolent sentiments should not be in a position to point this out
to those whose duties, etc., they are; and why this does not amount to a claim” (1970, p.258).
Narveson’sargumentseemsabittoobroad. Hedescribesthepotentialclaimantsas“theproper







The additional element, I think, is an aspect of authority. Making a claim in-
volvesnotmerelydrawingattentiontoawaythatoneoughttobetreated,butdo-
ing so in an authoritative fashion. When one makes a claim, one does more than
just put something forward for the other person’s consideration with their own
judgment. It is not just making a suggestion or giving advice. Rather, making
a claim implies an authority to tell another person how to act. In this sense, to
makeavalidclaimistoinsertoneselfintothedeliberationofanother. Itinvolves
giving—notjustshowing—anotherareason.
Feinberg’s point, I think, is that the possibility of this special kind of drawing
¹³ One might appeal to the idea of wronging to explain the extra aspect that claiming intro-
duces. Atanumberofpoints,Feinbergdoesappealtothisidea: “Ifthedeservedrewardhadnot
beengivenhimheshouldhavehadnocomplaint,sinceheonlydeservedthereward,asopposed
to having a right to it, or a ground for claiming it as his due.” “[W]hile the sovereign was quite
capable of harming his subjects, he could commit no wrong against them that they could com-













of authoritative assertion, then the duties that are owed to us would all resemble
duties of gratitude—fitting and required, but not claimable. For this reason, he
suggests that, in a world without claiming, there could be duties based on what
is fitting for others, but there couldn’t be rights. Rights cannot exist without the
activityofclaiming.
This active conception of rights connects with one way of thinking about the




that a person “exacts for himself” and that “he can demand from every other hu-
man being.” The respect involved in rights, in this sense, is a respect that can be
asserted or demanded. When someone has a right, others appreciate not merely
that they owe something, but that something can be exacted from them. This is
thekindofrespectthatarightentails.
10.3.2 RightsasEntitlements
As much as Feinberg’s argument illuminates key connections between rights, re-
spect, and claiming, I am not convinced that claiming is more essential to rights
than the thing that is claimed. Consider the diﬀerence between deserving a prize
inacontestinwhichyouarethemostqualifiedentryanddeservingyourpaycheck
at the end of the week in accordance with your employment contract. The latter
352looks like a right; it can be claimed, in Feinberg’s sense, in a way that the former











beenacknowledgedtobehis”(1970, p.251). Inthislight, theactivityofclaiming
seemspredicatedontherebeingthingstowhichweareentitled. Ifweaddedsuch
entitlements to Nowheresville, then it seems like claiming would follow on their
heels.¹⁴ This thought makes it seem like rights aren’t about being able to claim




be said not merely to deserve the good thing but also to have a right to it.” (1970, p.245). This
seems basically correct to me, but I don’t see why Feinberg should believe it. In a sovereign
rights monopoly, satisfying the conditions of a public rule should be like deliberately becoming














this way of thinking about rights and respect—not as the claim, but as the thing
beingclaimed,whichistosay,astheobligationintheotherperson.
As already noted, not all obligations of respect give rise to rights. We can rec-
ognize a piece of art or a natural wonder as having its own non-instrumental nor-
mative significance without thereby according it rights. The question is what is
specialaboutrights. Onepossibilityisthatrightscanbeclaimed. Butmightthere
beanotherpossibilityintermsoftheobligationitself?
One temptation here is to appeal to interests. Obligations of respect for a nor-
matively significant status constitute rights, one might think, only when the obli-
gationsorthestatusadvancetheinterestsoftheotherentity. Artworkandmoun-
tains, even if deserving of respect, cannot be rightholders because they have no
interests. And it may seem that, even for humans, something is only a right if it’s
good for us. If a normative constraint did not on balance advance the interests of
the subject, then, according to many writers, it would not be a right. For exam-
354ple, if the law requires you to enslave me, we would not say that this gives me a
legal right to be enslaved (Cruft, 2004, p.364). Without a rider that a right must
serveitsholder’sinterests,thenonemighthaverightsinvirtueofbeingentitledto
certaintreatmentas,say,“undesirable.”
Despite the intuitive appeal of such examples, I don’t believe that rights must
advancetheirholders’interests. InChapter2,Idiscussedcasesinwhichaperson
seems to have a right that does not serve his or her interests at all—for example,
the farmer who has a right to use a particular fertilizer even though she is com-
pletelyindiﬀerenttoit. Beyondcasesofcompleteindiﬀerence,thereareplausibly
examples of rights that are adverse to our interests. Sophie was granted the right
tochoosewhichofherchildrenwouldlive,althoughitdoesnotseemthatthisad-
vanced her interests. Somewhat diﬀerently, various thinkers have, for example,
posited a right to be punished.¹⁵ It seems to me that that this thought should not
be taken to be either a category mistake or a claim that punishment advances the







¹⁷ I think that these examples actually lend further strength to the idea that having a right in-
volves having a status that generates duties in others. Although neither punishment nor humil-
iation advance the interests of the subject, they presuppose that the subject has a certain status.
Itisappropriatetopunishsomeoneinsofarasthepersonissomeonewhocanberesponsiblefor
hisorheractions. Tosaythatsomeoneshouldnotbepunishedinspiteofhisactionsistodeny
that person status as a responsible agent. In this sense, it is demeaning. But this is not to say
thatpunishmentservestheinterestsoftheperson. Soalthoughtheactualdutygeneratedisnot
valuable to the person, the status on which it is based is valuable. Similarly, being humiliated
355It may still be the case that, in order to count as a rightholder, one must have
interests. Such a constraint makes sense because claiming and acting only make
sense if something has interests. Without interests, making claims or performing




ers, unlike artwork or mountains, are animate—they are capable of acting. Obli-
gations regarding them can count as rights because they can protect their actions
from the interference of others. Rights carve out spheres of activity. This is a dif-
ferentperspectiveonHart’sideaof“asmall-scalesovereign.”Thepointhereisless
about authority and more about boundaries. Rights establish the public bound-
arieswheremyactionscannotinterferewithyouractionsandviceversa.
According to this idea, rights, when thought of as entitlements, are spheres of
protectedactivity. Whenwemakeaclaim,whatweareclaimingisaprotection—
not just any protection but the kind of protection that demarcates when one per-
son’sactionmaynotinterferewithanotherperson’saction. Rightsasentitlements,
does not advance one’s interests. But it does imply that one has a sort of dignity or standing
that is threatened. Although being humiliated is not in one’s interests, it would be, in a sense,
worsetohavethe statusofbeingunabletobehumiliated. This iswhyit makessensetosaythat
one has a right to be humiliated. In this way, these examples diﬀer from Cruft’s duty to enslave
because in that example we assume that it is an undesirable status on which the duty is based.
Onecan,however,reimaginetheexampleinsuchawaythatitnolongerseemsmistakentothink
ofarighttobeenslaved. Suppose,forexample,thatsocietyhadacultureofdueling,inwhichit
was the duty of the winning party to enslave a worthy opponent but let free an unworthy loser.
It seems to me that one might, in such context, speak of someone having a right to be enslaved,









not about the shared rules by which we carve up the realm of action. In this way,
neitherconstituterightsintheentitlementsense.
Fromthis perspective, wecanquiteeasilyunderstandthethoughtthatnonhu-
man animals and disabled humans can have rights, even where they might not be
capable of making claims. Nonhuman animals and disabled humans are animate.
They do things, and our activity can interfere with their doing things. We can, in
thissense,interact withthem. Asaresult,respectforthemisn’tsimplytherespect
that we might owe a great painting—appreciation and preservation of a locus of
value. It is, instead, the respect for something that has a sphere within which it is
entitled to act without interference. It is the respect that goes along with appreci-
atingthatanothercandoasitpleases.
When we engage in the activity of claiming, it seems like there must be some
entitlement like this that we are claiming. In this way, claiming seems to depend
ofthethingclaimed. Butentitlementsalsoseemtodependonclaiming. Why,af-
terall,donormsthatdemarcatespheresofactivityhaveaspecialcharacter? Such
norms are special, one might think, precisely because they mean that the other
357actor’s choices become an authority for us. Put this way, it can look like activity
is important because it implicates claiming. Rights arise because we interact with
one another. This interaction is governed by norms, which, insofar as they apply
to what happens between us, are shared. They aren’t just norms connecting our
actionwithabstractvalue;theyarenormsthatconnectouractionwithotherpeo-




content; claiming depends on there being something to claim. But entitlements,
thethingsthatwecanclaim,aredistinctivebecausetheyrepresentthesortofthing
that could be claimed; they are protections of our sovereign authority. We often
operatewithoneortheotherconceptionofrights,buttheyseemtobeimportantly
connected.
In particular, both ideas describe perspectives on the thought that rights are
about the duties that we owe to other agents out of respect for them. Rights are
about recognizing the normative significance of another. This recognition can be
oftheotherasanauthoritywhomakesdemandsorasanotheractorwhosesphere
ofactivitylimitsone’sown. Eitherway,therightsofothersservetheirfunctionin
¹⁸ It should be clear that the ‘could’ here is not describing a physical capacity. I might not be
able to claim the jackpot because I am unaware of that my ticket is a winner. But this factual
barrier doesn’t mean that I don’t have a right to the jackpot. That right is based on the fact that




358shaping our deliberations ex ante. In this way, both conceptions oﬀer a clear con-




rights. I have argued that rights and wronging are two distinct relationships in
whichpartiesmaystand. Theyarenotflipsidesofthesamecoin. AndIhavetried




I have focused on distinguishing two diﬀerent moral phenomena. But the careful
reader will notice that I have, at various points, acknowledged that we sometimes
operate with various diﬀerent conceptions of rights and wrongs. For example, I
justdescribedtwodiﬀerentconceptionsofrightswithwhichwesometimesoper-
ate. Elsewhere,IhaveacknowledgethatwemightoperatewithwhatIhavecalled
a “placeholder” conception of wronging, which dodges the diﬀerences between
rights and wrongs by stipulation. The fact that we can shift among these diﬀerent
conceptionscanobscureourthinkingabouttheunderlyingmoralphenomena. In




the word is sometimes used in this way. If this is our meaning, then we can say
that the mother in Hart’s example is not wronged, precisely because she has not
hadheranyrightviolated. Here,“wronged”isusedsimplyasaplaceholderforthe
violation of a right. On the other hand, we might also sometimes use the word
“right”tomeanthatthepersonstandstobewronged. Inthisway,wecansaythat





thing, we could not have only placeholder conceptions, as that would be entirely
empty. We must have a substantive conception of one relationship in order to
haveaplaceholderconceptionoftheother. Insofaraswedohavesubstantivecon-
ceptions, the placeholder conceptions mask the fact that there are distinct moral
phenomenathatcountasrightsandwronging. Wehavecommitmentsaboutwhat
rights are and about what wrongs are. There are features of our moral experience
that we think of as rights and that we think of as wrongs. It is these substantive
conceptions that I am focused on. I have argued that, understood in these ways,
rightsandwrongsaredistinctphenomena.
Even limiting ourselves to the substantive conceptions, there may be diﬀerent
conceptions of rights and wrongs. In the previous section, I described two diﬀer-
360entconceptionsofrights. Bothconceptions,Iargued,canbeconsideredwaysof
filling in the sense in which rights involve respect for the rightholder. One con-
ception was active—rights involve the activity of making claims. According to
this conception, rights involve norms that the protected party can assert in a spe-
cial way. The other conception was more passive—rights involve having morally
significant qualities of a certain sort. Rights, in this sense, exist where the norms
protecting something have a special character and wall oﬀ a sphere of protected
activity.




ing in claiming. But other examples can include rights of ordinary human agents,
where some barrier exist to the activity of claiming. For example, as the benefi-
ciary of a blind trust, there may be certain things to which I am entitled—things
that we would think of as my rights—even though it would be quite odd to think
that I have any claims. There is no reason to think that rights of this sort, where




Having described this category of rights in which a passive conception applies
but an active conception does not, one might wonder why a parallel point might
361Active Passive Placeholder
Rights claims entitlements potentialtobewronged
Wrongs complaints mistreatments rightsviolations
Table10.2: Activeandpassiveconceptions
be made about wrongs. Might there be active and passive conceptions of wrong?
In analyzing wronging, I linked it with the activity of making a complaint. I ar-












cording to which nonhuman animals can be wronged, may seem to be in tension
with what I have claimed elsewhere. It might be if this conception is just as im-
portant to us. But I suspect that it is not. I emphasized the active conception of
wronging—wrongs-as-complaints—because I believe that this conception is the
362one that captures wronging’s function in our moral experience. When we say “X
wronged Y,” I think that this is what we ordinarily mean. This is conception of
wrongingthatweordinarilyuse,Ibelieve,becauseitcapturesoursettledcommit-
ments about wronging—commitments about accountability, reactive attitudes,
remedial obligations, practices of apology and forgiveness, and so forth. In short,
complaintsaretheimportantphenomenainourmorallives.
Mistreatment, in contrast, is more like a placeholder. It oﬀers an intelligible
conception of wronging, and one that picks out certain circumstances. But it is
not one, I think, that plays a major role in our moral lives. What matters to us—
what shapes how we relate to one another—is wronging understood in terms of
complaints.
Mycentralargumentisabouttheconnection,orlackthereof,betweenourfun-
damental moral phenomena. The arguments that I have oﬀered have sought to
show that what matters to us about rights does not always line up with what mat-
terstousaboutwronging. Asaresult,Ihavetriedtoshowthatwrongs,understood





tinct phenomena, one might still wonder whether there is not some underlying
connection. Afterall,thereseemstobealargeamountofoverlapbetweenthem.
363Atthebeginningofthischapter,Ioﬀeredavenndiagramofsomeofthecasesthat
hadbeen considered. This diagramshowed a substantialregion of overlap, which
containedstandardexamplesofrightsandwronging. Thisoverlapreflectsthefact
that rights violations typically count as wrongs and many wrongs result from the
violation of a right. Surely this is not a coincidence. Even if rights and wronging
docomeapartinthewaysthatIhavedescribed, theremustbeanexplanationfor
whytheysofrequentlycometogether.
I believe that the above sketches of wrongs and rights oﬀer an explanation for
this overlap. Wrongs, I suggested, arise where an action cannot be justified to
someone who has a stake in that action. Rights, in contrast, arise where respect
for another person generates a special kind of norm regarding how that person
ought to be treated. Considerations about what one ought to do figure in both
stories, albeit diﬀerently. For wrongs, such considerations matter to the question
of whether an action could be justified to the other person. Rights, in contrast,
involveaspecialsubsetofconsiderationsaboutwhatweoughttodo.
Because normative considerations play a role in both stories, they can explain
why wrongs and rights so often come alongside one another. The same consid-
erations that generate a right will often also be the crucial element in whether an
action is justifiable. For example, if you ought not physically assault another hu-
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I have argued that this is not the only way. I might wrong you by failing to
do what I ought, and thereby being unable to oﬀer you justification for the harm







is to illustrate how the same elements can play a role in both rights and wrongs.
Butthereareimportantelementsofmyaccountthatthisdiagramleavesout. First,
theconsiderationsthatgiverisetorightsare,Ihavesuggested,onlyasubsetofthe
considerations that may bear on questions of justification and wronging. For ex-
ample,thefactthatyoupromisedtocareformymothermaynotgiverisetoaright
365in her, and yet it may still explain why a failure cannot be justified to her. So the
diagramshouldnotbetakentoimplythatthesameconsiderationsalwaysgiverise
to both rights and wrongings. Second, the diagram leaves out important features
ofrightsandwrongs. Forexample,Iarguedthatwrongsinvolvenotmerelyafail-




should hardly be surprising. Itis what makesthemboth aspectsof our ethicalex-
perience. But this common element should not, I have argued, lead us to think
thatthesetwophenomenaarenecessarilyreflectionsofoneanother. Rather,they
eachplayimportantlydiﬀerentrolesinourethicallives.
366The surface of the earth is soft and impressible by the feet of




Distinguishingmoral relationsas expostandex antemayseemrather
abstract. Forthisreason,Iwanttoconcludebysketchingthepracticalsignificance
of the distinction. Although how we categorize moral phenomena can appear
purelyacademic,thisappearancecouldnotbefurtherfromthetruth. Rightsand
wrongs represent ways that we relate to one another in our everyday lives. They
367are bound up with a wealth of practices and understandings. When it is appro-
priate to deploy these practices and understandings is a matter of great practical
importance.
I argued that, by separating rights and wronging, we can accommodate two
competing pulls, found in both our theories and our rich practical commitments
concerningrightsandwrongings. Withthewilltheory,wecanunderstandrights
as concerned with an ability to exert normative control over someone else’s con-





On the other hand, with the interest theory, we can say that we are wronged
when someone violates a norm that would have protected our interests. In this
way, interpersonal morality involves the idea that we owe it those aﬀected by our




What is at stake here is hardly just a matter of labeling. It involves questions
of who can waive or demand performance, complain or forgive, seek compensa-
tion, and so on. And it also involves questions about the source and stringency
of the obligation and the costs andramifications of its violation. Inseeking toan-
368swer practical questions like these—which arise in legal, political, and everyday
contexts—people routinely draw inferences between rights and wrongs as a mat-
terofconceptualentailment. Ifmyargumentiscorrect,thentheseinferencesare
oftenmisguided.
On the one hand, a familiar form of argument infers that a party cannot be
wrongedifthatthatpartydidnotholdarightinitially. Inlaw,forexample,atort-
feasor may escape liability by arguing that the injured party was not the holder of
the right that was violated. This argument is available because of the framework
articulated by Cardozo in Palsgraf, which essentially relies on the necessary con-
nection of wrongs with rights violations. Consider a typical example of how this
plays out.¹ A physical therapist allegedly used highly atypical treatment methods
that negligently implanted false memories of sexual abuse in the patient’s mind.
Thepatient’sfather,againstwhomtheseallegationsofabuseweremade,attempted
to sue the physical therapist. The court held that, because the physical therapist
did not owe a duty to the father, who was merely a third party, the father could
not bring a complaint. Having a right is viewed as prerequisite to having stand-







²Alderman v. United States,394U.S.165,169n.2,174(1969).
369The same mistaken inference occurs outside the law as well. In political dis-
course, it is sometimes argued that a disadvantaged group can have no complaint
against a given social arrangement on the grounds that the group has no right to
assistance.³ Eveninpersonalinteractions,onemightthinkthatsomeonecanhave
no complaint at being spurned because he or she had no right to aﬀections or
friendship.⁴ If my contention is correct, then all of these inferences are invalid.
Lackingarightdoesnotprecludethepossibilitythatonehasbeenwronged.
Theoppositeinference—fromwrongstorights—isequallymistaken. Thereis
a temptation to think that every wrong can be traced to a rights violation. Those
concerned with injustice may therefore be inclined to posit rights. The law, for
example,positsa“righttoconsortium,”whichisessentiallyalegalfictionconjured
up for the sake of acknowledging certain wrongs.⁵ And there is a temptation to
saythatparents,whenfacedwiththeinjuryordeathoftheirchild,havearightnot
³ To pick on someone, consider Jon Elster’s argument in “Is There (or Should There Be)





those who society leaves unemployed. It may be—indeed, I suspect it is—the agenda of those
whofavorarighttoworktosuggestthesenseinwhichsocietyfailstodorightbythosewhoare
leftunemployed. ItseemstomethatElster’sargumentdoeslittletoaddressthisquestion.
⁴ A common response to a perceived wrong is to say or think, “I didn’t owe you anything.”
I believe that this retort is based on a mistake, shifting the issue to a diﬀerent question. This is
why it feels cruel. It is the same inferences seen from the other side that bothers Levin in Anna






been the one whose rights were not properly respected, so we simply pretend that that is what
happened.






nections with one another are not simply diﬀerent perspectives on the same un-
derlying moral relation. Being wronged and having a right are not opposite sides
ofthesamecoin. Instead,theyrepresenttwodiﬀerentwaysinwhichpersonscan
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